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Summary  
  
This thesis is concerned with the intentions and effects of subsidised trade within 
the Eastern bloc.  It argues that the core Soviet objective in Eastern Europe from the Thaw 
onwards was not exploitation for economic gain; subsidisation in return for political 
concessions; or an ideologically-driven desire for socialist integration, but instead to 
secure the dependence of the smaller socialist economies on the USSR.  It is argued that 
advances can be made on existing literature by employing a concept of dependence which 
is capable of linking-up the primarily political concerns that motivated socialist 
international economic policy with the economic consequences for development that 
resulted.  In order to accomplish this, a revised version of dependency theory (DT) formed 
through a critique of classical dependency work is used.  
DT is proposed as a starting-point for two reasons: firstly it was concerned to look 
at the interrelation between international processes and national development, a notable 
absence from the literature on Eastern bloc trade, and secondly the subsidised nature of 
this trade seems to beg the application of a theory which stresses the significance of 
international political and economic asymmetries.  
The type of dependency analysis proposed here differs from classical DT in 
several ways, most centrally in that an ideal-typical approach is used which allows for 
open-ended investigation of reciprocal influence between centre/periphery, as well as the 
recognition of significant differences between Soviet-type and developed market 
economies by refraining from making positive statements about either the nature of 
centre/periphery in themselves or their interactions.  The impetus for this reformulation 
comes from the result of the literature review that some concept of dependence could help 
to fully articulate the consequences for development of Eastern bloc trade relations in the 
context of East-West antagonism. 
    
Oliver Weiss  
‘Dependency Theory and Eastern Bloc Trade: Reformulating a Forgotten Paradigm’  
Thesis Submitted for the Fulfilment of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in  
International Relations  
University of Sussex  
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Trade and Development in the Eastern bloc  
  
1. Introduction  
  
Shonfield (1968) recounts a joke about a Hungarian trade official who 
triumphantly announces to a colleague that he has had a successful day in his role as a 
representative of his country’s trade agency: “A marvellous day!  I managed to export a 
cat under the trade agreement with our Socialist neighbour, X, for $50,000”.  The second 
official answers, “You can’t really mean it–one cat?”.  “It's true”, replies the first, “and 
that’s not the end of it.  I managed to import two dogs for $60,000, as well!”.  As a concise 
expression of the absurd situation where quantitative augmentations of physical flows of 
commodities across borders within the bloc were celebrated by officials in spite of the 
limited demand for such commodities in their home markets, the joke is extremely 
apposite.  
This thesis offers a reinterpretation from existing data of the structure of trade 
between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and its consequences for development 
during the Cold War.  It argues that part of the post-Stalin reconstruction of Soviet power 
in Eastern Europe–initially in response to the Marshall Plan and its reinforcement of 
capitalism in Western Europe–was the introduction of economic incentives, specifically 
subsidised trade, which led to a particular development process taking place within the 
bloc, the contradictions to which became apparent from the 1970s onwards.  In this thesis, 
contradictions are understood to be results inherent in the processes making up a particular 
phenomenon which simultaneously undermine the stability of the phenomenon itself.  
This thesis traces the changing interaction between trade and development within the bloc 
over the Cold War period and situates this regional dynamic within the broader 
geopolitical context which is essential for understanding the origin and development of 
intra-socialist economic relations. 
I argue that the key phases of the geopolitical antagonism of the Cold War as it 
related to intra-bloc trade which will be included in the historical narrative given in later 
chapters were as follows.  Firstly, the unclear geopolitical contours of the period 1945-
47, as the war-time alliance between the Soviet Union and the Western powers, began to 
unravel is the first relevant period, since it was at this time that the Eastern bloc began to 
emerge.  1947-53 was the period in which Stalin’s domination of the bloc formed a key 
part of early militarised Cold War antagonism; the pronounced military element to both 
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Soviet domestic and international economic relations will later be argued to be of 
relevance for the development of intra-socialist trade, most notably the central position 
established for the defence industry in the Soviet economic system from this point 
onwards.  1953-57 is considered to be a period of general crisis following the death of 
Stalin and the recognised need for change in both relations with the West and within the 
bloc.  It was from this conjuncture that the trade system which facilitated a unique form 
of dependent development in the bloc emerged, and so these developments will be focused 
on in detail in chapter 4. 
I argue that the maintenance of this trade system right until 1991, with only a 
partial reform of the price mechanism in 1975, means that this early period is the most 
worthy of examination; however, key shifts in the Cold War after this period also need to 
be covered as they threw light on the changing significance of bloc trade.  The most 
significant features of the later decades to be focused on include: the genuine sense that 
socialism could compete with capitalism in the 1950s and 1960s; the relative success of 
the USSR in the Third World in the 1970s; the increased East-West trade fostered by 
détente; and the return of overtly militarised inter-bloc relations and the general stagnation 
of the socialist bloc in the 1980s.  The periodization of trade and development of the 
Eastern bloc given in chapter 4 aims to show how these international developments 
interrelated to the international economic relations within the bloc this thesis aims to 
elucidate. 
Categorising trading partners in terms of the Cold War distinction between East, 
West, and South, in general Eastern bloc countries conducted around 60% of their trade 
with other members of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), 30% with 
developed market economies (DMEs), and 10% with the developing world.  Invariably 
trade with the Soviet Union took-up a larger share than trade with any other single partner, 
and the commodity composition and price structure of this exchange implied substantial 
net transfers from the USSR to Eastern Europe (see table 14 for price data specific to 
Hungary illustrating this pattern).  Whilst the existence of implicit Soviet subsidies is 
rarely questioned, as the literature review will make clear there is substantial disagreement 
over their interpretation.  As Orlowski (1993) points out, such indirect trade transfers are 
not unique to socialism, but their central place in the entire system of intra-socialist trade, 
as well as the systematic nature of the transfers, was exceptional.  This thesis will argue 
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that Soviet geopolitical concerns–such as the maintenance of communist power in Eastern 
Europe; the security concerns stemming from the hostile international environment during 
the Cold War; the Soviet desire to assert primacy within the world communist movement; 
and central place of military production in the Soviet economic system–are vital for 
understanding this. 
This thesis constructs an international political economy of this regional system in 
terms of a revised version of dependency theory (DT) which sees the Eastern bloc as a 
centre/periphery arrangement with an internal development dynamic which was none-the-
less subject to external economic and geopolitical influences as well.  Although the 
international political dynamic of the Cold War in itself is outside the scope of this thesis, 
given that Cold War context and the changing geopolitics of East-West relations are 
argued to be essential to conceptualising the origins and development of CMEA, the 
interrelation between intra-bloc and global factors is given a central place in the historical 
narrative and is conceptually secured as part of the reformulation of DT proposed in the 
theoretical chapter.  In this light the uneven nature of capitalist development outside of 
the bloc–particularly the technological backwardness of the bloc as a whole in relation to 
the West and how this related to CMEA–will be discussed, as this comparison exposes a 
key contradiction in the developmental results of the Soviet strategy of subsidised trade.  
In this way the thesis attempts to consciously incorporation of how the dynamics of the 
uneven capitalist environment outside CMEA interacted with intra-socialist dynamics, 
and the question of how to do this without resorting to determinism is focused upon in 
chapter 3. 
Poznanski (1988) raises the fundamental puzzle of Soviet economic policy 
towards Eastern Europe during the Cold War.  
  
For several years the annual subsidy calculated by Marrese and Vanous [whose 
ground-breaking work will be introduced later] exceeded total Soviet imports of 
Western products, and was far above the transfers provided by any other single 
economy to any region in the world (including the US involvement in the Middle  
East).  Why should the Soviet Union shoulder such an enormous burden, given 
that it is a poorer country than most of its CMEA partners in Europe, and that it 
has enough political leverage over those countries not to allow such a tremendous 
outflow of resources [?] (p.290).  
  
In examining this puzzle, this thesis aims to make two contributions: firstly that the 
methodological and theoretical framework presented in chapter 3 is an original 
  
13  
  
formulation of DT which can be distinguished from prior work in the field, and secondly 
the substantiation of the claim that trade within the bloc can be analysed as resulting in a 
historically-specific form of dependent development.  
The central research questions are as follows:  
  
1. What were the intentions and effects of Soviet trade policy with Eastern Europe 
between 1945-89?  
  
2. Can DT be developed through a consideration of this historical case?  
 
A series of secondary research questions will be used in order to open-up these wider 
concerns:  
  
1. Taking into account the high volume of trade within the bloc, what were the 
dynamics of economic interaction between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe?  
  
2. How did the structure of trade in terms of prices, quantities, and commodity 
composition relate to development?  
  
3. What were the implications of this system of international economic relations for 
structures of production in Hungary, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union?  
 
4. How did this regional system of trade and development relate to the wider 
geopolitical context of the Cold War? 
  
Since this thesis consciously tries to incorporate the international context outside 
of CMEA into the main argument about intra-bloc trade and development, it is necessary 
to begin to specify how this will be approached, with fuller details provided in the 
theoretical chapter.  Essentially, the two key components of the international context 
outside the bloc–the capitalist world market and uneven capitalist development, and the 
geopolitics of the Cold War–are both important for understanding CMEA in different 
ways.  The geopolitical context of the Cold War is claimed to be necessary in order to 
explain the extra-economic significance of Soviet trade policy with the Eastern bloc, and 
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for this reason this issue is presented as a research question in its own right.  The uneven 
nature of capitalist development outside the bloc is argued to be significant chiefly (but 
not exclusively) in the sense that trade dynamics internal to CMEA gave development in 
the bloc a particular character which fundamentally influenced the type of engagements 
with and the overall relation in which the bloc stood to the capitalist world market.  
Accordingly, international economic relations outside CMEA are included where 
appropriate to highlight the specificities of development within the bloc, but it is the 
geopolitics of the Cold War which is argued to be the most significant element of the 
international context for the purpose of explaining the character and operation of CMEA.  
These two issues together form part of the global context in which it is vital to place 
CMEA if its peculiarities are to be fully comprehended.   
In order to provide answers to these questions, a revised version of DT will be 
used which, it is suggested, can improve on existing literature in International Relations 
(IR) and East European area studies.  As the most coherent account from the existing 
literature, the subsidisation thesis is emphasised from this point of view; I argue that while 
this position can account for the initial decision to subsidise trade with Eastern Europe, it 
struggles to explain the continuation of the subsidies into the 1970s and 1980s in the face 
of dramatically rising costs and pays insufficient attention to the nuances of the political-
economic and geopolitical dimensions of the puzzle.  Another viable alternative, which 
will be termed the East European thesis, contains valuable empirical information but 
doesn’t offer a systematic theoretical framework for the interpretation of this material.  I 
argue that by approaching the empirical material from the perspective of the dependency 
tradition, both that a gap in the area studies literature can be identified and that DT can be 
reformulated in a useful and potentially transferable way.  
This thesis was prepared and submitted in an IR department, and so it is important 
that both the historical case and the theory chosen to analyse it are today relatively rarely 
discussed within IR or its subfield International Political Economy (IPE).  In terms of 
drawing-out why it is interesting to study Eastern bloc trade in an IR context, the first 
theme to be highlighted is that in the post-Cold War, multi-polar international system, 
regional development dynamics have increasingly come to replace global narratives of 
‘the West and the rest’.  Theoretical studies which take regional development dynamics 
and non-Eurocentric world history seriously are making major contributions to 
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understandings of world politics, and this thesis shares something in common with these 
efforts.  IR is a subject with a rightly prized theoretical diversity, and since a significant 
part of this thesis’ contribution is to DT as a theoretical tradition, this also speaks of the 
wider significance of this study for IR/IPE.  As will be returned to specifically in the 
concluding chapter, the version of DT developed here could potentially be applicable 
elsewhere, and in this way the thesis aims to make a general case for the continuing 
relevance of certain DT categories for the analysis of trade and development.  
  
2. Socialist International Economic Relations  
  
As a theoretical concern, the Soviet Union’s subsidised trade relations with Eastern 
Europe stand as a unique example of a relatively underdeveloped centre interacting with a 
set of comparatively advanced satellites.  For this reason Dawisha (1990) posed the 
rhetorical question whether any other examples of an ‘impoverished’ imperial centre 
transferring resources outwards to its dependencies ever existed before.  Similarly, Roberts 
(1999), has claimed, ‘The Soviet ‘empire’ in eastern Europe was, as many writers have 
pointed out, very strange indeed – an empire in which the metropolitan power was 
economically exploited by the ‘colonies’’ (p.49).  I argue that the key to this puzzle can be 
found in the DT, and more specifically in the theoretical concept of dependent 
development once it is reformulated in such a way that contradictory dynamics of 
international development–specifically the coerced industrialisation of peripheries by the 
centre–can be accounted for in terms of geopolitical exigencies.  The literature review and 
theoretical chapters to follow will further substantiate this point in relation to other 
frameworks. 
It should also be made clear from the start that whilst I agree with the broad 
perspective implicit in the above statements about the peculiar nature of international 
economic relations within the bloc, a number of qualifications of these general 
characterisations are needed in terms of challenging the relatively homogenous image of 
Eastern Europe during the Cold War which they imply.  These kind of assessments could 
be taken as implying that the East European economies as a group were substantially more 
advanced than the USSR.  From a theoretical perspective which focuses on the 
interrelation between trade and development, it is necessary to point out that while this 
was the case for East Germany and Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and all 
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but the most Western regions of Poland were substantially less industrialised than the 
USSR at the establishment of communist power.  It is highly significant that the system of 
planned economy was established in the USSR and different parts of Eastern Europe when 
they were at different stages of economic development; i.e. Russia in 1917 was 
substantially less industrialised than parts of Eastern Europe in 1945, and therefore the task 
of socialist construction began from a much higher base in some parts of Eastern Europe.  
This meant the imposition of the Soviet model of central planning and the later system of 
subsidised trade had different effects across the region.  What Dawisha and Roberts can 
be agreed with about is that the Soviet Union didn’t enjoy a comprehensive developmental 
advantage which could have justified its central role in the system on purely economic 
grounds.  This makes it essential to consider the geopolitical factors at play which 
influenced the way the Soviet Union engaged in economic relations with Eastern Europe, 
and thus shaped the origin and development of intra-bloc economic relations. 
It is useful to start with a brief description of the political economy of Soviet 
foreign economic relations.  Firstly it should be recognised that the goals, institutions, and 
mechanisms of planned economies differ fundamentally from those of DMEs.  Here only 
those elements which affected international economic relations are considered; this means 
directing attention towards nationalised ownership of the means of production and the 
state monopoly of foreign trade.  In addition to this, the geopolitically-influenced nature 
of the Soviet economy due to its existence in a capitalist world-system should also be 
mentioned.  Soviet industrialisation was carried out explicitly to provide the kind of 
industrial base which would be capable of providing for a modern military, and the 
particular character given to the Soviet economy by the perceived necessity of achieving 
this goal as quickly as possible and at any cost under Stalin remained in place throughout 
the Cold War.  Specifically, the special status given to heavy industries, armaments 
production and military technology gave the Soviet economy characteristics which 
influenced its engagement with CMEA in several ways.  In addition to this, the export of 
the Soviet model of industrial development, with its central focus on producer goods, to 
Eastern Europe will also be returned to later. 
Since Soviet production was planned towards meeting targets, and not maximising 
profitability, retail prices were stable and changes in production methods were rare.  
Although not all exchanges involved direct controls, all prices were centrally fixed, and 
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important products relating mainly to defence, capital goods, and foreign trade were 
subject to direct control by state agencies.  Planners determined output targets, delivery 
dates, and told enterprises who to procure inputs from and where to ship finished products.  
Since decisions were taken paying little attention to the structure of demand, shortages of 
high-demand goods and surpluses of things no-one wanted were common.  State subsidies 
concealed losses by inefficient producers, and targets to produce more and more with little 
consideration of quality or consumer preference generated widespread waste and 
inefficiency.  
As a result of these problems, the question of reform became a characteristic theme 
post-Stalin in both the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.  The different nature of these 
reform paths and how they interrelated to both the dynamics of intra-bloc and East-West 
relations will be described in later chapters.  In general, the reforms were usually partial, 
partly due to the fact that full employment and stable prices, the two main macroeconomic 
goals the planners were working towards, were achieved but at relatively low levels of 
comparative efficiency, and partly due to the ability of vested interests to maintain the 
status quo.  The increased affluence enjoyed from the 1950s onwards (again in relative 
terms) made the planning process much more complex than it had been in the 1930s when 
the bureaucracy had administered the first wave of industrialisation centred around heavy 
industry and armaments production.  For this reason, attention must be directed towards 
conflicts of interest between different elements of the nomenklatura present in the party, 
state bureaucracies and management positions in industry. 
The industrialisation of the 1930s had involved what has since been termed 
extensive development–quantitative augmentation by adding more land, labour, or 
capital–and the bureaucracy was to prove either incapable or unwilling to oversee a move 
towards intensive development through raising factor productivity via technological or 
organisational innovation.  The distinction between the two development strategies 
exposed a fundamental weakness which became increasingly apparent in the post-war 
period: the failure to innovate in the way that competition (in theory at least) forces 
Western firms to resulted in technological stagnation, and with fewer new inputs available 
to be added into the production process, growth necessarily slowed.  I will later argue that 
the type of dependent development which took place in the bloc buttressed by a system 
of subsidised trade was contradictory partly because it could only generate extensive 
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growth, while the increased economic interaction with the West from détente onwards 
highlighted the necessity of moving towards intensive growth.  Arguably this lack of 
technological dynamism was because in spite of significant scientific expertise, 
innovation is essentially a risk-driven activity, and the system of planned targets provided 
no incentive for managers to employ new, and therefore untried, technologies.  As such, 
central planning and the conflicts of interest around it emerges as a key domestic 
institution which must be understood if both the nature of and the links between Soviet-
type economies are to be properly grasped. 
The fact that the dynamic of intra-bloc relations tended to discourage fundamental 
reforms of the planning mechanism–a necessity of intensive growth–whilst increased 
East-West trade in the 1960s and early 1970s made the need for such reforms clear 
represents a key contradiction between the logic of dependent development within the 
bloc and the possibility of increased participation in the world economy which will be 
returned to in the historical chapters.  The manner in which this claim is to be substantiated 
makes clear the dual way in which the extra-CMEA international context is included by 
this thesis; I argue Cold War geopolitics are essential to understanding the origin and 
evolution of CMEA as a discrete grouping, and the particular way in which the perceived 
geopolitical necessity of binding the satellites to the Soviet centre was translated after 
Stalin into a unique system of trade and development within the bloc fundamentally 
influenced the relation of the socialist economies to the world market.  From the mid-
1950s onwards, Soviet leaders saw the benefits to increased commercial relations with 
the West, both in economic terms and as a material support to peaceful co-existence with 
the leading capitalist states.  In this way, the issue of changing Soviet perspectives on the 
‘cost/benefit ratio’ of subsidised trade within the bloc needs to be brought into the 
narrative. 
With the appearance of multiple socialist states after 1945, three general options 
for international economic policy could be identified: complete autarchy (e.g. the Soviet 
Union till the 1950s, China between 1960-1977); trade and integration with other socialist 
countries (e.g. Eastern Europe, Mongolia, Cuba, and Vietnam); or integration into world 
markets (e.g. Yugoslavia after 1948, China after 1978).  This thesis is primarily concerned 
to examine the developmental consequences of the second strategy and how geopolitical 
and economic pressures from outside the bloc related to this.  The forum within which the 
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Eastern bloc economies’ international economic relations took shape needs to be 
introduced.  Although noting that CMEA was never synonymous with the socialist bloc 
as a whole, the organisation never-the-less provides a convenient empirical point of 
departure.  Created in 1949, the politics of who could become a full member, who had 
observer status, and who was excluded entirely reinforce the impression that CMEA 
served a political as well as an economic purpose.  ‘The six’ (Hungary, Czechoslovakia, 
East Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, Rumania) and their relations with the Soviet Union are 
the main object of inquiry, although a discussion of non-aligned Yugoslavia’s trade and 
development is included to provide a comparative case.  Whilst there are things that can 
be said in general about this group, their lack of homogeneity in terms of both levels of 
industrial development and the differing subsidies they received from the USSR (see table 
1 in appendix) means care must be taken to avoid the kind of structural generalisations 
which will later be argued to have been problematic in DT. 
It needs to be mentioned that the monopoly of economic decision-making 
exercised by the Soviet state was not as total as sometimes presumed.  The totalitarian 
state model (associated with Sovietologists like Friedrich and Brzezinski, 1961) which 
was prevalent in the West in the first decades of the Cold War was gradually replaced by 
the view that there was substantial political conflict within socialist societies, and that in 
some sense their economic problems stemmed from the weakness of the centre, rather 
than its strength.  The totalitarian state approach has been substantially revised since 1991 
due to the work of Fitzpatrick (1992), Kotkin (1995), and others who emphasised the 
frequent inability of the party-state apparatus to control social life as totally as had 
previously been assumed.  With the demise of the totalitarian state thesis, the need to 
accept the diversity of social struggles around the state, bureaucracy, party administration, 
nomenklatura practices, enterprise management, etc. has been fully established, and this 
involves giving social contests over resource utilisation a central place in the political 
economy of socialism.  
This necessitates conceptualising economic structures within and between 
socialist societies as essentially contested, and therefore if some structures were 
maintained through the period in question then the agency behind their reproduction also 
needs to be investigated.  The most significant groups whose agency was of relevance 
were the party, state bureaucracy, and firms across the bloc.  These are not to be claimed 
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to be unitary actors, merely as useful groupings who can be seen to have had relatively 
discrete interests which influenced their choices.  These are examples of elite agency; the 
focus on long-run development tendencies means attention is directed here and away from 
less powerful agency, such as labour struggles.  It also needs to be mentioned that it will 
be necessary to sometimes give great weight to the agency of individuals like Stalin, 
Khrushchev or Tito.  To be clear, this is not recourse to the so-called ‘great man’ theory 
of history, since the discussion of such individuals is always grounded in the analysis of 
groups, institutions and their relation to economic development.  This outline is generally 
accepted in East European area studies; what is often missing from such accounts is the 
fundamentally international nature of the pressures acting upon these agents in terms of 
the variable interactions of party, state and enterprises.  This is a significant example of 
where the DT emphasis on constructing an international political economy of trade and 
development can fill gaps in the area studies literature.  Such a perspective can allow local 
developments to be viewed not in isolation from the international context which may lead 
to significant components of the interests and material basis of these groups being 
consequently understudied. 
 
3. The Argument  
  
Following this introduction, chapter 2 provides a literature review in which two 
general motifs are focused on: the binary distinction between politics and economics 
which is implicit in many interpretations–either political interests trumped economic 
considerations (subsidisation), or Soviet economic interests overrode political 
considerations (exploitation)–is unhelpful in explaining the peculiar phenomena of intra-
CMEA trade over the whole period in question, and many existing accounts do not 
adequately relate these features to developmental consequences.  Attention must be paid 
to the complex intertwining of (geo)political, economic and also ideological 
considerations; I argue that the dependency tradition has within it valuable elements 
which can be reformulated to accomplish this. 
 Chapter 3 gives a concise statement of the reformulation proposed to do this.  It is 
firstly concerned with questions of methodology, by which is understood a system of 
concepts which provide a clear guide to practical research upon which a theoretical 
framework can be based, before moving onto the explicit critique and reformulation of 
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DT.  In establishing the possibility of a useful reformulation, chapter 3 introduces and 
critiques the two main variants of DT; those associated with Frank, whose work needs to 
be covered as he is by far the best known proponent of DT, and Cardoso.  Agreeing with 
Larrain (1998) that, ‘although less well-known than [Frank and Wallerstein]… Cardoso 
and Faletto’s approach is by far the most cogent, balanced and complete analysis of 
dependency that has appeared so far’ (p.159), the chapter makes a case of the continued 
relevance of the category of dependent development over and above other concepts often 
associated with the dependency tradition (namely unequal exchange and 
underdevelopment).  The chapter culminates in a reconstruction of dependent 
development as an ideal-type and an elaboration of what this means for the ensuing 
historical chapters. 
Chapter 4 considers what the relationship between the USSR and the six looks like 
once the framework presented in the previous chapter is used to organise the empirical 
material.  This account is the necessary complement to the criticisms offered in the 
literature review and provides the regional and global context within which nationally-
specific developments need to be seen.  This chapter has the task of identifying and 
charting the course of what is argued to be a process of dependent development within 
the Eastern bloc whilst setting this phenomena in the changing context of Cold War intra-
bloc rivalry, the geopolitical considerations of which are ultimately evoked as a key factor 
explaining both the instigation of the system, the contradictions in its operation, and the 
extra-economic significance attached to it by the USSR.  The doctrine of ‘Socialism in 
one country’ needs to be mentioned in this regard, both because it helps to unpick the 
interrelation between geopolitical and ideological factors behind Soviet policy, and since 
the export to Eastern Europe of the autarchic model associated with it led to economic 
problems in terms of parallel development which CMEA had to address. 
Bearing in mind the criticism of DT that social relations tended to be excluded in 
favour of structural determinism, the next three chapters (5, 6, and 7) will show how the 
theory can be operationalized to analyse nationally specific development trajectories.  
Chapter 5 focuses on industrialisation within the USSR under Stalin and argues that there 
are significant parallels between this and the later expansion of international economic 
relations in the 1950s, and that study of this period helps to explain why CMEA 
integration took place in the way it did.  Further, the intertwining of geopolitical and 
ideological considerations identified in Soviet policy of this period will be argued to be 
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similar to the mix of geopolitical and ideological concerns behind the creation of the 
unique international trade system established in the 1950s.  In both instances, ideological 
justifications for essentially geopolitical policies were presented which serve to illustrate 
the secondary and derivative role of ideology in relation to geopolitics.  The second part 
of the chapter will focus on the unintended consequences of the reform of CMEA trade 
in the 1950s in terms of the necessary allocation of Soviet resources to meet the export 
requirements that resulted.  This is not to claim that this was the main determinant of 
investment allocation, rather that the trade relations internal to CMEA can be seen to have 
affected the allocation of investment and development in all countries involved, including 
the ‘centre’.  This line of inquiry represents a significant theoretical break with the DT 
tradition.  The return to militarised inter-bloc rivalry in the 1980s, and especially the 
economic costs this placed on the USSR, are also discussed at this point.   
Chapter 6 gives an analysis of Hungarian development in the context of the 
Eastern bloc and is aimed at answering the question of how did participation in CMEA 
affect the contested process of economic reform?  As a reformed and to some extent 
decentralised market socialist economy, Hungary participated in the world economy 
relatively more than other CMEA members.  In this way Hungary provides an ideal 
illustration of the contradiction between the two orientations, either towards the world 
economy or inwards to the rest of CMEA, in that the demands of the two orientations can 
be seen to have incentivised different and sometimes directly opposed economic 
behaviour.  This is essential to understanding the course of the reforms, and the specific 
nature of Hungarian society (especially conflicts of interest between different sections of 
the Hungarian nomenklatura) will be discussed in order to highlight what was distinctive 
to struggles around dependent development in Hungary.  Instead of focusing on the 
nomenklatura system in general, emphasis will be placed on the unusual relation between 
intellectuals and technically-educated people and the Hungarian nomenklatura (Frentzel-
Zagorska, 1990). 
In chapter 7, Yugoslavia, as the originator of both the market socialist model and 
of the example of developing socialism outside of the USSR’s sphere of influence, will 
be used as a comparative case.  Arguably the fact that Yugoslavia evolved from the 
traditional planning model makes it an ideal comparative case-study for any Eastern bloc 
economy, but this is especially true of Hungary who went farthest towards market 
socialism whilst remaining within CMEA.  The question these chapters attempt to 
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answer–and one that is highly significant from a DT perspective–thus becomes, what did 
it mean to reform a planned economy inside or outside CMEA and with necessarily 
different relations to CMEA and the world economy?  This chapter thus allows some 
perspective on the relative significance of factors internal to the bloc to be offered on the 
grounds that Yugoslavia was outside the dependent development dynamic of CMEA and 
faced a different geopolitical context. 
In terms of making an assessment of strengths and weaknesses, I would propose 
the clearly stated and consistently applied theoretical framework to be the study’s main 
virtue.  In terms of weaknesses, the most obvious thing is the lack of primary evidence.  
However, the academic context in which the thesis was prepared should be taken into 
account–language skills and archival/interview fieldwork are not as central to IR as they 
are within area studies.  Conversely, many area studies projects do not have a detailed or 
explicit theoretical framework.  Further to this, several points can be made to justify the 
lack of fieldwork: all the data needed for this study have been known for many years (the 
point is to reinterpret known information in the light of a new framework), and secondly, 
there seems little reason to believe any new information is out there to be found.  
Commenting on Stone’s (1996) field-work, Sanchez-Sibony (2009) has claimed,   
  
Moreover, [Stone’s] archival material was vetted by extensive interviews with 
officials from many of the countries involved, making Stone’s research 
unsurpassable under current conditions [of restricted access to previously open 
archives].   The material to be found in Gosplan, the Council of Ministers and 
other agencies still open to the researcher merely replicates his findings and offers, 
in my experience, little additional insights into the matter (p.10). 
 
This suggests that existing data should be considered sufficient as it is highly unlikely 
new information will come to light which would fundamentally alter the picture.  
 
4. Dependency Theory and Eastern Bloc Trade  
  
Having given some context to the research questions presented above, it is 
necessary to discuss what the dependency tradition is and why it is proposed as capable 
of adding to the literature.  The essentials of the dependency approach, which will be 
introduced and critiqued in more detail in chapter 3, can be stated quite simply.  The 
central claim of DT as it developed in the 1960s and 70s was that international economic 
relations were the fundamental determinant of an economy’s ability to develop.  In the 
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world economy, Western nations prospered at the expense of the Third World via a direct 
transfer of wealth enforced by the international division of labour, which condemned 
former colonies to engage in low-value activities such as providing cheap labour, 
agricultural goods, and raw material extraction.  Meanwhile, high-value technologically 
and organisationally sophisticated activities were concentrated in already rich countries, 
and a cycle of cumulative causation meant both groups of countries, one termed the core, 
the other the periphery, largely continued on their allotted paths.  It is assumed that, had 
these countries not been integrated into the world economy in the manner in which they 
were, other development trajectories were possible, and crucially, according to classical 
DT, it is capitalism that is responsible for this global structure of exploitation.  As such, 
development is impossible for the periphery which is condemned to a permanently 
subaltern position in the world economy. 
There are both positive and negative things to say about this model.  I argue that 
due to serious problems with the dependency framework, the only way to proceed is with 
a targeted critique and reformulation which will focus on three key issues:  
  
1. The categories of centre/periphery were reified to the point where changes in the 
world economy were ignored in favour of a supposed continuity.  Specifically, the 
constitution of the model in terms of positive claims about the structure of the 
world economy, many of which were problematic in terms of world trade at 
market prices and completely irrelevant to trade within CMEA, needs to be 
addressed.  The core propositions typical of classical DT include: ‘Surplus is 
transferred from periphery to centre’; ‘periphery exports raw materials and 
imports finished goods’; ‘terms of international trade always benefit the centre’; 
‘industrialisation is impossible for the periphery’; ‘periphery economies are 
technologically inferior to the centre’; etc.  For examples of classical DT making 
such claims, see Frank (1969, 1982). 
  
2. Internal factors, notably social relations, were consistently minimised in favour of 
an emphasis on external conditions in forming explanations.  This served to further 
curtail the theory’s ability to explain the diverse economic histories of countries it 
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collectively labelled peripheral, which faced similar external constraints but 
experienced different development processes.  
  
3. The conceptual definitions offered were sometimes rather vague and this had 
implications for the quality of DT analysis.  Terms like monopoly, surplus, 
underdevelopment and dependency itself were often left as intuitive ideas without 
clear definitions.  
  
Due to these problems, classical DT did not deliver on its promise to be a political 
economy of the interrelation between trade and development.  Therefore, whilst the 
drawing of attention towards the global context of national and regional development was 
valuable, a stylised account of the consequences of international economic relations left 
the theory unable to explain development within the world economy.  The reformulation 
proposed in this thesis instead seeks to provide a framework within which the interaction 
between regional dynamics, namely the mode of development encouraged by CMEA 
processes of trade and integration, and geopolitical factors, namely the shifting nature of 
Cold War pressures, can be articulated in a non-deterministic way. 
 
4.1 Centre and Periphery in the Eastern Bloc  
  
Given these problems, it is not clear why any form of DT could or should be used 
to analyse Eastern bloc trade.  Two justifying reasons are given for using DT as a starting 
point: firstly, the voluntary and massive subsidisation of the smaller socialist states by the 
USSR seems to be well suited to analysis via some concept of dependence, since this can 
make explicit what the centre gained by the adoption of this strategy; and secondly, I 
argue the theory can be usefully reformulated through a consideration of Eastern bloc 
trade, as this forces a complete break with the problematic assumptions of classical DT.  
As such it is necessary to begin by thinking about what it is that makes any 
centre/periphery paradigm permissible in the context of the Eastern bloc.  
Although the static sense in which centre/periphery came to be understood is 
argued against in this thesis, the idea of artificially separating an international economic 
system into two parts in order to look at the interactions between them is held to be a 
useful analytical device, so long as its application does not efface differences between 
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economies characterised by some similarities.  In this way, the reformulation attempts to 
give explicit space for the articulation of differences in spite of similarities.  This thesis 
also breaks with DT tradition in removing the assumption that this system must 
necessarily or usually be the capitalist world economy; the Eastern bloc can be argued to 
provide an example of a regional system with an internal logic of its own which related 
to the world economy but was not fully determined by it.  As such, centre and periphery 
are held to be useful concepts which could potentially be applied at various levels of 
analysis depending on the specifics of the case under consideration. 
In making a general case for the utility of this frame, it is worth remembering that 
the concept of centres/peripheries was always meant to provide an alternative to 
theorisations of trade based on assumptions of equal market players (Preston, 2002, 
p.186), and this idea is clearly appropriate for the Eastern bloc.  A number of political, 
economic, and historical asymmetries justify considering the Soviet Union as the centre 
of the bloc.  These include the dominant military capability of the Red Army; the size and 
diversity of the Soviet economy; the geographical expanse of the USSR and its resource 
endowment; the historical priority of the Bolshevik Revolution over the latterly created 
People’s Democracies; and the geopolitical status of the Soviet Union after 1945.  As 
such, once the centre/periphery paradigm is separated out from assumptions about the 
capitalist world economy, it seems uncontroversial that a centre and a periphery can be 
identified within the Eastern bloc. 
Following on from this, the core DT concept of dependence as something linking 
periphery to centre seems to be intuitively relevant to relations within the bloc.  In fact, it 
is precisely in regard to the assumptions of classical DT that CMEA emerges as an 
interesting case.  This is to say that a centre and a periphery can be identified on the basis 
of observable asymmetries, but that their interrelations actually resemble a mirror image 
of classical DT claims.  Clark and Bahry (1983) comment that,  
This structure of trade between the Soviet Union and her dependencies reversed, 
then, the normal dependency pattern of ‘vertical trade’ in which a dependent 
economy exports raw materials and imports finished products.  Nevertheless, this 
changing trade structure evidently increased East European economic dependence 
upon the Soviet Union in that there were few, if any, viable alternatives to Soviet 
markets for both raw material imports and industrial exports (p.280).  
  
Whilst historians have recognised and described this unusual state of affairs, and 
economists have used various methodologies to try to quantify the extent of this transfer, 
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as the literature review highlights there appears to be little by way of a satisfactory 
theoretical explanation of the political economy of the intentions and effects related to it.  
This implies that the intuitive starting-point that economic relations within the bloc 
can be investigated from a dependency perspective necessitates breaking with the pre-
existing DT frameworks which cannot fully be dissociated from questionable positive 
claims.  For this reason, I propose reformulating dependent development as an ideal-type 
which describes asymmetrical international situations but refrains from making specific 
positive claims in favour of preparing for historical investigation to proceed free from 
presumptions about intentions or effects.  In short, when an international relationship such 
as that within the Eastern bloc intuitively seems dependent, and commentators regularly 
use this term to describe it, if the exiting theory of dependency is irrelevant because it’s 
propositions are too rigid to take account of the historical case, this implies that one way 
to rethink the theory is to base it instead on an idealisation which avoids making positive 
claims.  
4.2 Soviet Intentions  
 
The question of Soviet intentions behind the design of economic relations within 
the bloc is a complex one.  I argue that there were three key motifs: geopolitics, ideology 
and technocratic or economic considerations.  The changing balance between these 
agendas will be discussed further in later chapters, but the essence of each perspective and 
the kind of policy they sanctioned will be introduced here. 
I argue that the geopolitical approach to intra-bloc economic relations was the 
most widely accepted view during the Cold War within the Soviet leadership, the most 
significant example of this which this thesis deals with directly being the decision to 
subsidise trade with Eastern Europe from 1956 onwards.  This approach saw trade and 
other international economic relations as servants of Soviet international policy more 
generally, and so moved the assessment of the utility of economic relations onto how they 
supported political goals such as bloc stability and unity; the acceptance of Soviet 
leadership of the international communist movement; co-existence and peaceful 
competition with the West; and security concerns.  These diverse motivating factors can 
be grouped together in that they all make geopolitical considerations of some sort the key 
evaluative principle of trade, and concerns of this type can be clearly distinguished from 
the technocratic rationality to be outlined below.  Most significantly for intra-bloc 
  
28  
  
relations, this view accepted large economic costs in terms of trade policy so long as 
visible geopolitical gains were achieved in return.  I will show in chapters 4 and 5 how 
the policy of subsidised trade and the process of dependent development it led to need to 
be viewed as arising out of the perceived geopolitical necessity of maintaining communist 
power in Eastern Europe during the Cold War.  Evidence of the exceptionally high 
valuation of this geopolitical objective is provided by the fact that Marrese and Vanous 
(1983) estimate the Soviet Union paid approximately $87 billion dollars to Eastern Europe 
between 1960-1989 through the mechanism of subsidised trade prices. 
The role of ideology in the formation of Soviet policy has long been a source of 
debate amongst historians.  Westad (2000), defines ideology as, ‘a set of fundamental 
concepts systematically expressed by a large group of individuals’ and understood to be 
of some significance in terms of explaining their actions (p.552).  Although this thesis 
argues that geopolitical considerations were relatively more significant throughout the 
period in question, the role of ideology cannot be entirely discounted.  Since the end of 
the Cold War and the opening of previously closed archives, some sort of consensus has 
emerged that ideology was in fact a relevant factor in policy debates in the USSR and so 
cannot be entirely discarded as a factor motivating policy decisions (Kramer, 1999a).  
This thesis follows some key contributions to this debate in seeing ideology essentially as 
a flexible justifying device, usually made to conform to geopolitical objectives.  For 
instance, one major post-Cold War study, (Evans, 1993), has argued that Soviet ideology 
was far from static after Stalin, but actually in a continual state of revision and adaptation 
to meet changing needs, and Checkel (1997) has explicitly argued for the importance of 
ideology as a justifying factor in Soviet international policy. 
In terms of intra-bloc relations, ideological considerations suggested the following 
types of policies: supporting the industrial development of Eastern Europe out of a 
genuine sense of socialist solidarity; maintaining the non-transferability of the rouble and 
other East European currencies to shield the region from inflationary pressures emanating 
from world market price changes (i.e. an ideological assessment of inflation as something 
necessarily negative and inferior to the stability provided by centralised planning and 
financial controls); allowing terms of trade to favour the smaller socialist states at the 
expense of the Soviet Union; and the use of price negotiations to foster equal exchanges 
between the socialist states.  I argue that such ideological concerns were a fluctuating 
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factor behind Soviet policy which need to be investigated principally through their 
interrelation to geopolitics. 
Perhaps the most important way ideology influenced bloc trade and development 
was that the assumed superiority of central planning, which was both popular and credible 
in the 1950s and 60s, to some extent led to a lack of urgency in the development of the 
institutions and theory of socialist trade; if capitalism is a contradictory and crisis-prone 
system doomed to fail soon enough, then socialist trade need not be fully developed, either 
in terms of intra-socialist or socialist to capitalist relations (see Kuusinen, 1961).  This 
mistaken notion was directly challenged by what will be termed the technocratic approach 
which should also be mentioned in this introduction.  This view, which became more 
popular in the 1980s having been side-lined in previous decades, stressed the need for 
Soviet international economic relations to at least in part serve the interests of the Soviet 
economy (Alexeev et al, 1992).  The intellectual origins of this perspective were the 
fundamental advances made by the mathematical school of Soviet economics in the 1950s 
and 60s (see Zauberman, 1976, for an excellent survey of this), and this agenda was 
increasingly popular in the 1980s as the social basis of the Soviet nomenklatura began to 
shift slowly towards the inclusion of more technically educated individuals.  As such, the 
politically-motivated practice of massively subsidised trade with Eastern Europe, as well 
as the extension of large-scale aid to Cuba, Mongolia, and other struggling socialist 
economies, were seen as expensive and unsustainable policies without clear economic 
rationales from this perspective.  The fact that the technocrats did not succeed in re-
shaping Soviet trade policy with CMEA has to be seen as telling evidence of the deep-
seated nature of the geopolitical approach. 
 At times these three perspectives moved in and out of favour, and sometimes there 
was agreement between various combinations of them about certain issues, but I argue 
that until the late 1980s the geopolitical approach held by far the most support.  Especially 
interesting is the interaction between geopolitical and ideological concerns.  Whilst the 
geopolitical and technocratic agendas were fundamentally opposed in terms of the criteria 
they offered for the evaluation of policy, ideological concerns often marched hand-in-
hand with geopolitical motivations (most obviously in the sense that both could provide 
justifications for subsidising trade), although when an irreducible contradiction between 
the two emerged it was more often than not the geopolitical agenda that triumphed.  The 
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technocratic approach only started to gain ground in the late 1980s–see the reversal of 
attitudes towards the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank to be discussed 
later–and the declining hegemony of the geopolitical view is an essential part of the 
ideational context to the end of CMEA. 
What first-hand evidence is available suggests the Soviet leadership was well 
aware of the geopolitical implications of subsidising trade with Eastern Europe.  A report 
prepared by the Soviet Institute for the Economy of the World Socialist System and 
presented to the politburo reads as follows:  
It would be desirable to develop a flexible, manoeuvrable tactic with respect to 
these socialist countries in order not to alienate them, but at the same time in order 
that they might really feel an economic loss as a result of their nationalistic 
isolation from the socialist camp; and, in order that every step in the direction of 
unity with the socialist countries gave them perceptible economic benefits… A 
differentiated approach to the various countries with regard to providing them with 
deficit fuel, energy, and raw material commodities would be very important in 
strengthening the cooperation of the other countries of the CMEA with the USSR 
(quoted in Stone, 1996, p.72).  
  
This suggests ideology stood some way behind geopolitics in terms of assessing the 
general contours of Soviet trade with Eastern Europe.  Further evidence is provided by 
Kurierov (1998), a member of the Research Institute of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign 
Trade.  
  
Foreign trade was used by the Kremlin to bolster various regimes, to assist 
‘friendly firms’ (i.e., lined with the local Communist parties), and ‘friends’ 
themselves… In all these cases, the leadership disregarded the disadvantageous 
terms of the contracts and even pushed foreign trade organizations to go ahead 
with the deal at any price.  Instructions and ‘recommendations’ to this effect were 
not always properly documented, and sometimes were given orally (p.273).  
  
This dominant geopolitical approach, as against the usually subordinate 
ideological and technocratic approaches, needs to be related to the historically specific 
execution of state policy in the Soviet Union where the system of nomenklatura was first 
established.  Djilas (1962) was the first to highlight the significance of this group which 
emerged in the 1930s, and more recently Pakulski (1986) has emphasised how distinct 
the patterns of organisational rationality were in the USSR–deference to superiors and 
their sometimes arbitrary decisions; the role of patronage and the prevalence of clientism; 
ideology as a flexible justifying factor; the lack of oversight or control agencies–which 
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outlived Stalin and put a permanent stamp on how the system functioned.  As a category 
for the analysis of socialism, it needs to be acknowledged that the nomenklatura had 
contested boundaries; exactly who was in it was sometimes unclear, especially in 
Hungary, the case-study in which the question of the nomenklatura will be returned to, 
due to the inclusion of intellectuals on party and state committees to a far greater extent 
than elsewhere in the bloc.  In this thesis the term essentially refers to elites, i.e. 
individuals in senior positions within the party, state bureaucracies or industry. 
The nomenklatura system meant the fate of top officials often depended on 
alliances with more powerful patrons further up the hierarchy.  Accordingly, it seems 
reasonable to presume in view of Kurierov’s testimony that the nomenklatura system 
assisted the implementation of geopolitically-motivated trade policy and eased senior 
party-state officials’ task of keeping technocratic elements at bay; i.e. the dominance of 
the geopolitical approach to trade meant that rising through the ranks of the nomenklatura 
within the institutions managing trade was more achievable if you had geopolitical, rather 
than technocratic, opinions.  Only in the late 1980s did the struggle begin to be more 
evenly pitched, and as such technocratic reformers only got close to power at the time 
when the socialist system itself was teetering on the brink of collapse (Bruce and 
MacPhee, 1995). 
The question of Soviet agency behind the subsidies will be investigated in chapter 
5 from the point of view of examining the crisis of Soviet authority in the region that 
resulted from Stalin’s death, which I argue the strategy of subsidised trade was adopted 
in response to.  The contradictions inherent in Stalin’s approach to the bloc had generated 
unrest and instability; the introduction of substantial economic incentives was meant to 
be a more stable approach to cementing the unity of the bloc under Soviet leadership.  
This strategy also contained structural contradictions however–for instance, between the 
traditional centralised planning encouraged by CMEA trade and the need for economic 
reform and technology transfer from the West–the increasing severity of which ultimately 
contributed to the demise of this unique international system of trade. 
According to Brzezinski (1967), Khrushchev ‘realized that an important substitute 
for Stalinist coercion was to create such economic interdependence [within the bloc] that 
any separatist temptations would be tantamount to courting national disaster’ (p.285). 
This is a fairly uncontroversial thesis and fits with the general shift in Soviet foreign policy 
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after Stalin, under whose direction economic relations within the bloc had been heavily 
slanted in the USSR’s favour.  Situating this shift in terms of the Cold War context, 
Khrushchev’s commitment to peaceful co-existence and competition with the West 
encouraged the significant re-orientation of intra-socialist trade policy away from Stalinist 
domination of the bloc backed-up by military power towards a much more politically and 
economically complex situation between the USSR and the six.  Similarly, the fact that 
the Soviet model of industrial development was then highly attractive to leaders across 
the Third World as signifying a route to modernity and relative independence from the 
West meant the need for the bloc to function in a more mutually beneficial manner was 
seen as paramount.  Westad (2005) has provided a detailed history of the significance of 
the Soviet model for developing countries in the post-war decades.  The fact that Soviet 
military interventions still occurred after Stalin will be returned to later in connection with 
the ‘militarised’ nature of the Soviet economy due to the large share of surplus going into 
the Soviet military-industrial complex.  Thus, post-Stalin Soviet leaders displayed a much 
greater degree of latitude and flexibility in adapting intra-bloc trade relations to a changed 
geopolitical environment, although military intervention was not discarded as a potential 
strategy until Gorbachev. 
The mechanism by which the USSR aimed to secure the dependence of Eastern 
Europe, and thus to reduce the need for Stalinist domination and to raise the credibility of 
the bloc as an advert for Soviet socialism, was the instigation of a historically-unique 
system of international trade in which prices systematically and deliberately deviated 
from those on world markets.  Specifically, this involved the under-pricing of Soviet raw 
material and energy exports and the simultaneous over-pricing of East European 
manufactured goods.  Szymanski (1982) explains the nature of post-Stalin trade relations 
between the USSR and Eastern Europe:  
The terms of trade used in [the USSR’s] trade with its CMEA partners are not set 
by the Soviet Union, and they certainly are not exploitative.  Since 1956 CMEA 
countries have established the prices used in their mutual trade by negotiation 
(p.77).  
  
Given the eccentricities of these negotiations to be described in the literature review, it is 
not hard to see how, say, an enterprising Czechoslovakian trade delegation might 
manoeuvre to secure an advantageous price for the processed industrial exports of their 
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country against a Soviet ‘opponent’ who Kurierov’s (1998) evidence suggests was often 
under direct instruction from above to play by a different set of rules.  
The relatively stable state of this deeply unbalanced situation means the agency of 
East European party leaders, as well as of economic interests within the countries, must 
also be integrated into the account.  That East European parties were aware of the 
subsidies has been established by Stone (1996).  Likewise, Westad (1997) gives archival 
evidence of East European’s awareness of their ‘privileged’ position and ability to 
articulate themselves against the USSR in agreement with Stone.  As such it is well 
established that both East European and Soviet parties and bureaucracies knew about the 
transfers taking place.  This thesis does not attempt to argue that the subsidies or their 
distribution were entirely the outcome of deliberate political decisions by the Soviet 
leadership, but rather agrees with Köves (1983) that the subsidies should be read as the 
outcome of a mutual bargaining process. 
This involves conceptualising the ruling parties in Eastern Europe as both part of 
an international socialist coalition and as national elites in complex relations to domestic 
interests, and thus facing contradictory policy choices derived from these two spheres.  
All the regions’ communist parties needed stability and growth in order to legitimate their 
rule; since stability meant the continuance of existing policies as much as possible, while 
it became increasingly evident that maintaining growth rates required economic reform 
of some kind, the question of how to reform the traditional planning system was thus 
heavily implicated in this contradiction.  The role of factory managers also needs to be 
included.  Since CMEA market orders were often fixed in size and specification for 
several years, these contracts were highly desirable (from the producers’ point of view) 
because they did not require innovation or efficiency. 
 
4.3 Effects  
  
It is now necessary to summarise the effects of the continuance of subsidised trade 
within the Eastern bloc.  Particular attention is paid to the contradictory nature of these 
for both the Soviet Union and the six which emerge clearly once the regional system is 
set in the context of changes in the world economy.  This thesis will argue that the 
intended consequence of the mid-1950s price reforms, that of making Eastern Europe 
economically dependent on Soviet resources, was achieved and that this led to a particular 
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type of development for Eastern Europe.  However, also significant were the unintended 
consequences exacerbated by the dramatic rise in the opportunity cost suffered by the 
USSR after the oil shocks of the 1970s.  The Soviets were compelled to forgo substantial 
windfall gains to be had from trading outside CMEA so long as they wished to extend aid 
to the six and so continue to secure their dependence.  I argue that this policy dilemma is 
best captured by a DT frame of analysis which highlights the geopolitical significance of 
Eastern Europe’s dependence on the USSR. 
This system of trade had various effects for the development of Eastern Europe.  
Firstly, damage was done in terms of international competitiveness as the six were re-
structured away from areas they had comparative advantages in and towards Soviet-type 
industrialisation.  This resulted in structures of production which were only adept at 
meeting the needs of the Soviet market and could not export successfully to the West.  
From the theoretical perspective developed in this thesis, the geopolitical significance of 
this was that subsidised trade with the Soviet Union did lead to development in Eastern 
Europe, but the nature of this development effectively limited the ability of the smaller 
CMEA members to diversify and expand their international economic relations outside 
the bloc, thus reinforcing dependence on the USSR.  The blanket imposition of the Soviet 
model across the region even generated conflicts within the group, as less developed 
Rumania initially celebrated the possibilities for industrial development made available 
by CMEA, whilst Czechoslovakia and East Germany resented the imposition of the Soviet 
model and even tried to block the development of rival industrial branches elsewhere in 
the bloc (Staar, 1971, p.258). 
Secondly, energy inefficiency became a common feature of East European 
production as cheap, plentiful Soviet inputs were not economised on.  Csaba (1988, p.268) 
has underlined how there was no effective demand constraint on East European industry, 
and taking account of the structural intertwining of Soviet and East European industry on 
the one hand, and Soviet raw material and energy sectors on the other, this disproportion 
needs to be considered as highly significant.  The price rises after 1973 that faced East 
European firms as CMEA prices slowly approached those on the world market were thus 
especially harmful, and the adjustment process entailed a further fiscal burden on the state 
as it strove simultaneously for full employment and stable retail prices.  Systemic pressure 
for high resource use can be seen even in the relatively advanced GDR and 
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Czechoslovakia.  This is an example of how the structures of production CMEA 
reproduced left the region as a whole poorly placed to take advantage of opportunities 
outside CMEA, and the technological inefficiency of the region in relation to the West 
widened greatly over the period. 
Whilst it is generally accepted that there was a link between the Soviet model of 
industrial development and this inefficient development pattern (Winiecki, 1988, p.102), 
it is not always observed that CMEA trade reinforced both and provided the link between 
the two.  In fact the significance of intra-bloc trade and the logic of bloc development is 
underestimated in general; this is one example where the attention directed to a crucial 
international dimension by DT leads to the reinterpretation of empirical information.  
Examples of scholars who tend to undertreat CMEA in relation to development include 
Bleaney, 1988; Brown, 2009; Fowkes, 1995; Nove, 1988; and Priestland, 2009.  A recent 
example of work on socialist economic development which represents this tendency is 
Harrison (2012), which does not mention CMEA at all.  Similarly, the international nature 
of the material basis and influences acting upon agents in the Eastern bloc is often 
underestimated.  For example, the struggle within the Soviet party-state apparatus 
between technocrats who wanted to raise efficiency, and the leadership who had to 
consider geopolitics, or the Hungarian large enterprises who wanted to monopolise soft 
CMEA contracts in opposition to the party who increasingly pushed for modernisation 
and trade with the West in the 1980s, need to be understood in terms of the dynamic of 
intra-bloc relations.  
  Thirdly, the type of industrial development encouraged in Eastern Europe by the 
USSR created an economy centred round heavy industries which could only function if 
connected to the Soviet supply network.  This was a result of the fact that Soviet 
industrialisation in the 1930s had seen the heavy industries as the backbone of a necessary 
military-industrial complex, and this emphasis was transferred on to Eastern Europe 
without questioning its viability.  Dependence on these delivery networks meant that 
switching suppliers not only involved facing higher prices but major infrastructural issues 
as well.  This had severe implications for the USSR, too, as was openly acknowledged by 
Gorbachev (see Rumer, 1991, p.453).  This technocratic assessment of trade with Eastern 
Europe and the investment pattern it implied competed on an uneven basis in the Soviet 
party-state apparatus with the predominant geopolitical perspective and can be seen to 
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have motivated the timid and moderate modifications of CMEA price formulas in the 
mid-1970s. 
The accumulated effects of this meant that economic development in the Eastern 
bloc cannot be adequately comprehended in isolation from the international system 
centred on the USSR, and the origins and development of this system itself needs to be 
put in the context of the Cold War.  I argue that this led to a form of development which 
was dependent on the continuation of the CMEA system of trade, the limits to the 
development potential of this system being increasing exposed in the 1980s.  Only further 
links to the world economy could enable further development for the bloc.  The 
conclusion is therefore that, despite static gains from the subsidies, smaller CMEA 
members ultimately bore substantial costs from their close association with the USSR.  
So prevalent did this opinion become in Eastern Europe in the 1980s that Lavigne (1991) 
has termed it the ‘East European thesis’, in contradistinction to the 
subsidisation/exploitation debate that took place in the West.  The dependent development 
account developed here differs from this in stressing that some sort of development did 
take place, but the contradictions within it created dependence alongside this 
development, and in fact dependence was an outcome of the particular way this 
development took place. 
  
5. Dependency Theory Past and Present  
  
Simplifying a little, there are two key strands of DT: the neo-Marxist stream 
associated with Frank (1969) and Wallerstein (1993), and the dependent development 
approach of Cardoso (1977a).  In addition to these approaches, DT bears a close 
resemblance to other critical theories of international trade such as structuralism 
(Furtardo, 1964), unequal exchange (Emmanuel, 1972), and the work done at the UN 
Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), most notably the Prebisch-Singer 
thesis (Toye and Toye, 2003).  Frank and Cardoso have been selected to be examined in 
detail since their contrasting contributions were central to the development of DT, and 
crucially their work, in distinction to many other important contributions (Sunkel, 1976; 
Dos Santos, 1970), has been seen as and can potentially be argued to be applicable outside 
the context of Latin America.  
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A trend established in the 1990s with regard to re-working DT was to extend the 
theory to include the analysis of newly industrialised countries (NICs) and their position 
in the world economy (see Cardoso, 1993; Hoogvelt, 1997).  Whilst this was probably the 
most common theme of more recent contributions to DT, the continuing potential of the 
dependency tradition has also been argued from a number of other perspectives: Blaney 
(1996) argues for a more explicitly political conception of dependence; Elsenhans (1996) 
has tried to reinvigorate the structural economic position; and Hornborg (2006) has used 
DT to approach ecological issues.  This thesis takes a different approach to these in 
suggesting that DT can be re-worked via a consideration of socialist international 
economic relations which represent a significant case in terms of challenging the classical 
models. 
A large body of critical literature developed in response to DT.  Good surveys of 
both the original and the critical literature are provided by Brewer (1990) and Kay (1989).   
This can be divided into two general camps: liberals who saw DT’s analysis and policy 
prescriptions as flawed (this position is well summarised by Nove, 1974), and a group of 
Marxist commentators who took issue with various theoretical premises.  Foremost 
among this second group was Warren (1988), who charged that there is little evidence for 
the positive claim of a global process of underdevelopment; Brenner (1977), who showed 
how the over-emphasis on exchange led to a problematic treatment of capitalist 
development itself; and Laclau (1982) who alleged the imprecise definition of capitalism 
left the theory with no clearly defined object of study.  More recently, Hobson (2012, 
pp.234-6) has charged that a more serious problem with DT and subsequent WST 
analyses of development was that they were Eurocentric and denied agency to non-
Western societies.  
This thesis accepts these critiques of the validity of the classical accounts of 
dependency and that DT is largely irrelevant to the Eastern bloc in its current form.  Three 
key areas where improvements must be made have already been raised, and now a short 
summary of the proposed reformulation is given. 
  
1. I argue that ideal-typical method is useful for DT and that chapter 4 
demonstrates this by forming a coherent account where previously only 
intuitive and under-specified references to socialist dependency existed.  It 
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seems it should be possible to circumvent many of the problems highlighted 
in classical DT by abstracting from the historical details of particular instances 
of dependency to arrive at an ideal-typical description.  Referring back to the 
first key problem mentioned before, beginning from an ideal-type seems to 
provide a way of avoiding the reification of the centre/periphery system into a 
static structure with an assumed dynamic of interaction expressed as positive 
statements.  This reconstruction of abstract dependency as a discrete 
theoretical object is carried out not to insulate the model from the intrusion of 
messy historical reality, but rather on the explicit premise that the purpose of 
such rarefied abstractions is to give a basic account of what dependence 
actually is against which the subsequent historical account can be calibrated.  
This means that instead of the empirically problematic claim that relations 
between centres and peripheries are a zero-sum game where the development 
of one is a function of the underdevelopment of the other, open-ended 
questions of reciprocal influence can be focused on.  
  
2. Another problem relates to the methodological issue of structure/agency.  
Whilst there are various approaches to this issue within the dependency 
tradition, and many contributors do not explicitly state their approach, a simple 
interrelated conception taken from Cardoso is given in chapter 3.  This 
interrelated conception is not claimed to be original or controversial but is 
especially relevant given the problems with structuralism often associated 
with DT.  In this way the valuable contribution of classical DT that 
development should not be analysed in isolation from the international context 
is strengthened by beginning from an ideal-type which allows analysis to 
cover the entirety of the system, and the conception of structure/agency as 
interrelated further supports this by drawing attention to agency in both the 
centre and periphery which either contested or reproduced the 
centre/periphery relation.    
 
3. In terms of third problem, progress can be made by providing clear definitions 
of analytical concepts sourced from Marxian political economy (specifically 
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the concepts of reproduction and economic surplus).  Since it will be argued 
in the literature review that the relation between trade and development has 
remained undertreated, and that this can in part be traced back to the lack of 
an explicitly political economy approach characteristic of many contributions, 
the framework presented will aim to rectify this by beginning from the concept 
of economic reproduction central to historical materialism. 
  
Agreeing with EH Carr (1990) that, ‘a rationally and historically significant 
explanation of an event is one which could conceivably be applied elsewhere’ (p.106), it 
is worth beginning to consider how generally applicable such a reformulation could be.  
Lichtheim (1974) has argued that,  
  
Since imperialism is older than capitalism, there seems to be no particular reason 
why, for theoretical purposes, the two should not be dissociated, to the point 
perhaps of laying the groundwork of an as yet non-existent theory of post-
capitalist imperialism.  Such a theory, if and when it comes into being, will have 
to take the Stalinist era for its starting point.  What it will look like remains to be 
seen, but it seems improbable that the analysis of market relations will figure 
prominently within it (p.128).  
  
It seems that by a theory of post-capitalist imperialism Lichtheim has in mind an approach 
which rejects the central role given in the classical theories of imperialism to market 
exchange and the international action of the labour theory of value to explain global 
accumulation, rather than a post-capitalist theory which would be more inclined to stress 
the role of political factors alongside but not instead of production and exchange in 
assessing international economic relations.  Similarly Woods (2006) emphasises a 
distinction between economic imperialism, which she associates solely with capitalism, 
and previous non-economic forms on account of what she calls capitalism’s, ‘unique 
capacity of economic power to detach itself from political coercion’ (p.18).  Whilst this 
thesis avoids having to define and theorise a contested idea like imperialism in favour of 
referring to a specific type of international development instead, some of the sentiment 
expressed by Lichtheim could be attached to the potential application of a theory of 
dependent development in other historical contexts.  
Early DT held out the promise of being a political economy of international 
processes and how they interrelate with national development, and part of the motivation 
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for re-thinking this paradigm is that there would appear to be many asymmetrical 
international instances which simply do not resemble the classical models, but still 
intuitively look dependent.  Kubalkova and Cruichshank (1985) suggest that the 
unwillingness to develop the theory of dependence to take account of the Eastern bloc 
may have been a strategic move; ‘It is then no wonder that dependencia authors often 
tried to ignore the USSR and conceptualize the core and periphery as ‘two halves’… to 
make the surprised discovery that their analysis does not apply to Soviet relations with 
her communist periphery’ (p.231).  In reformulating DT in relation to this international 
system and its extreme variance from the assumptions of the classical model, perhaps the 
foundations of a generally applicable approach to asymmetrical international economic 
relations could be laid.  This will be returned to in the concluding chapter. 
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Literature review  
   
1. Introduction  
  
The position implicit in this review is that the chief objective of the Soviet Union 
towards Eastern Europe after the Thaw was not exploitation for national enrichment; 
subsidisation in return for non-economic gain; or an ideologically-driven desire to 
equalise national levels of development, but rather to secure the dependence of the smaller 
socialist states on the USSR.  Since this dependence was secured by initiating a particular 
type of development process, I argue that to fully capture this, a new theorisation of 
dependence is needed.  Accordingly this review attempts to highlight two absences, one 
in the empirical literature which has not fully articulated the phenomenon of socialist 
dependency, and one in pre-existing DT studies of the Eastern bloc which shows the 
possibility for DT to be rethought in relation to this historical case.  In terms of the area 
studies literature, the interrelation between trade and development is a notable weakness 
in the extant literature and I argue that some concept of dependence is ideally suited to 
rectify this.  
A political economy approach which focuses on the co-determination and 
interaction of political and economic factors is useful to do this, and for this reason the 
review will often examine the implicit assumptions of how politics and economics relate 
in the literature.  An explicitly political economy approach is relevant on account of the 
peculiarities of interaction between planned economies, where the statements, a) Eastern 
Europe was an economic burden on the USSR (as argued by Marrese and Vanous, 1983), 
and b) Eastern Europe was an economic benefit to the USSR (as argued by Staniszkis, 
1992), can both paradoxically be argued to be true.  A political economy approach is 
further needed as the subject matter is planned economies where state and economy were 
fundamentally co-constituted.  Accordingly the separation between politics and 
economics specific to market economies should not be carried over unquestioned to the 
study of actually-existing socialism, where the extensive role of public ownership and 
planning mean attention must be directed towards their interaction.  Similarly, the 
significance of geopolitical factors is essential to explaining the origins and development 
of the regional system of trade and development focused upon, but such concerns are not 
normally included (most problematic from this point of view are customs union theory 
and world-systems theory).  Accordingly, the reformulation and the historical account it 
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generates will pay particular attention to this dimension of the problem, and situations 
where the exclusion of geopolitics is problematic will be highlighted in this review. 
This absence is perhaps understandable as there is relatively little IR literature 
available, with the debate mostly taking place between economists and area-studies 
specialists.  Several reasons can be proposed for this.  Firstly, the issue of Eastern bloc 
trade and development is inherently and irreducibly of a political economy nature, and the 
sub-optimal and strict division of labour in Western academia between economists and 
political scientists perhaps inhibited IPE scholars from moving into this area.  Secondly, 
the Cold War context and the US-dominated nature of IR as a discipline meant work on 
Soviet foreign policy tended to focus on its military-strategic aspects, leaving trade 
relatively neglected.  Finally, the core theoretical approaches characteristic of IR; realism, 
liberalism and their various reformulations, as well as the English school and more 
contemporary theories of gender and environment which have significantly broadened the 
scope of the discipline; seem poorly suited to the analysis of the particular international 
phenomena approached here.  Accordingly, a relatively in-depth discussion of area studies 
literature is included.  This is justified partly by the theoretical point that the tendency to 
over-generalisation in DT and WST is claimed to be problematic, and so beginning with 
the specifics of the situation is important, and partly as this is the best way to substantiate 
the intuitive starting-point that some form of DT could fill a gap.  
 
2. English Language Soviet Literature 
 
The debate to which this thesis speaks outlined above took place in the Western 
academy.  However, it is important to note that the English language branch of Progress 
Publishers, based in Moscow, released a significant number of publications by Soviet writers 
aimed at an international audience which dealt with CMEA and intra-socialist economic 
relations (for example, Sanakoyev, 1972; CMEA Secretariat, 1974; Bautina, 1975; 
Kuznetsov, 1976; and Shershnev, 1978).  A short discussion of the general limitations of this 
literature is included to justify why it is not given a central place in this thesis.  This Soviet 
literature is used to illustrate the ideological assessment of trade, as well as the later 
emergence of the technocratic approach.  I argue there was a fundamental contradiction 
between technocratic and geopolitical approaches to trade, but that this was not necessarily 
the case between ideology and geopolitics.  As such, the growing popularity of the 
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technocratic approach in the 1980s, albeit from a very low base, had to have implications for 
CMEA. 
 In general, English language Soviet publications on CMEA have two key 
characteristics: they offered in exhaustive and sometimes quite tedious levels of detail 
descriptions of the bureaucratic operation of CMEA and the 32 institutions it oversaw; and 
they made various ideological arguments about the superiority of socialist international 
economic relations in comparison to capitalism.  I claim that the empirical information 
provided by these sources need not be reproduced here since this thesis is concerned with 
long-run developmental processes, and secondly that the theoretical arguments these works 
contain should be seen as interesting illustrations of Soviet ideology as they related to 
questions of trade, rather than as analytical treatments comparable to the other accounts to be 
discussed below.  Finally, some examples of this literature will be briefly examined to show 
the beginning of the transition to a type of technocratic policy agenda which began to emerge 
in the late 1970s and rose to prominence in the late 1980s. 
As an example of the ideological approach usually taken by Soviet writers, Kuznetsov 
(1976) argues at length that whilst the guiding principles behind West European integration 
are bourgeois individualism and nationalism, socialist internationalism is the principle of 
integration in the Eastern bloc, and that whilst the former leads to increases in international 
inequality, the later fosters the equalising of the levels of development of all participants.  
 The question of ideology and how seriously it should be taken as a potential factor behind 
socialist economic policy will be returned to in chapter 4, and whilst it should not be 
discounted as one factor influencing decisions, this thesis sees geopolitical factors as more 
significant determinants of policy choices relevant to international economic relations within 
the bloc. 
The move over the 1970s away from ideological formulations in relation to trade with 
capitalist and socialist states and towards technocratic assessments can be seen from the two 
examples below.  Sanakoyev (1972) contrasts the socialist ‘international cooperation of 
labour’ with the capitalist ‘international division of labour’.  He further claims that these two 
approaches to international economic relations are so distinctive as to mean that the states of 
the socialist bloc actually comprise a separate social and economic system independent of the 
capitalist world economy.  This specific theoretical proposition can also be attributed to some 
WST practitioners and will be discussed later on in this chapter.  Sanakoyev’s ideological 
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position became less popular as the decade wore on, and by the late 1970s, recognition of the 
fact that the Eastern bloc was within the world economy and that this could be a source of 
growth became much more widely accepted in the Eastern bloc.  An interesting example is 
provided by the fact that Shershnev (1978) actually went so far as to justify the monopoly of 
foreign trade (a corner-stone of the socialist approach to international economic relations) on 
the grounds that it promoted stability in long-term relations with both capitalist and socialist 
states.  This stands for an acceptance of the fact that trade with the West was desirable and in 
fact necessary for the East, in contrast to the earlier grandiose proposals that the bloc would 
out-compete the West and so the direction of attraction would be the opposite to what actually 
took place. 
In summary, the English language publications of Progress Publishers give a window 
onto how the Soviet Union wanted to present CMEA to the international community–as a 
collection of states whose international economic relations represented a fundamentally 
different type of integration to that of the world market–and provide evidence of fact that 
ideological considerations were often central to how such questions were framed by 
intellectuals before they began to give way to more realistic technocratic assessments.  
However, this body of literature does not contain a recognisable theoretical account of the 
inter-relation between trade and development, and so is not considered to be as useful as the 
literature to be reviewed below. 
3. State Capitalism  
  
Before going any further, there is an issue of conceptual language which should 
be raised which relates to notions of politics and economics.  These concerns will be raised 
through a consideration of the state capitalist thesis (SCT) since this is one of the best 
known attempts to claim that conceptions of politics and economics appropriate to DMEs 
can be applied to the Eastern bloc (see Cliff, 1974).  The open question of whether to use 
the theory of state capitalism is one of the extent to which it usefully characterises Soviet-
type economies.  The assessment of SCT is especially significant given that DT provides 
the conceptual starting-point for this inquiry, and all forms of DT assign high explanatory 
significance to capitalism.  In other words, agreeing with SCT and claiming the Soviet-
type economies were not any form of socialism, rather just another variety of capitalism, 
would have implications for the reformulation of DT.  I have developed a general critique 
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of the varieties of capitalism approach to comparative political economy elsewhere 
(Weiss, 2014).  
Here it is argued that the SCT effectively collapses the distinction between 
capitalism and socialism in favour of an imprecise typology of various capitalisms, and 
that this negatively affects analysis of planned economies.  If capitalism is defined in 
terms of relations of production in which the class of producers is separated from the 
means of production by the institution of private property which allows the appropriation 
of profits by a class of owners, it would seem that this definition would have to be 
stretched to breaking-point to be made applicable to the USSR.  Side-lining the issue of 
relations of production, key proponent of the SCT, Harman (1988), argued that a tendency 
for state intervention in the economy can be observed under both capitalist and socialist 
property relations, and that this renders differences between them insignificant (p.326).  
This position relies on a problematic redeployment of the idea of the separation of the 
political sphere (the state), from the economic sphere (the market), which is wholly 
inappropriate for the study of centrally planned economies.  Aside from the fact that it is 
inaccurate to perceive the Soviet state as something separate and distinct from the 
economy into which it ‘intervenes’, this approach is inadequately general; the specific 
nature of economic crises in the Eastern bloc (be it the repeated shortages of strategic 
goods faced by the USSR; the inefficiencies of the large enterprises created by the 
Hungarian reform process; or inability of Yugoslavia’s labour-managed firms to manage 
wages increases), are clearly distinct from the economic history of the West over the same 
period.  
Key to understanding the rise of SCT with regards to the Soviet Union is the 
geopolitical conjuncture in which it emerged.  After the defeat of Nazi Germany, US 
involvement in Western Europe was instrumental to producing a peaceful, capitalist 
reconstruction of Europe (Saull, 2007, p.81).  In this context, in order to avoid the taint of 
association with Moscow the establishment of a theory which differentiated their own 
socialism from Stalinism was essential to Western socialists.  This effectively forced 
Western socialists into severing ties of loyalty, affiliation, or sympathy with the Soviet  
Union, and into reforming Trotsky’s own position on the nature of Soviet society.  
Essentially the SCT stands for the assertion that the Soviet Union is best understood as a 
new variety of capitalism where the state took on the role of the entire amalgamated 
capitalist class.  Counter-posed to this understanding is Trotsky’s notion of the USSR as 
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a deformed workers’ state.  Whilst the term ‘state capitalism’ had been in use among 
Trotskyites since the 1920s, it was not until after 1945 that a variant was arrived at which 
could be applied to the USSR.  Trotsky (1973) himself famously dissented from applying 
to term to the Soviet Union, preferring to treat the USSR as a genuine form of socialism, 
but one in which the state had not withered away.  The importance of this conception is 
that it allows analysis to proceed on the assumption that the economies of the Eastern bloc 
functioned significantly differently from their Western counterparts, and as such must be 
understood to have differed in essence.  
A recent example of the SCT is Resnick and Wolff (2002).  This improves on 
older state capitalist work by offering clearer definitions of what constitutes capitalism or 
communism in terms of which classes appropriate surplus.  In capitalist society there is a 
difference between the producers (workers) and the appropriators (capitalists), while in a 
hypothetical communist society the producers would themselves be the appropriators.  
State capitalism for them is therefore the, ‘capitalist process of producing, appropriating 
and distributing surplus, consisting of and interacting with processes that place state 
officials in the class position of appropriators and distribution of surplus’ (p. 85).  Two 
problems arise from this; both relate to real historical aspects of Soviet-type economies 
which are minimised by this perspective.  
Firstly, whether or not state bureaucrats can be seen as fulfilling the role Resnick 
and Wolff claim for them can be questioned.  Most obviously there was no clearly defined 
objective function that this class could be understood as maximising in the same way that 
capitalists are defined by their need to maximise profit/minimise cost, and the minimax 
theorem has proved these to be essentially the same imperative.  Thus if Resnick and 
Wolff were right they would have to face the burden of explanation for the marked lack 
of success of the USSR in capitalist terms.  This is especially problematic given that an 
amalgamated capitalist class would surely be more, not less, effective than an atomised 
one in overcoming the contradictions that arise precisely from this atomisation.  Relating 
this specifically to the issue of Soviet trade policy, Westad (1997) has commented on how 
unsuccessful the USSR was in this regard from a capitalist point of view; ‘the Soviet 
‘empire’… couldn’t cultivate mutually-beneficial ties such as those between advanced 
capitalist states’ (p.268). 
Secondly, their criterion of what would justify considering the USSR or any 
society as non-capitalist is unrealistic.  Resnick and Wolff acknowledge that collective 
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property had replaced private, and that plan replaced market (pp.91-97), but argue that 
since there was still a distinction between producers and appropriators this cannot be 
classified as anything other than a variety of capitalism.  This criterion is not very useful 
on the grounds that it denies the significance of such fundamental structural distinctions 
as private/public, plan/market.  The expansion of the term ‘capitalism’ to cover Soviet-
type economies seems to stretch the concept too far, and for these reasons the economies 
to be studied will be referred to as ‘actually-existing socialism’, meaning any political 
economy characterised by public ownership and planned development of the economy.  
  In conclusion, it is argued the SCT was primarily the result of a political necessity 
during the Cold War.  The radically different performances of the two blocs in terms of 
growth, one characterised by a stable deceleration of growth over the post-war period, the 
other experiencing boom-and-bust, should suggest an essential difference between the 
two blocs in terms of economic structure.  The fact that the USSR imploded so suddenly 
and dramatically in the neo-liberal world of the early 1990s is further evidence of its 
fundamental ‘otherness’ in relation to developed capitalism.  This theme of the qualitative 
difference between Soviet-type economies and DMEs, and the need for theory to 
recognise this, will be returned to when customs union theory and WST are considered. 
  
4. Spheres of Influence or Dependency?  
  
  Securing the possibility for a new DT interpretation must show the limitations of 
existing DT scholarship on this area.  Although the historical focus of DT had always 
been relations between more and less developed capitalist economies, there have been 
several attempts by East European area-studies specialists to apply DT to their field (Clark 
and Bahry, 1983; Zimmerman, 1978).  These contributions will now be assessed with 
emphasis placed on pointing out how their limitations related to problems inherent in the 
classical theory of dependency.  
In some respects it is strange that the question of dependency relations between 
socialist economies has so seldom been explicitly addressed in the theoretical debates 
(this absence has been commented on by Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1997, p.234).  
Socialist planning is implicit in DT; it is perennially present as a silent interlocutor and 
accordingly we can find some comments in dependency literature about the situation in 
Eastern Europe and the possibility of non-capitalist dependency relations.  For example,  
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Wallerstein (1993) writes that, ‘[w]ithin a capitalist world-economy, there exists a world 
market price for any item traded.  A socialist country is free to sell an item for a price 
below the world market price... but that is a political decision which amounts to a transfer 
of surplus for non-economic reasons’ (p.112).  Although he did not attempt to describe or 
analyse the consequences of this any further, this is an accurate observation on the explicit 
role of politics in socialist trade relations. 
The key issue with the application of DT to the Eastern bloc was that the approach 
was seen by the area studies specialists who sought to apply it as a collection of models 
making various structural claims which could be taken off the shelf and employed without 
alteration in a new context.  Taking account of the fundamentally different 
centre/periphery relation characteristic of the Eastern bloc, this approach has to be seen 
as restrictive in contrast to a more open-ended engagement which tries to rethink DT in 
relation to new historical contexts.  The problem with the application of DT as it was then 
was that it kept the propositions of DT as positive statements, and so the only result Clark 
and Bahry (1983) achieve is the discovery that these propositions only have a very limited 
relevance to the Eastern bloc.  The same comparative method provides the starting-point 
for Zimmerman’s (1978) paper, which need not be treated here as many of the same points 
apply again in this case.  In setting out merely to test DT in a new context, Clark and 
Bahry cannot be held accountable for abstaining from carrying out an overhaul of the 
theory, but the rigidity with which they apply the tools forged by Frank and Cardoso 
results in several problematic statements which could have been avoided had they been 
prepared to reconsider the theory.  
For example, Clark and Bahry observe that,  
  
Despite these similarities to Western dependency, Stalin’s Eastern Europe 
provided one radical departure from capitalist classic dependency. Instead of the 
externally enforced economic stagnation posited by this model, postwar Soviet 
dominance over Eastern Europe brought Soviet-style rapid industrialization 
emphasizing heavy industry and producer goods (p.277).  
  
This ‘radical departure’, in that the centre actually sponsored industrialisation in the 
periphery, seems to both discount the relevance of the classic dependency model (which 
stakes so much on the stagnation and structural underdevelopment of the periphery) and 
in turn beg the development of a new one capable of bringing such occurrences within 
the horizon of theoretical analysis.  
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Secondly, Clark and Bahry are rather indeterminate on the Khrushchev era and 
the transition it saw.  This is the corollary of their comparative method whereby the two 
dependency models they treat are superimposed onto the serried surface of the historical 
material simply to see what emerges.  Having applied Frank’s framework to the Stalin 
era, and Cardoso’s to Brezhnev, the intermezzo Khrushchev era is left unstudied, and this 
disguises the issue of how we can trace the changing dynamics of intra-bloc relations over 
this crucial transition period.  This can be seen clearly in their argument that structures 
specific to the Stalinist period are key to understanding the move towards dependent 
development (p.279).  Contrary to this, I argue instead that it was post-Stalin leaderships 
agency in response to the limitations of Stalinist political and economic structures which 
led to the initiation of subsidised trade and dependent development, and that the 
continuance of these subsidies was partly due to the ability of post-Stalin East European 
leaderships to articulate their interests against a weakened Soviet centre. 
As such the over-arching problem with Clark and Bahry is the unwillingness to 
undertake any revision of dependency concepts, even when their diligent application of 
them flags-up the need for this to happen.  Surveying the fruits of the application of DT 
to the Eastern bloc, Kramer’s (1999b) verdict is that, ‘Their efforts were useful in 
underscoring the shortcomings of dependency theory, but their research shed relatively 
little light on the broad dynamics of Soviet policy in Eastern Europe’.  Instead he proposes 
a spheres of influence approach where ‘a sphere of influence can be described as a region 
of the world in which a preponderant external actor (A) is able to compel the local states 
to conform with state A’s own preferences’ (p.99).  
There are several reasons why this state-centric conception is problematic.  For 
Kramer, the question of power relations between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is 
framed exclusively in terms of inter-state relations with the Warsaw Treaty Organisation 
(WTO) being the key institution.  This leads to the problem if that the state is assumed to 
be a rational power-maximiser, many of the Soviet states’ economic actions seem 
anomalous.  This is underlined when Kramer poses a question, his implicit answer to 
which seems to establish the possibility for a dependency-centred account.  Kramer is 
aware that, ‘the East European states found the relative prices for trade with the Soviet 
Union to be far more advantageous than the prices for comparable trade with non-CMEA 
countries’ (p.112), but is unable to provide an explanation of why this trading system 
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functioned as it did.  In setting up influence as the key category, Kramer’s focus is 
necessarily turned towards state behaviour in the diplomatic-political sphere and away 
from the underlying structural developments.  For these reasons there is no political 
economy of socialist trade and development to be found in Kramer’s work.  
  
5. Exploitation, Subsidisation, Prices  
  
The task of constructing this political economy involves going outside and beyond 
the work of IR scholars and DT contributions and into the literature produced by 
economists, beginning with the exploitation/subsidisation debate.  Arguably the most 
influential position advanced in this debate held that the Soviet Union was subsidising 
Eastern Europe through the provision of favourable terms of trade in order to obtain 
political advantages.  The archetypal statement of the subsidisation thesis is given by 
Marrese and Vanous (1983), who sought to challenge the assumption of prior Western 
literature that the Soviet Union was exploiting its CMEA partners by utilising its dominant 
position to impose discriminatory terms of trade.  
Mendershausen (1960) gave the original statement of the exploitation thesis, 
which appears to be accurate for Stalin’s era.  Under Stalin’s direction, over the first 
decade Soviet relations with the new states of Eastern Europe were not so different from  
Frank’s claims about the world market, as the Soviets unilaterally forced unfavourable 
terms of trade on Eastern Europe (Nove, 1988, p.316).  A notorious example was the case 
of the under-pricing of Polish coal, for which the Soviet Union would later officially 
apologise.  Under the agreement, Poland was compelled to supply 13 million tons of coal 
per year between 1947 and 1950, then 18 million tons a year afterwards at the price of 
$1.25 a ton, which was 1/10 of the world market price (Fejtö, 1971, p.228).  Immediately 
after the war, the USSR was worried her newfound political and strategic clout might 
prove unsustainable by a war-damaged and still relatively backward economy; this 
motivated the Soviet Union to extract surplus wherever possible, chiefly in the form of 
reparations and dismantled industrial plant, to bolster its own economic base.  This took 
place because many of the territories over which the Soviet Union now enjoyed de facto 
control were at higher levels of industrial development than the USSR.  In fact, as early 
as the second CMEA meeting in Sofia, August, 1949, Czechoslovakia was openly 
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criticized for preferring to trade with the West and not sharing her industrial expertise 
within the bloc (Fowkes, 1995, p.62). 
Marrese and Vanous’ position is that whilst Soviet-dictated prices unfavourable 
to Eastern Europe may have been the case under Stalin, it grossly misrepresents what has 
happened since.  Their view is that,  
  
implicit trade subsidies have played a major role in Soviet-East European trade– 
in other words, that Eastern Europe has received preferential terms of trade from 
the Soviet Union compared to those available on Western markets.  Furthermore, 
it has been our contention that the Soviet Union has at least in part made a 
conscious decision to continue these subsidies in return for what we have called 
unconventional gains from trade–that is military, political, and ideological 
nonmarket benefits from Eastern Europe (p.145).  
 
That the Soviet Union accepted poor terms of trade with Eastern Europe–defined as below 
world market prices (wmps)–in return for non-economic benefits, is a popular opinion 
shared by various other scholars.  Recent examples demonstrating the longevity of this 
position include Saull (2007, p.97) and Castells (2010, pp.18-9).  
Marrese and Vanous’ study is a valuable econometric attempt to quantify the 
extent of the transfer between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, but the authors go no 
further than this.  There is no consideration of the socio-economic impact of this state of 
affairs on either Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union.  The restrictive focus on whether the 
terms of trade benefited either the Soviets or their European partners allows for no enquiry 
into the (inter)dependence stemming from this asymmetrical relationship.  Marrese and 
Vanous seem to consider it beyond the task they set themselves, which was essentially to 
show that there was an implicit subsidy, but in setting out their basic thesis that the trade 
relations between the two cannot be understood by reference to national economic 
interests alone, this sudden halt is a disappointing end.  
The fundamental problem with the subsidisation thesis is that it leaves it unclear 
why the Soviets continued to bear the burden of subsidising Eastern Europe for so long; 
this is where the concept of dependence is useful as it makes explicit what the Soviets got 
out of the relationship, and we can infer how much they valued this goal by how 
consistently it was pursued.  In this way, I argue that the policy of subsidising trade with 
Eastern Europe led to economic dependence, and this implies an account which centres 
round the idea of dependence, rather than subsidisation, can contain the valuable material 
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of the subsidisation thesis, as well as going further into the intentions and effects of this 
policy.  Marrese and Vanous calculate that the difference between wmps and CMEA 
foreign trade prices (ftps) meant that the subsidy paid to Eastern Europe was 
approximately $87 billion over the twenty year period after 1960.  This is a staggering 
amount, and the maintenance of Eastern Europe within the WTO (which was only 
seriously questioned at several flashpoints: 1956, 1968, 1981) alone seems insufficient to 
explain the continuance of such vast subsidies.  
Since it was the difference between wmps and ftps which allows the calculation 
of this transfer, it therefore becomes necessary to look into how intra-CMEA ftps were 
actually formulated.  The classic treatment of this is offered by Hewett (1974).  The fact 
that planners within the government of each member state fixed prices to be used 
domestically meant that it was impossible to derive a set of prices acceptable to all 
members for use in intra-CMEA trade from any of the national price indexes.  The 
solution adopted was a system of bilateral negotiations in which a representative sample 
from the world market was selected to serve as a base, and what Hewett calls the ‘battle 
of the documents’ ensued. 
In this way the unusual price structure of intra-CMEA trade was in some sense the 
outcome of the fact that CMEA was a group of planned economies but was not itself 
planned.  This relates to the changing relevance of ideology as it affected trade policy.  
Over the first decades when growth rates were impressive, it could be argued that it was 
enough for the socialist states to simply ‘hold on’, since the final crisis of capitalism would 
soon ultimately tip the scales in favour of global communism.  As this ideological view 
came to be seen as more and more illusionary, and the relative economic superiority of 
the West became more apparent, the need for a more comprehensive system of 
international socialist prices was accepted.  However, Csikós-Nagy (1973) has stressed 
how a truly socialist system of international prices was needed but remained 
fundamentally out of reach for CMEA, and by the 1970s acceptance of the long-term co-
existence of capitalism and socialism, and the fact that the later confronted the former 
from a position of increasing weakness, was wide-spread. 
Initially organised around the Bucharest principle, which set prices to be used for 
5-year periods based on world market data from the previous 5-year period, the inherent 
ambiguity of this operation should be underlined.  Lavigne (1983, p.136) has emphasised 
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how even for raw materials, for which wmps can be assessed fairly objectively by looking 
at the major commodity markets, prices diverged significantly, and this was even more 
true for manufactured goods where there was significant scope for interpretation and 
negotiation in price formation.  This was superseded in 1975 by the Moscow principle 
which retained the main formula but included provisions for prices to be renegotiated 
annually if deemed necessary.  This step was taken in response to the first oil shock and 
will be discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters.  In this way the system of 
domestic planning begat a particular mode of international trade based on a price structure 
completely dissimilar to–although in some sense deriving from–that governing trade 
between market economies.  
  
6. Subsidy scepticism  
  
Marer’s (1974; 1982) work stands out for his explicit rejection of both the 
subsidisation and exploitation theses.  Marer is notably restrained in his final verdict: ‘one 
would be hard put to establish beyond controversy which side benefits or loses the most 
economically.  The possibility that there are no net beneficiaries but only substantial net 
costs to all partners certainly cannot be excluded’ (1974, p.253).  In fact, Marer (1982) is 
one of only a handful of commentators who actually question the existence of substantial 
subsidies in the first place by arguing that East European manufactures were not as 
overvalued in intra-bloc trade as often thought.  
Without presenting reams of price data, it can be pointed out that there is a very 
broad consensus on the relatively low-quality of East European manufactured goods by 
international standards (Clark and Bahry, 1983, p.280).  For instance, Poznanski (1988) 
working from primary data has calculated that East European manufacturers often sold at 
up to a 40% discount in Western markets where consumers had more choices and higher 
expectations.  Likewise Köves (1991) repeatedly drew attention to the fact that, ‘A 
significant part of the products that Hungarian enterprises export to the Soviet market for 
rubles cannot be sold in the world market at all, or only at significantly reduced prices or 
after substantial additional expenditure for improvement’ (pp.175-6).  He goes on to make 
a distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ goods traded within CMEA depending on whether 
or not they were capable of sale at wmps, and notes that the Soviet Union, due to the large 
share of energy and raw materials in her exports, always exported more hard goods to 
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CMEA than they exported in return.  Accordingly there appears to be enough evidence to 
dispel Marer’s objection, and for these reasons this thesis accepts the Maresse and Vanous 
calculations as reasonable estimates.  
  
7. World-Systems Theory  
  
As an established theory within IPE, and one which is closely associated with DT, 
key attempts to analyse the Eastern bloc from the perspective of WST should be 
introduced here.  In addition to highlighting problems in these attempts, this will also 
allow the distinctiveness of the reformulation suggested in this thesis to be further drawn 
out.  First this section examines an example of WST work that attempted to understand 
the USSR as part of the capitalist world-system (Luke, 1985); secondly, it considers 
Szymanski’s (1982) attempt to analysis the socialist bloc as an independent world-system 
in its own right; and thirdly it points out general problems with the WST framework.  
WST has a characteristic approach to development by setting it in the context of a 
global web of connections which it is claimed sum to an analysable single entity, the 
world-system.  This is the main unit of analysis, and many of the strengths and weaknesses 
of the perspective stem from this analytical move.  A world-system is defined as a unit 
with a single division of labour and multiple political sovereignties, none of which can 
manage or control the whole economic system on its own.  For Wallerstein (1990) this is 
what capitalism has been since the 16th century, and borrowing from DT, which in turn 
took the terms from ECLA, he proposes that the international division of labour separates 
the world into three categories–core, semi-periphery, and periphery–linked together by 
exchange on the world market.  Like Frank, WST is committed to the claim that 
international trade leads to direct transfers of wealth from periphery to core.  The existence 
of multiple planned economies trading amongst themselves posed a question for WST 
about how this post-1945 development related to their conception of a singular world-
system. 
Luke (1985) uses Wallerstein’s category of the semi-peripheral state to explain 
the Soviet Union’s mix of massive industrial economy with technology lag in relation to 
the West, and in so doing champions the notion of a singular world-system, albeit one 
containing non-market economies.  In this perspective the availability of foreign capital 
and technology are held to be the key factors conditioning the growth of the Soviet 
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economy.  As has already been suggested in the section on state capitalism, for most of 
the period in question the drastically differing economic performance of the bloc can 
better be explained in terms of the different economic structures (both national and 
international) characteristic of the group of planned economies, and not by the fact that 
they traded on the world market.  However, from the 1970s onwards increasing reference 
needs to be made to developments in the world economy and the relation of the bloc to 
these, although this does not mean accepting the WST proposition that Eastern bloc 
development can be understood exclusively in relation to this. 
The necessity of striking a balance between the internal developmental logic of 
the bloc and external influences which can take account of intra-socialist trade on its own 
terms can be illustrated by noting that the very phenomenon that this thesis focuses on 
and claims to be of significance (the centre/periphery system centred on the USSR) almost 
disappears under the WST frame of reference.  For instance, Luke notes that, ‘special 
currency and administrative exchange conditions in the CMEA bloc–not its advanced 
technology, greater capital reserves or higher productivity–gave the USSR whatever 
advantages it held in the other communist states’ ‘dependent development’ (p.343).  In 
other words, the Soviet Union’s position as the ‘centre’ of this system was not based 
purely on economic superiority, and so trade and development within the system ran a 
different course which needs to take account of the asymmetrical relation between the 
socialist states and the specifics of how this was translated into a system of subsidised 
trade with very particular effects. 
In this way one of the problems with applying WST to the Eastern bloc is one of 
levels of analysis–i.e. is a global or a regional frame most appropriate?  This thesis argues 
both that national development until approximately 1980 was more influenced by regional 
than global dynamics, and that agency of both the centre and the periphery is needed to 
explain this.  Firstly, the subsidised trade put in place in the mid-1950s allowed for a 
particular type of dependent development to take place, although the limits to this were 
increasing apparent from the 1970s onwards, and secondly East European as well as 
Soviet agency is essential to explain this.  Since for Wallerstein the world-system predates 
and largely determines state behaviour, no room is left for agency in relation to this or 
any other system as he in effect makes politics into a function of an economies position 
in the world economy.  This precludes analysis of how different systems come into being, 
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develop and disintegrate in favour of an ahistorical emphasis on ‘continuity within 
change’.  Wallerstein locates strong states in the core, weak states in the periphery, and 
makes this difference in state power essential to wealth transfer.  As Skocpol (1977) has 
pointed out, this is one of a number of simplifying assumptions WST relies upon to make 
the model work which seem to tap the model of explanatory potential by excessively 
generalising.  This problem will be returned to later. 
This dominant position that Eastern bloc development can be fully understood in 
relation to the world-system was challenged by Szymanski (1982) who claimed that ‘the 
USSR and the CMEA countries, on the one hand, and the developed capitalist countries, 
on the other, compose two autonomous world-systems’, and that the linkages between 
them were of a non-essential or ‘luxury’ type.  Addressing the issue of Soviet dependence 
on the world market, Szymanski asserts that the ‘Soviet Union is the most self-sufficient 
industrial economy in the world’, and that by 1959, ‘the Soviet Union was in a position 
to supply virtually all the industrial ingredients necessary for its growth without engaging 
in any trade at all’ (p.105).  This represents an improvement on Luke’s approach in that 
it allows the acceptance of a significant development dynamic largely internal to the bloc.  
However, if this was the case then the fact that there was ‘any trade at all’, and 
such a large volume between CMEA members, needs to be explained.  Szymanski’s 
answer is that the Soviet Union ‘engages in trade primarily to organize more efficiently 
its domestic production and consumption and secondarily to lend economic support to 
other countries.  It does not engage in trade because its economy could not operate 
successfully without such trade’ (p.106).  This proposition clashes on two fronts with my 
preliminary thesis about Soviet development: firstly, it will later be argued that 
preferential trade with CMEA had a significant impact on the national production of the 
Soviet Union, and secondly that Soviet trade with Eastern Europe was carried out from 
1956 onwards specifically to secure the dependence of the later, and in so doing to achieve 
the geopolitical goal of bloc unity.  Thus Szymanski can be questioned about both the 
intention and the effects of this system of economic relations. 
Essentially, regardless of whether Luke or Szymanski’s view is accepted, those 
using the world-system paradigm do not have an explanation for why the USSR 
voluntarily chose to trade at a loss or an analysis of the effects of this decision for 
development in the bloc.  The focus on understanding the Eastern bloc as a non-market 
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entity embedded within the world market is useful but alone is not enough to explain 
development within the bloc.  This thesis attempts to substantiate the proposition that 
structures of production characteristic of actually-existing socialism were determined to 
a greater degree by factors internal to the bloc.  Without denying the significance of the 
world market, economic structures within the bloc, such as public ownership, centralised 
planning, trade and integration within CMEA, and single-party government, are argued 
to have been more significant, the best evidence for the precedence of these features being 
the lack of success enjoyed by the region in the world market.  It will later be argued that 
this lack of success owed much to CMEA trade and integration processes, and in this way 
this thesis argues that by centring the analysis round the logic of development internal to 
the bloc, albeit while showing how they interrelated to external geopolitical and economic 
factors, the type of development achieved, both in terms of its successes and failure, can 
be better explained. 
Many problems identified with DT, particularly the reification of the categories of 
centre/periphery and the assumed nature of the interactions between them, are magnified 
in WST.  Wallerstein (1982) claims that, ‘the core-periphery relationship indicates the 
degree to which surplus-value is unevenly distributed in the direction of the core’ (p.93).  
This is a good example of the kind of positive statements DT/WST produced–in fact it 
makes the transfer of surplus-value the substance of the whole relationship.  Given that I 
have already argued that the Eastern bloc can usefully be considered as a centre/periphery 
relationship, but one characterised by an entirely different dynamic of interaction, this 
seems to make WST an inappropriate theoretical tool for this historical case given its 
axiomatic commitment to a particular dynamic of centre/periphery relation. 
Similar issues of distinguishing between economic systems as were claimed to 
affect the state capitalist analysis of Soviet-type economies can be seen in WST (see for 
example Frank, 1977).  Beginning from the world market leads WST into seeing all 
economies as essentially variations on the theme of exchange, and since exchange in some 
form or another has been a feature of every economy from the Neo-lithic period forwards 
(Laclau, 1982), an a-historic generality results.  The uncritical transfer of concepts 
developed for the analysis of DMEs to the socialist bloc that results from over-
emphasising world market trade has been criticised by Staniszkis (1992): ‘The 
transposition of concepts from the capitalist context which has been typical in such 
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discussions [of Soviet international economic relations] simply does not allow one to deal 
with a phenomenon which is specific to socialism’ (p.43). 
Whilst WST made a deservedly large impact on social science in the 1980s, in 
moving the level of analysis so far away from concrete social contexts it proved incapable 
of fully grasping the dynamics which characterised Soviet and East European structures 
of production, exchange, and consumption.  Although the fact that the Eastern bloc existed 
within the world market, and from the 1970s onwards trade between East and West 
became substantial, these linkages should not be privileged over interrelations within to 
the bloc.  Such East-West linkages are very significant in terms of highlighting the 
limitations to the dependent development of CMEA, but should not be appealed to as core 
explanatory categories for development per se. 
  
8. The East European Thesis  
  
The East European thesis, examined here through the work of Staniszkis (1992), 
differs from WST in two key respects: the level of analysis remains national or regional, 
and attention stays directed towards specific socio-economic consequences (see also 
Köves, 1981; Gács, 1989; and Nyers, 1986).  This is an improvement from my point of 
view given the aim is to first study the intentions and development consequences of 
relations internal to the bloc and then to integration the global context.  For Staniszkis, 
dependence on the Soviet Union put a ‘permanent stamp on the way in which the states 
and economies involved functioned’ (p.42).  She further argues that this dependence was 
unique to socialism since it grew out of the particular nature of economic interaction 
between planned economies.  The originality of Stanizskis’ position consists in her 
argument that the primary value of Eastern Europe for the Soviet Union was economic, 
rather than political or military, but she accomplishes this without simply restating the 
original exploitation thesis which was rightly challenged by Marrese and Vanous.  
This is because the dependence relation secured the continuous flow of products 
into the Soviet economy which could only otherwise have been obtained with difficulty 
due to the inconvertibility of the rouble and the political impediments to trade with the 
West.  This freed-up factors of production which did not have to be engaged in similar 
activities; the corresponding cost to Eastern Europe was in the Soviet-directed pattern of 
specialisation which necessarily resulted in dependence on the CMEA market.  Alongside 
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this the import of Western components which were then turned into finished products and 
exported to the USSR became increasingly common.  This used-up valuable hard 
currency which could otherwise have been used to modernise the technological base of  
Eastern Europe’s industry by financing imports of capital goods.  This could have created 
the possibility of lessening dependence on the Soviet Union by raising product quality 
and therefore increasing possibilities of exporting to non-CMEA countries.  
Whilst there is much to be applauded in this perspective, there are several areas 
where this body of work is problematic.  Firstly and most importantly there is a general 
lack of well-defined theoretical concepts on display meaning that analysis is sometimes 
ad hoc and unsystematic.  Most obviously, Staniszkis loses sight of fact that Eastern 
Europe did not only lose through association with the USSR–dependent development is 
still development, and it would be difficult to argue Eastern Europe could have 
industrialised so rapidly without Soviet support.  It also should be pointed out that this 
literature was primarily researched during the Cold War, and as such perhaps it could be 
expected that an anti-Soviet bias would be involved.  Writing after the Cold War, it should 
be possible to go beyond the sometimes politicised nature of this East European 
scholarship and look at the interrelation between trade and development in a non-
normative way.  Finally, and perhaps as a result of the point made above, the East 
European thesis is weak on the issue of reciprocal influence, with the USSR almost totally 
disappearing from analysis.  This is one of the key points of the reformulation offered 
here; that the internationalisation of development necessitates looking at how all parts of 
the system were affected by processes of trade and integration.  Accordingly, the East 
European thesis’ valuable empirical information was not complemented by a theoretical 
framework capable of systematically building an account based on these realisations.  
 
9. CMEA as a Customs Union  
  
At the same time as analysts were questioning the WST approach, a new theory 
was proposed which conceptualised CMEA as a customs union (CU), a trading bloc with 
a common external tariff.  Although there was no actual common external tariff around 
the CMEA area, the extensive system of quotas and other administrative measures in place 
made it seem as though there was one.  The CU position is that CMEA ftps deviated 
considerably from wmps, but were none-the-less in proportion to the factor endowments 
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internal to the largely autarkic unit (Desai, 1987; Brada, 1988).  This is to say that since 
CMEA taken as a whole was rich in terms of natural resources and poor in terms of 
machinery, the high prices for machinery and manufactured goods relative to raw 
materials were the ‘natural’ prices which would have emerged in any CU.  The conclusion 
is therefore there were no subsidies, implicit or otherwise, and geopolitical factors had no 
noticeable influence on trade.  CU theory thus offers an essentially structuralist 
conception of intra-bloc trade, in contradistinction to the assertion made by this thesis that 
both East European and Soviet agency is essential to understand it. 
One reason prompting the application of CU theory to CMEA was that by the mid-
1980s studies were claiming that the subsidies were more diverse than had been thought 
(Holzman, 1986).  Although Marrese and Vanous had accounted for the difference 
between what East Germany and Czechoslovakia, at one end of the spectrum, and 
Romania at the other, received from the Soviet Union by reference to their respective 
strategic values to the Kremlin, their theory could not account for occasional instances 
where the difference between ftps and wmps actually allowed for small subsidies passing 
from the six to the Soviet Union.  CU theory could account for these instances by stressing 
the non-political nature of the price structure which was effectively determined by the fact 
that CMEA functioned as a CU in all but name.  The chief virtue of the approach was 
therefore its questioning of the simplified understanding of ‘non-economic gains from 
trade’ used by Marrese and Vanous which proposed a linear relation between the strategic 
value of a country to the USSR and the dimensions of the subsidy extended to it.  
A second more technical success for the theory was its correct prediction that 
CMEA integration would tend to be characterised by inter-industry rather than intra-
industry specialisation (as defined in chapter 3).  From 1970s there was a trend for more 
intra-industry specialization in the West, and CU theory suggested that a similar process 
would not take place in the East, or only at a much slower pace (Pelzman, 1978).  This is 
an example of a valuable insight generated by a different theoretical frame which a 
reformulated DT can take account of (see the specifics of the reformulation given in 
chapter 3, and chapters 5 and 6 for historical examples).  Whilst CU theory successfully 
challenged the simplified conception of politics employed by Marrese and Vanous, the 
new solution was in effect to try to solve the puzzle by making no reference to political 
factors at all, and this excising of politics from the debate was a step backwards for several 
reasons.  
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Firstly, advocates of CU theory ignored the fact that although goods, services, and 
to a lesser extent capital did move in substantial quantities within CMEA, the organisation 
never was and never could have been considered a ‘market’ in the sense understood by 
economic theory; non-monetised barter agreements using negotiated prices simply cannot 
be treated as comparable to the exchange relations in market economies.  Secondly, CU 
theorists paid insufficient attention to the fact that the range of this semi-autarchic 
‘market’ was itself a construct guided by geopolitical concerns, and the institutional 
mechanisms through which it operated were likewise emphatically political, most 
importantly the use of negotiated prices.  The need to conceptualise structures in terms of 
social struggle will be developed in the next chapter.  The example of Yugoslavia 
underlines this point: Yugoslavia had wanted to take part in the founding CMEA 
conference but was barred by Stalin.  This exclusion made little economic sense as there 
were many treaties and cooperation agreements already in force between Yugoslavia and 
CMEA countries, but the decision was about the politics of who would or would not 
submit to Stalin’s dominance of the bloc (Singleton and Carter, 1982).  
Finally, CU theorists tended to assume that the planned economies were inherently 
trade-averse.  This was not the case–all Eastern bloc party leaders were well aware of the 
gains to be had from trading with DMEs and tended to resent the political barriers to 
accomplishing this imposed by the West (Sanchez-Sibony, 2010).  This therefore 
represents a serious misapprehension on the part of CU theory.  These problems suggest 
the transfer of concepts appropriate to the analysis of market economies cannot be avoided 
with the application of CU theory, and this approach to the study of actually-existing 
socialism has already been critiqued.  
Conceiving of CMEA as a CU offers an internally coherent solution to the 
problem; it expels political concerns from the debate and then proclaims the economics 
of international socialism to be roughly commensurate with the economics of any CU.  
To re-state a core proposition, the point is that the subsidies were not primarily or just 
political, equally as well as they were not primarily or just economic–they were the 
institutional mechanism by which CMEA became a coordinated system of development, 
and more specifically of dependent development, the dynamics of which can best be 
captured by a theoretical paradigm which places such concerns at the centre of its analysis 
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and accepts the substantial role of geopolitical concerns behind its origin and 
development. 
 
10. Institutionalism  
  
  The final item to be included is Stone’s (1996) attempt to bring IPE back into 
contact with the Soviet bloc.  In addition to the relatively recent date of publication, 
Stone’s research occupies a unique position in that he was the first to secure access to 
both the relevant archives and also to former trade officials.  As such, whilst some of his 
theoretical and methodological premises can be questioned, his study is empirically 
pristine and an invaluable source of qualitative information.  Specifically, Stone’s 
research represents the best available evidence to support the claim that East European 
party leaders and state officials were entirely aware of the economic benefits of CMEA 
and acted to secure the continuance of the subsidies, even after Soviet enthusiasm for the 
arrangement began to cool.  
  
New evidence demonstrates that the Soviet Union’s control over its satellites was 
much weaker than was believed during the years of the cold war.  The East 
Europeans waged a covert campaign over several decades to rebuff Soviet 
proposals for economic integration, to fill official documents with loopholes, and 
to avoid implementing agreements that had been signed.  This campaign 
succeeded even though the Soviet Union paid a handsome subsidy to its satellites 
in the form of skewed prices for machinery and raw materials (p.3).  
  
As such, that this extensive trade system existed at all, let alone in a stable state for almost 
half a century despite being continually contested, is in itself interesting and reminds us 
of the over-riding significance of the Cold War context which led the Soviets to continue 
to accept the costs of the system. 
  Stone begins from the methodological postulate that explanations need to be based 
on ‘micro-foundations’.  This means that outcomes must be shown to follow from the 
choices of individuals who are assumed to be able to identify and follow their interests.  
This does not deny the importance of unintended consequences; rather it redefines them 
as puzzles to be unlocked through looking at the collective results of individual choices 
made in pursuit of discrete objectives.  This methodological individualism is the natural 
complement to Stone’s institutionalism, and it is the troika these two form when coupled 
with rational choice theory which provides the explanatory traction for Stone’s thesis.  
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This perspective, which centres on rational actors, normally but not exclusively 
individuals, making choices within a determinate institutional setting, will henceforth be 
what is meant by institutionalism.  
This leads Stone to conceptualise CMEA trade in terms of the choices of 
bureaucrats at various levels of the state apparatus, and in this way the key issue appears 
as one of bargaining strategy, or more specifically, ineffective bargaining strategy on the 
part of the USSR (p.72).  This is a striking reorientation of the received view of the politics 
of CMEA; even when the economics of the Soviet ‘Empire’ were revised to allow for a 
more multifaceted picture to emerge through the various rounds of debate over the 
quantity and meaning of the subsidies, it was still largely assumed that despite this Eastern 
Europe was unable to assert itself against the Soviet Union and had instead been a passive 
recipient of subsidies accountable for by Soviet agency alone.  
  There are several reasons for thinking institutionalism may be theoretically 
problematic, especially given that the stated aim of this thesis is to construct an account 
of the links between trade and development in the context of Cold War antagonism.  The 
most noticeable problem is Stone’s almost total inversion of the relationship to arrive at 
a situation where it can seem as though the Soviets got little except a large bill from the 
situation.  The application of bargaining theory compels Stone to accept a somewhat 
distorted perspective of the ‘victories’ of the East European negotiators which seemed 
naturally to imply corresponding ‘losses’ for the Soviet Union.  This approach 
foregrounds the bargaining process and it’s outcomes to arrive at a minimalist account 
insulated from the broader dynamics which operated beyond and behind the institutional 
tussles Stone focuses on.  Most centrally, the fact that the USSR did secure Eastern 
Europe’s dependence, as well as the geopolitical significance of this, disappears and the 
mode of development CMEA trade generated is not analysed.  
In this way there is a danger that institutions come to be seen as independent, 
exogenous variables when they are precisely the entities that need to be explained in the 
first place.  This excludes the question of the origin and development of institutions in 
relation to the changing material base of society which historical materialism starts from.  
Who made the institutions of socialist economic life and how?  They were, in fact, 
constantly being remade; that these recurrent reforms seldom changed anything 
substantial is another fact in need of an explanation.  Had Stone employed a less reductive 
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method he could have arrived at the different question of why the East European state 
bureaucrats, who operated within institutions carbon-copied from their Soviet 
counterparts, were able to ‘vigorously [oppose] integration proposals designed to reduce 
the subsidy[…] As a result, the Soviet Union did not achieve any of its major goals in 
economic relations with its satellites from the late 1960s to the collapse of the bloc in 
1989’ (p.39).  This position both hints at the existence of a long-run development pattern 
which is not systematically examined and seems to make recourse to institutions alone 
insufficient to explain why the USSR was consistently outplayed in trade negotiations 
with its satellites.  
 
11. Conclusion  
  
Summarising the literature presented here, the following chief conclusions can be 
drawn:  
  
1. Whilst the exploitation thesis captures the relationship between the Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe in the immediate post-war period, the process of de- 
Stalinisation brought fundamental changes which meant Mendershausen’s 
position had to be rethought.  
  
2. The subsidisation thesis provided new and important empirical insights but 
remained simplistic–it ignored the growing complexity of the situation and instead 
substituted a logic whereby the Soviets secured political influence in return for 
economic subsidies.  
  
3. Marer, on the other hand, is too pessimistic–he begins by critiquing the 
subsidisation thesis but by focusing only on the costs of this system, which 
obscures Eastern Europe’s real dependence on the Soviet Union, as such this part 
of the picture remains out of focus.  
  
4. WST made some interesting contributions to the on-going debate, particularly 
around dynamics stemming from the embedding of the Soviet bloc within the 
world economy.  However, enthusiasm for determinist logics ultimately led 
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practitioners of WST away from the perception that Eastern bloc development 
cannot be explained just by reference to the world economy and minimised the 
role of geopolitics which it simplified into a function of the world economy. 
 
5. WST, CU theory and SCT all share the notion that Soviet-type economies are best 
understood through market categories.  This position is rejected by this thesis in 
favour of an approach more akin to what has been termed the Eastern European 
thesis.  This appears to be an attempt by local scholars to study the actual 
implications of the system of international linkages within the Soviet bloc which 
WST and CU theory were side-lining in the 1980s.  
  
6. Finally, Clark and Bahry’s comparative dependency analysis and Stone’s 
institutionalist approach were assessed with an eye to highlighting theoretical and 
methodological problems in what stand as the most recent treatments of the topic.   
The fundamental nature of many of the issues identified with Stone’s research in 
particular means an engagement with such primary concerns would be useful if 
the legitimacy of any divergent interpretation is to be established.  
  
This literature review has argued that the above approaches all made valuable 
contributions but do not adequately link trade to development in the context of the Cold 
War, and that the root cause of this is that CMEA trade generated a form of dependent 
development which cannot be fully articulated either by the paradigms used by area-
studies scholars or economists, or by the application of classical DT.  As such, I disagree 
with the area studies literature in so far as it treats it’s organising concepts intuitively 
rather than defining them clearly–few area studies scholars would disagree with the broad 
claim that Eastern Europe was dependent on the USSR during the Cold War but they do 
not define dependence or systematically treat the economic history of the period from this 
perspective–and I disagree with other theoretical frames which posit significantly 
different premises for analysis: for instance, with WST, that links to world economy were 
the only significant determinant; SCT, that planned economies can be analysed as forms 
of capitalism; CU theory, that the structures of exchange were independent of politics; 
etc.  The next chapter will set-out the methodological and theoretical principles of a 
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reformulated DT which it is proposed can fill this gap and provide a political economy of 
trade and development in the Eastern bloc. 
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Rethinking Dependency Theory 
   
1. Introduction  
 
Three key problems need to be addressed if DT is to serve as the foundation for 
an account of Eastern bloc trade.  
  
1. The categories of centre/periphery were reified to the point where real changes in 
the world economy were ignored in favour of a supposed continuity.  This meant 
that increasingly diverse processes of development were not accurately perceived 
and could not be explained within the framework.  Beginning from an ideal-type 
is proposed as a solution to this, the details of which are presented in section 4.  
  
2. The definitions and concepts offered were sometimes imprecise.  This issue is 
taken-up in sections 5, 6 and 7. 
  
3. The treatment of agency typical of DT can be improved upon.  The significance 
of internal factors for understanding the development of different regions was 
consistently minimised in favour of an emphasis on external conditions, and this 
issue is also returned to in sections 5, 6 and 7. 
 
This chapter will first outline the primary methodological approach argued to be suitable 
for rectifying these issues before introducing and critiquing the key parts of the 
dependency tradition.  It will end by stating the proposed reformulation which brings 
valuable elements from the DT tradition together with new concepts. 
 
2. Methodology 
  
This section is concerned with methodology, by which is meant a system of 
concepts which provide a clear guide to practical research upon which a theoretical 
framework can be based.  Specifically, the following sections give statements of ideal-
typical method in general and an account of how comparison is conceptualised in relation 
to this approach.  The classic summary of methodological approaches in IR is Hollis and 
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Smith (1991) and see Jackson (2011) for a recent comprehensive survey containing a 
lucid description of contemporary ideal-typical analysis.  
 
2.1 Ideal-Typical Method  
  
 Although the term ‘ideal-type’ comes from political theorist, Georg Jellinek, it is 
most associated with Max Weber (1949).  Scholars working in this tradition are concerned 
with the construction and application of abstract characterisations of particular 
phenomena which present the essential features without the contingent elements specific 
to any example (Benton and Craib, 2001, p.80).  Although the relationship between 
historical materialism and Weber is keenly debated (see Sayer, 1990), there are schools 
of thought which have sought to combine elements from the two.  The key figure in the 
Marxist tradition who argued for the importance of idealisation in Capital–although not 
necessarily in Marx’s earlier work–is Nowak (1971), who gave a mathematical analysis 
of Marx’s system on the presupposition that it is understood to be an idealised version of 
real historical tendencies.  From a different perspective, Lukacs (1983) has also sought to 
incorporate some ideal-typical elements within his Marxism; see his discussion of class 
consciousness as an ideal (p.50ff).  However, Löwy (1996) has emphasised how Lukacs 
makes a purely heuristic borrowing of the form of the ideal-type, and the same approach 
is adopted here; the content imparted to the ideal-type is not Weberian.  As such, this 
thesis proceeds on the non-dogmatic assumption that the analytical form of the ideal-type 
need not be exclusively associated with Weberian sociology.  I argue that this method is 
useful for reformulating DT and applying it to the Eastern bloc on the grounds that the 
centre/periphery relation within the bloc simply did not resemble the positive claims of 
classical DT, but can still be argued to have constituted a form of dependence none-the-
less. 
Weber distinguished between ‘average types’, which are syntheses of general 
features, and ‘ideal-types’, syntheses of significant features which must be logically 
compatible with one another (1949, pf.100).  Since they highlight the essential features 
alone, ideal-types are unreal in the same way that axioms are separate from empirical 
reality; ideal-typical research accepts that no concept can capture and reproduce all the 
details of specific situations.  Partly for this reason, types must be flexible and open to 
being rethought as the subject matter changes.  Weber (1968) proposed a large variety of 
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ideal-types including abstract descriptions of forms of social organisation; he was 
especially interested by neo-classical economics’ idealisation of economically rational 
man.  In contradistinction to these uses, here the form of the ideal-type is used to describe 
a particular type of development.  
The set of analytical claims making-up an ideal-type provides the framework and 
the terminology with which to construct what Jackson (2011) terms an analytical 
narrative–a ‘coherent story that differentiates between analytically general and case-
specific factors responsible for bringing about an outcome and details their sequential 
interaction and concatenation over the time frame of the analysis’.  Importantly, this does 
not constitute a testing of the theory in the positivist sense because, ‘the ideal-type is 
implicated in the very construction of the narrative itself’ (p.154).  Thus, it is the 
beginning, not the result, of ideal-typical research that is of general validity in 
contradistinction to positivism where the ordering of generality is reversed.  Where we 
intuitively suspect relations similar to those contained in the type, it can then be used to 
assist in depicting and understanding these relations (Ringer, 1997, p.111).  Weber did 
not consider this procedure to be a new method; he simply saw this as clarifying and 
bringing awareness to what social scientists had always been doing.  In this way, he felt 
scholars had a choice between offering logically-controlled and unambiguous definitions 
of the ideas they worked with, or of allowing their ideas to remain intuitive and imprecise 
(Gerth and Mills, 1970, p.59; Giddens, 1971, p.141).  The sometimes vague use of 
concepts like surplus and reproduction in DT, and the usually intuitive sense in which 
dependence is understood in areas studies literature, has already been criticised; I agree 
with Weber that unambiguous statements of ideas is a useful procedure in general and 
argue that is especially well-suited to the project of reformulating DT.  
A number of inter-paradigm criticisms need to be acknowledged in order to secure 
the legitimacy of this method over alternatives.  One problem with categorisation is that 
if pursued for its own sake it can artificially circumscribe enquiry.  Suspicion towards the 
use of ideal-types normally stems from this perceived penchant for cataloguing which 
critics attribute to Weberians.  Developing this point of view, Teschke makes two 
criticisms: first, Teschke (2009, pp.50-1) argues ideal-typical analysis cannot account for 
social change since this is excluded by the very practice of constructing and applying the 
ideal-type; and secondly that Weberian method in effect offers a comprehensive ‘filling-
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cabinet’ for empirical data but nothing more (Heine and Teschke, 1996, p.410).  These 
represent the most regular forms of criticism levelled against such approaches; that the 
process of absorbing complex and varied events under ideal-types effaces difference and 
encourages excessive generalisation.  Given that a problematic tendency towards 
generalisation has already been highlighted in DT and WST, this criticism has to be taken 
seriously and considered in the reformulation.  
Firstly, it is relevant that the ideal-type used in this thesis, dependent development, 
is an ideal-type of a mode of development, and so it is an ideal description of a type of 
development process, not a static form of social organisation as Weber’s models of 
bureaucracy and feudalism were.  More generally, the answer from proponents of ideal-
typical research is that they have a particular view of knowledge-creation in which abstract 
theoretical constructs are seen by them as instrumental tools; Weber (1949) accordingly 
admonished that, ‘there is only one criterion, namely, that of success in revealing concrete 
cultural phenomena in their interdependence, their causal conditions and their significance.  
The construction of abstract ideal-types recommends itself not as an end but as a means’ 
(p.92). 
This makes ideal-typical research fundamentally different from positivism, in that 
whilst positive statements are checked against an independent and objective reality, and 
thus researchers seek to find if their propositions ‘hold’ across multiple cases, 
idealisations are instrumental abstract constructs which were never claimed to serve this 
purpose at all.  Ideal-typical research therefore is not necessarily just about measuring the 
distance between the ideal and reality; it is also about providing the core analytical terms 
that allow a narrative of that reality to be built in the first place.  Having outlined ideal-
typical method, how this relates to the reformulation of DT as a theory of international 
economic relations needs to be covered next.  
  
2.2 Comparison 
  
Unlike positivism, which requires attention be directed to multiple cases in order 
to test hypotheses, ideal-typical research aims at the crafting of case-specific analytical 
narratives, and so can take or leave comparative methods.  When comparisons are made, 
they are done so explicitly to draw-out the specific features of the case under 
consideration.  Tilly (1984) makes a relevant distinction between individualising and 
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universalising comparison, with ideal-typical comparison being an example of the former 
and positivist comparison of the later.  In individualising comparison, ‘the point is to 
contrast specific instances of a given phenomenon as a means of grasping the peculiarities 
of each case… [while] universalising comparison… aims to establish that every instance 
of a phenomenon follows essentially the same rule’ (p.82).  In this study, the given 
phenomenon is dependent development, the abstract description of which is therefore not 
meant as a set of exact definitions or rules which hold across multiple-cases.  
At certain points in the historical narratives, comparisons will be used to draw-out 
specific features of the Eastern bloc economies in comparisons to DMEs.  Most 
importantly, CMEA ftps are compared to those which could have been obtained on the 
world market, but also the posited costs to Eastern Europe in terms of reduced efficiency 
and disrupted innovation only make sense in relation to the world economy.  This is one 
example of how the peculiarities and contradictions of development within CMEA will 
be drawn out via comparison to industrialised capitalist countries.  These comparisons 
made between real-world historical examples can be distinguished to the comparative 
method in Clark and Bahry’s work, which was linked to positivist assumptions which aim 
to investigate whether general propositions, in their case those of Frank and Cardoso’s 
dependency models, hold over multiple cases.  This ossifies theory, and accepts an 
implicit (if unstated) definition of dependency which would exclude many potential cases, 
which is the opposite of what this thesis aims to do.  
Similarly, these individualising comparisons can be distinguished from the 
ideologically-motivated comparison of an idealised socialist planned economy to the 
reality of development.  It is worth remembering that in the 1950s and 60s, the rapid 
growth of the socialist countries was often contrasted to low grow in the developing world 
by dependency theorists (Amsden, 1979).  Usually the Soviet model of industrial 
development was the counter-factual against which the dependency conferred upon less 
developed economies by the world market was compared and found wanting.  This is 
especially evident in the case of Baran (1971, 1994), but also applies to Frank (1969), 
Amin (2011), and Furtardo (1964).  Even where contributors were not sympathetic to 
Marx (for example Prebisch and Singer), the existence and success of Soviet-type 
economies never-the-less provided part of the context for their own theories.  Howard and 
King (1992, p.169) have stressed the importance of the successful transformation of the 
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Soviet Union, and the later extension of the system of planned economy to Eastern Europe 
and China, for leading Baran and those who built on his work to perceive any form of 
capitalist development as inferior to the alternative offered by central planning. 
 
2.3 Summary 
 
These sections have argued a number of points which are of relevance to the 
reformulation of DT and the analytical narrative of Eastern bloc trade and development.  
  
1. Ideal-typical method can be used to build coherent explanations of social 
phenomena by specifying what should be understood as generally valid and 
what as conditional on particular identifiable factors.  With this in mind, an 
ideal-typical model of dependent development will be proposed further down 
which can allow for open-ended historical enquiry on the grounds that the 
ideal-type offered refrains from presupposing any particular dynamic of 
interaction between centre/periphery.  
  
2. Ideal-typical method does not make use of universalising comparison, where 
comparison serves to identify if the same rule holds across multiple cases.  It 
does make use of individualising comparisons, which seek to draw out the 
specific nature of different instances of a given phenomenon. 
   
3. Dependency Theory  
  
The next task of this chapter is to establish a critical account of DT against which 
the reformulation can be contrasted.  I argue that dependent development is more useful 
as a starting-point than the Frankian concept of underdevelopment, and so this will be 
accomplished through an engagement with Frank (1969, 1982, 1994b), and Cardoso 
(1977a, 1977b), from whom the concept of dependent development comes.  Another 
major part of the critical tradition of IPE, unequal exchange, will also be considered 
briefly and reasons given why it are not used here.  The key point is that although unequal 
exchange might sound well-suited to analysis of CMEA trade, ultimately it represents an 
approach too reliant on assumptions appropriate to market economies to form the basis of 
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an ideal-typical treatment of dependence general enough to cover socialist international 
economic relations and be potentially applicable elsewhere.  
  The theory of unequal exchange proposed by Emmanuel (1972) was a highly 
original attempt to forge a Marxian theory of trade, and so to question the dominant 
(neo)Ricardian understanding.  Emmanuel’s critique centres on the Ricardian assumption 
that labour and capital are immobile.  He argues that whilst this is a legitimate assumption 
to make of labour, which cannot easily pass across national or regional borders, recent 
economic history is characterised above all by the increasingly global mobility of capital.  
This mobility of capital tends to cause the rate of profit to equalise internationally, whilst 
wages tend to equalise within rather than between nations.  It is this discrepancy between 
the substantive characteristics imparted to wage-labour in different national economies 
which is the basis for unequal exchange.  As such, the theory of unequal exchange posits 
that in trade at wmps, poor nations are compelled to exchange products embodying a large 
number of hours of labour against rich nation products containing relatively less labour-
time.  
The theory of unequal exchange was in part a response to the fact that there are 
examples of nations whose international economic relations look like the ones Frank et al 
claim cause underdevelopment, but are in fact rich (for instance New Zealand and 
Australia who export primary and agricultural products).  Unequal exchange was thus a 
significant improvement from an analytical point of view as it could account for these 
examples by turning attention towards differing wage-levels and their impact on terms of 
trade.  Unequal exchange is thus predicated on a definite link between domestic factor 
prices and international prices provided through a more-or-less free market.  However, 
the dual discrepancy between both prices internal to Eastern bloc economies and CMEA 
ftps, as well as the only tangential relation of these CMEA prices to those found on world 
markets has already been made clear.  For this reason unequal exchange cannot be used 
to look at trade between planned economies, where extensive negotiations led prices to 
deviate considerably from ‘free market’ prices and there was no link between wages and 
international prices.  Since this deviation is the whole reason for this study, the theory of 
unequal exchange is argued to be a less useful starting-point than dependent development.  
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3.1 Classical Dependency: Andre Gunder Frank  
  
 Received in the English-speaking world as the founder of DT, Frank sees 
dependency as an entirely negative phenomenon caused by the hierarchical nature of the 
world market.  Capitalism is defined by Frank solely as production for exchange on the 
world market in which a group of economies designated the ‘centre’ exploit another 
group, the ‘periphery’.  The result of this exchange relation is the appropriation and 
concentration of capital providing growth for the centre, stagnation and 
underdevelopment for the rest.  Frank terms this the ‘development of underdevelopment’, 
making a distinction between being undeveloped–the state of affairs which existed in all 
regions prior to their integration into the world economy–and underdevelopment, by 
which he means a subsequent process of restructuring to meet imperial needs.  
Development is thus fundamentally international, in the sense that it is driven by the 
global transfer of wealth, as well as zero-sum in Frank’s view since the gain of the centre 
comes necessarily at the expense of the periphery. 
Frank’s work can be considered a reaction to the then hegemonic modernisation 
thesis (Rostow, 1990), which tended to downplay the significance of international 
context.  Frank countered this by calling attention to varying socio-economic structures 
in different countries and their relations to one another through the world market.  Contra 
modernisation theory, DT has always stressed the importance of considering a country’s 
involvement in wider encompassing economic systems, and whilst this was a valuable 
contribution, a number of problems can be identified which suggest Frank’s formulation 
should not be used here.  
The first problem to emerge relates to the extremely economistic way in which 
international context is included by Frank.  Little room is left for geopolitical factors or 
state agency, both of which are largely considered to be determined by the world 
economy.  Any reformulation must include geopolitics as a variable influence on trade 
and development, but this is especially important given that I argue geopolitical concerns 
are essential to understanding the extra-economic significance attached by the Soviet 
Union to trade and integration within the Eastern bloc.  The central and restrictive focus 
on exchange links to the world market can be related to Frank’s incoherent use of Marx’s 
categories; for example, by locating exploitation in the international circulation of 
commodities, attention is necessarily directed towards international exchange 
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independent of production.  Whilst this in itself is only a problem for Marxists, it becomes 
a problem of more general significance once it is accepted that this is in part responsible 
for Frank’s deterministic view that all social phenomena are explicable via a series of 
propositions about the logic of global capital.  For example, Frank (1994b) claims that  
  
the expansion of the capitalist system over the past centuries effectively and 
entirely penetrated even the most isolated sectors of the underdeveloped world.  
Therefore, the economic, political, social, and cultural institutions and relations 
we now observe there are the products of the historical development of the 
capitalist system no less than are the seemingly more modern or capitalist features 
of the national metropoles of these underdeveloped countries (pp.150-1).  
  
Whilst the extreme generality of this claim makes it difficult to evaluate, it can be noted 
that this feature of his theory has drawn criticism from many different perspectives on the 
grounds that it cannot take account of the diversity of social and economic history over 
the past two centuries (Holsti, 2001, p.290).  This effacement of differences is an outcome 
of Frank’s zero-sum conception of the world economy, where the wealth and development 
of the centre are claimed to be a function of the underdevelopment of the periphery which 
is necessarily homogenised. 
The empirical foundations for Frank’s claims about the world economy are also 
unsecure (Warren, 1988, p.113).  The issue of whether or not it is useful to conceptualise 
the world economy as an arena of mass, zero-sum, one-directional transfers is one of the 
reasons classical DT turned out to be a dead-end, and this thesis explicitly distances itself 
from such positive assertions instead favouring an idealised description of a type of 
development.  Since the early 1980s numerous examples of successful industrialisation 
and rapid growth have been achieved by economies previously designated as peripheral, 
and this makes the stark assumptions made by Frank debateable.  For a recent example of 
this position which reproduces many of the problems critiqued in Frank’s work see Amin 
(2011).  
  The predisposition to analyse everything as a product of the historical 
development of the capitalist system led Frank to see the world-system as a relatively 
static structure of exploitation.  This ahistorical external structure was consistently 
privileged over internal factors in explaining development paths, and the problematic 
over-generalisation inherent in the Frank/Wallerstein perspective is partly why an ideal-
typical approach which pays careful attention to such issues is proposed here.  Given the 
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nature of the historical concerns which will govern later chapters, it is appropriate to 
illustrate how this became problematic by looking at Frank’s work on the collapse of the 
Soviet bloc (1994a).  Frank’s core proposition is that,  
  
the answer to the question of ‘what went wrong’ [with actually-existing socialism] 
must be sought much more in the material reality of our one world economy than 
in any ideological discourse about ‘socialism’ or even policy in the former Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe (pp.317-8).  
  
For the project of reformulating DT, there are two problems with this.  Firstly, as 
has already been argued in relation to WST, CU theory and the SCT, such explanations 
are problematic given the distinct structure of economic activity in the Eastern bloc which 
was certainly related to the world economy, but also had a specific regional dynamic.  The 
attempt to subsume the Eastern bloc under the explanatory category of the capitalist 
world-system means this regional dynamic disappears from view, while this thesis seeks 
to examine it both as a centre/periphery system in its own right, and as it evolved in 
interrelation to the world economy.  Secondly, this frame consciously and deliberately 
excludes agency, which is essential to explain the trading system.  
The final broad criticism is that Frank seldom defined precisely what he meant by 
such terms as monopoly, surplus, exploitation, etc. and given the enormous amount of 
work these concepts do in his theory this is a big problem (Ghatak, 1986, pp.54-55).  Most 
seriously, dependency itself was never pinned down in adequate detail.  An ideal example 
of this is the so-called ‘chain-like’ conception of exploitation.   
 
External monopoly has always resulted in the expropriation (and consequent 
unavailability to [underdeveloped countries]) of a significant part of the economic 
surplus produced… and its appropriation by another part of the world capitalist 
system... [This] exploitative relation in chain-like fashion extends the capitalist 
link between the capitalist world-system and national metropoles to the regional 
centres (part of whose surplus they appropriate) and from these to the local centres 
and so on to large landholders or merchants who expropriate surplus from small 
peasants or tenants, and sometimes even from these later to landless exploited 
labourers by them in turn (Frank, 1969, p.7).  
  
In collapsing all social relations across the globe into this single continuum in which 
everyone is exploiter and exploited in turn, Frank reduces exploitation to a meaningless 
concept simultaneously applicable to everything and nothing.  This is perhaps best 
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evinced by Frank and Gills’ (1996) proposal that the concept of the world-system as a 
kind of explanatory master-variable could be extended backwards thousands of years.  
  As such, three major problems with Frank’s theory have been encountered: (1) 
Centre and periphery were reified into a static structure of exploitation prejudging all 
future empirical findings; (2) internal factors were assumed to be determined by external 
ones encouraging circular explanations always beginning and ending with the world 
market; (3) the vague notions of capitalism, exploitation, monopoly, surplus, etc. led to 
errors of analysis and an inability to theorise increasingly diverse development processes.   
Largely in response to these problems–see Cardoso’s explicit critique of Frank (1977a)– 
a new approach was developed in the 1970s which went some way towards solving the 
issues pointed out above. 
  
3.2 Associated-Dependent Development: Fernando Henrique Cardoso  
  
Most centrally Cardoso’s approach improved on Frank’s by being less 
deterministic with regard to international conditions and their relation to domestic 
politics.  This brought state, class and production back into the picture, no longer as 
factors solely determined by involvement in the world market, although geopolitics still 
did not feature very centrally.  This was possible because of the removal of the assumption 
that all countries which traded internationally were capitalist and that their development 
could be fully explained by reference to this set of exchange relations.  Displaying a 
greater willingness to distinguish between different situations than Frank, Cardoso and 
Faletto write that,  
 
Although there are forms of dependent relationships between socialist countries, 
the structural context that permits an understanding of these is quite different from 
that within capitalist countries and requires specific analyses.  The same is also 
true for economies like the Indian economy–and, to a lesser extent, that of Japan– 
which have historical patterns of formation that cannot be explained by the 
unfolding of European or American capitalistic economic expansion, although 
they also became linked, later on, to the international market (1979, p.xxiv).  
 
The claim that the economic development of India or Japan, or anywhere at all for that 
matter, could not be completely explained in reference to the development of Western 
capitalism would be unacceptable to Frank.  
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The language of Cardoso’s analysis is concomitantly different from Frank’s; 
instead of the ‘chain-like’ net of exploitation, Cardoso and Faletto (1979) begin by setting 
out their conception of dependence as follows: ‘From the economic point of view a system 
is dependent when the accumulation and expansion of capital cannot find its essential 
dynamic component inside the system’ (p.xx).  In the case of less industrially developed 
capitalist economies, this dynamic component was the advanced technology which is 
normally only available to periphery countries via cooperation with Western 
multinationals.  Acquiring this technical and financial capability entails relations between 
periphery and centre, whereby certain sections of the dependent society ally themselves 
with the interests of transnational capital and represent those interests within their own 
society (p.173).  
  In this way, studies of dependent development must necessarily be sensitive to the 
particular way domestic and international factors interact in any given instance.  This can 
be contrasted to Frank’s primary focus on circulation, and the fact that Cardoso and 
Faletto include the state as an independent variable capable of influencing late 
development is another notable shift from Frank and later Wallerstein’s tendency to 
dissolve all states, central or peripheral, into a single continuum.  Coeval with Cardoso, 
Evans (1979) and Petras (1978) also emphasised the need for a return to relations of 
production and a more open-ended analysis of the role of peripheral states as contested 
apparatuses to move beyond Frank’s paradigm.  That Cardoso and Faletto’s approach 
represents an improvement over Frank’s can be seen in the more sophisticated conception 
of how the international and national levels of analysis are integrated.  
  
In the case of economically dependent countries, the explanation of structures of 
domination involves establishing the links that may exist between internal and 
external determinants.  These links should not be understood in terms of a 
mechanical and immediate determination of the internal by the external: it is 
important to delineate the interconnections between these two levels, suggesting 
the ways through which external factors are interwoven with internal ones (p.15).  
  
This meant abandoning the static vision of the world economy in favour of a more fluid 
conception which stressed the mutual interaction and co-determination of internal and 
external factors.  In this way Cardoso stressed the need for a middle way between 
globalism (external factors determine internal) and internalism (vice versa) which this 
thesis also seeks to find.  
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  This led Cardoso and Faletto to focus on what they termed, ‘those characteristics 
of national societies which express external relations’ (p.28).  This attention to 
international class alliances which reproduce relations of dependence is an important 
feature of the dependent development approach, and one which is highly relevant to the 
Eastern bloc.  This allowed the return of agency into explanations of development, while 
still accepting the asymmetries of the world economy.  
  
The conflicts or agreements among these different [social] forces are not subject to 
determinism.  In specific situations, their interactions may result in historical events 
that are absolutely different from the ones analyzed here, as in the case of Cuba.  But 
to the extent that the system of social relations is expressed through a system of 
power, a combination of structural possibilities is established historically.  Within 
the framework of the structural possibilities engendered by earlier social practices, 
certain courses are indicated and other alternatives are excluded (p.154).  
  
I agree with the conception of structure/agency implicit in this statement, a key virtue of 
which was that this meant Cardoso and Faletto were better able to take account of diverse 
economic histories.  In defining development as a socially-contested process in which 
various groups have a stake and outcomes cannot be assumed once external constraints 
are known, Cardoso demonstrated how international factors could be integrated into 
accounts of development without resorting to the deterministic approach Frank 
propagated.  This means that the two fundamental elements of any explanation, agents 
and structures, can be thought of as interrelated and therefore neither should be privileged 
over the other in the process of forming a historical account which should look to their 
mutual interaction and possible transformation over time.  This is in contradistinction to 
the general emphasis on global structures considered to be stable over long time-periods 
and largely determining agency which is implicit in much of DT and WST.  This 
interrelated conception is argued to be an important divergence from the style of DT 
associated with Frank and will be employed in the historical chapters. 
 The consequence of these revisions led Cardoso and Faletto to reject the Frank’s 
static view on the grounds that some form of development in the periphery was possible.  
In this regard Cardoso and Faletto were concerned to see that DT should not be a mere 
negative teleology; i.e. just state what cannot occur (an imagined autonomous 
development which Frank proposed could have taken place were it not for the world 
market), but should instead look at what actually does occur (various development 
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processes dependent upon international conditions).  This is the setting for the concept of 
dependent development which, ‘goes beyond the traditional dichotomy between the terms 
“development” and “dependence”, because it permits an increase in development while 
maintaining and redefining the links of dependency’ (p.174). 
 The major advance represented by Cardoso was thus that his theory allowed for 
recognition of international asymmetries which could still usefully be described as 
dependency relations, but which rejected the cumbersome claim that dependence 
necessarily caused underdevelopment.  The balance sheet of classical DT thus reads 
something as follows: Frank succeeded in drawing attention to the international 
dimension of development, but this was achieved through a vague structural determinism 
which failed to take account of real changes in the world economy and simplified 
geopolitics to a function of an economies position.  Cardoso and Faletto shifted the focus 
of dependency analysis back towards actual historical developments but ultimately failed 
to move far enough away from Frank in three respects.  Firstly, Cardoso does not go far 
enough on the issue of offering precise definitions of analytical concepts.  For instance, 
the claim that dependent development is distorted and non-ideal is essentially normative.  
Cardoso was focused on establishing a methodology for the study of actual situations of 
dependency, and whilst this was valid and important, abstract theory is also needed but 
cannot be found in Cardoso’s work.  
Secondly, the re-integration of agency came to some extent at the expense of 
theory.  The notion of structure/agency as fundamentally interrelated to the point that to 
talk about one in isolation from the other is meaningless is not an original point, but one 
that is particularly relevant to the DT tradition where the tendency to over-privilege one 
or the other is common.  Thirdly, the ‘centre’ itself is excluded from analysis and so the 
issue of reciprocal influence was not considered.  This is one of the most important 
differences between Cardoso and Faletto’s concept of dependent development and the one 
proposed here; the internationalisation of development means the centre/periphery 
relation which generated this form of development must have consequences for all parts 
of the system.  The fact that Soviet development is brought within the frame of analysis 
of this reformulation of DT is a significant break with the tradition.  
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4. An Ideal-Typical Reconstruction of Dependent Development  
  
As has already been mentioned, ideal-typical research explicitly acknowledges the 
implication of starting assumptions in the construction of a narrative, the criteria by which 
the results are to be judged being not their correspondence to the ‘Truth’, but the extent 
to which they are internally consistent and useful.  So under this conception it could be 
said that to scan economic history in search of dependent development will more often 
than not lead to its ‘discovery’, just as to look in search of hegemony, imperialism, 
modernisation, etc. will also return the desired results, provided the data is not totally 
unamenable to such interpretations.  Whilst this realisation would be problematic for 
positivism, this is acknowledged at the outset by ideal-typical method.  
 I propose that the propositions which would comprise an idealisation of dependent 
development as something which could occur in asymmetrical international contexts are 
as follows:  
  
1. Industrialisation creates an economy of previously unknown complexity with 
needs for different types of labour, materials, and capital which can seldom be 
met entirely or even mostly from within national stocks.  
2. As such, industrial development tends to generate increased economic relations 
between national communities.  
3. A group of economies among whom these links have taken on a definite form 
and degree of permanence (usually expressed via the creation of an international 
institutional structure) can be considered as an economic system.  
4. This system could be the world economy, but the ability to analyse specific 
developments is understood to be reduced as the size of the system under 
consideration is increased.  In general the most appropriate unit to be analysed 
as a system will be smaller and be defined by some obvious geographical, 
political, and economic commonalities. 
5. However, designating a group as a system does not mean they can be analysed 
independently of the world economy and geopolitical factors outside the group.  
The relation of this group as a whole to the international context must also be 
considered.  
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6. Significant asymmetries of power, wealth, resources, etc. can usefully be 
discussed in terms of centres and peripheries.  This only refers to observable 
asymmetries and does not represent a relationship where the wealth of one is a 
result of the others impoverishment.  Accordingly, centre and periphery are 
seldom entirely homogenous, and the analytical method of drawing a circle 
around each to make an artificial separation is carried out only to bring the 
nature of the interactions between the two into greater focus.  
7. Dependent development refers to situations where development becomes 
dependent on the processes that link all the parts together into a system.  
Specifically, both the qualitative expansion of new products and industries, as 
well as the quantitative expansion of existing industries becomes conditional on 
essentially international processes. 
 
The programme of ideal-typical dependency analysis, therefore, begins from the 
comprehension of an international system, including the centre/periphery divide peculiar 
to it, before moving on to analysis of the relations between the two.  This is proposed as 
a solution to the first problem found with classical DT, the tendency to treat its basic 
categories as ahistorical truths.  By reconstituting this model as an ideal-type, rather than 
as a set of positive assertions, no particular dynamic of interaction between the two parts 
is presupposed and the way is opened to exploring relations of reciprocal influence and 
co-determination.  In this way the basic theoretical claim that in asymmetrical 
international contexts development becomes dependent can be distinguished from the 
claim that such international linkages fully determine development paths.  
There are no essential logics in this type; international development, even 
asymmetrical, need not necessarily look like this, and the type is not claimed to be relevant 
for cases which do not resemble it.  It might be argued that ideal-types are emptied of 
historical content too far and just become general concepts which cover everything.  On 
the contrary, there are numerous examples which could not usefully be framed by this 
ideal-type and so should not be analysed as dependent development: Soviet 
industrialisation was carried out almost entirely in insolation from trade; economic 
nationalist regimes sometimes pursue policies of autarchy; developing countries 
embarked on ISI in the 1970s, etc.  In this way ideal-types have implicit parameters within 
which they are legitimate, and in stating them unambiguously it should be expected that 
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situations to which they do not apply can be identified, just as can situations for which 
they are useful.  The question of the transferability of the ideal-type will be returned to in 
the concluding chapter. 
 
5. Economic Surplus and Reproduction 
  
 It is now necessary to elaborate on the theoretical ideas which are to be used in 
applying this ideal-type; i.e. how will the chasm between the ideal-type and historical 
reality be bridged?  A good place to begin is to acknowledge that whilst there is agreement 
that economic dependence is something that places limits on the scope for development, 
there is no coherent definition to be found among contributors to the debates.  This led 
Lall (1975) to argue that it is either very difficult or in fact strictly impossible to draw a 
line between economies which are dependent and those that are not.  With this in mind, 
Lall proposed that DT must set down certain features of dependent economies which do 
not appear in non-dependent ones, and also show that these features are harmful to 
development.  This is a serious challenge to which an answer must be provided if the 
category of dependence is to have any traction and if it is to be possible to identify 
situations for which the ideal-type above is relevant.  Although I question Lall’s 
proposition that for DT to be analytically sound a clear demarcation between dependent 
and non-dependent economies is required–instead I argue theoretical devices capable of 
investigating degrees and different types of dependent development is more useful–the 
answer that will henceforth be developed will rely on concepts from historical materialism 
on how economies (re)produce themselves. 
Considering the argument that ideal-types can provide a starting-point from which 
some of the problems in DT can be avoided, here we begin to discuss structural factors 
affecting development starting from the idealised notion of reproduction as it is found in 
Capital.  The key idea behind Marx’s reproduction schemes was that production should 
be viewed as a circular process rather than the linear transformation of factors into goods 
and services ready for consumption.  Despite the fact that Marx was analysing capitalism, 
here it is argued that the schemes of reproduction are not uniquely relevant to capitalism 
since the basic demands of reproduction apply alike to any industrial economy.  
Categorizing the ways an economy might experience the process of reproducing itself, 
Marx operated with a distinction between simple and expanded reproduction.  An 
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economy is capable of simple reproduction when all the necessary inputs expended in the 
course of the previous production period can be replaced out of available stocks.  
However, I argue it is in expanded reproduction that the key to providing a sounder 
foundation is to be found.  For simple reproduction to hold, saving and net investment 
must be zero.  Accordingly if capital is to accumulate and the economy to grow some 
portion of the surplus value realized from the previous production period must be saved, 
rather than wholly consumed, thus allowing a positive rate of investment. 
It is armed with this theoretical distinction with which a basic analytical criteria 
by which a more dependent economy could be distinguished from a less dependent one 
can be offered: a dependent economy is one in which the operation of expanded 
reproduction becomes necessarily an international affair.  As such, the development of 
the dependent economy cannot be adequately explained in insolation from international 
context.  Returning to Lall’s challenge, whilst these criteria may sound like it would apply 
to every open economy, it is both a question of relative degrees and the way that this 
process interrelates with other factors, and so the crafting of a case-specific narrative 
should be sensitive to the investigation of such asymmetries of dependence.  
For instance, while the Soviet centre’s development must be seen to be influenced 
by CMEA trade and integration processes since no part of a centre/periphery system is 
free from reciprocal influence, the relative exposures to trade differed greatly and so the 
way trade effected development will also vary.  Dawisha (1990) underlines how,  
  
the USSR remains the single greatest market for East European exports, as well as 
the single greatest source of East European imports, including strategic raw 
materials.  Thus, while the USSR is dependent on East European trade in certain 
commodities not easily substituted for elsewhere, an asymmetry of dependence 
places the East European countries at a disadvantage vis-a-vie the Soviet Union 
(p.121).  
  
The size of the USSR’s internal market meant trade was not as vital for the everyday 
functioning of the economy as it became for the rest of CMEA.  This is principally what 
constituted the material basis of the Soviet Union as the centre; i.e. scale rather than 
superior economic development.  In this way analysis of how all parts of the system were 
affected by processes internal to it is possible whilst still acknowledging a qualitative 
difference between development in the periphery and the centre.  
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The abstract conception of reproduction is useful as a starting-point, but a more 
concrete category is needed as well.  Here such a concept capable of expanding the 
critique of classical DT’s sometimes vague theoretical vocabulary is introduced which 
grows-out of the notion of reproduction given above.  This concept is economic surplus 
as it appears in the works of some of the dependency school.  As a category of analysis, 
economic surplus owes most to the work of Baran (1957, 1971), in which he argued that 
how surplus was produced, which classes appropriated it, and how it was disposed of were 
the key determinants of a societies’ development trajectory.  As such, Baran’s work was 
part of the revival of interest in classical political economy, of which the publication of 
Sraffa’s short treatise (1960) was undoubtedly the centrepiece.  A forgoing premise of the 
following section is that this can fruitfully be employed to help bridge the gap between 
the ideal-type and historical research.  
Stated simply, economic surplus is the sum of resources a society has at its disposal 
to achieve growth minus the needs of subsistence; i.e. the amount that could potentially 
be reinvested into increasing future social output.  Comparing with Marx’s model, this 
quantity thus corresponds to the surplus value created and potentially accumulated.  
However, the category of economic surplus is not an unobservable, abstract value 
category, but a potentially quantifiable material category as was consistently stressed by 
Leontief (1966, pp.135-6).  As Pasinetti (1979) has noted, this category is particularly 
appropriate to the study of planned economies, ‘where it [was] important to know what 
share of the net national income [could] be used for purposes other than consumption 
(notably investment)’ (p.37). 
The relationship between the two categories can be made clear by keeping in mind 
the insight of classical political economy that the existence of surplus value in itself does 
not guarantee growth; it may be consumed in the form of luxuries by a wealthy class of 
rentiers, or amassed into monuments, pyramids, or extravagant corporate headquarters 
serving no (re)productive purposes.  Hence questions of distribution between social 
groups, which under capitalism takes the historically specific form of the ratio between 
wages and profits, were seen to be of vital importance (Baran and Sweezy, 1970, p.23).  
In this way, the concept of economic surplus allows analysis to integrate study of trade 
with production, in the sense that surplus is something (re)produced, rather than a static 
concept of wealth.  This makes the idea appropriate for the historical case in question, 
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where the real significance of trade and surplus redistribution is revealed in the impact 
this had on structures of production across the bloc and the international consequences of 
the very particular type of development they represented. 
This conveys a sense of how the concept of economic surplus can provide a 
concept towards which historical studies of dependent development could be oriented.  
Since capital formation, military expenditure, and luxury consumption amongst other 
things must all come out of the surplus, the identification of economic surplus as a discrete 
category allows analysis to highlight alternative uses and to show how the realisation of 
these alternatives would depend upon the decisions of social agents which either challenge 
or reproduce these outcomes.  Indeed, it follows that since surplus is a sum on top of and 
in addition to the simple reproduction of the system, its use is necessarily open to 
contestation; the utilisation of surplus, expressed in its composition, is the arena of class 
struggle over the fruits of society’s collective labour.  
A useful distinction between inter-industry and intra-industry specialisation can 
be made in terms of the interdependencies between industrial sectors consuming and 
producing the surplus.  Inter-industry trade refers to exchanges between different 
industries–for example how much the automotive sector as a whole buys from the steel 
industry–whilst intra-industry refers to exchanges within a sector.  This implies higher 
levels of specialisation if, for example, a machine-tool or computer systems manufacturer 
were to purchase goods from other firms in their sector with specialised capabilities.  
Following on from thus, a distinction can be made between complementary and 
competitive development at the international level depending on whether economies 
cooperate primarily on inter- or intra-industry lines.  In this case complementary refers to 
the case that production profiles are consciously tailored to fit together into commodity 
chains, while competitive means similar sectors in different countries compete with one 
another.  For instance, to have multiple producers of semi-conductors, and in fact of 
several different types of semi-conductors reflecting different production processes and 
end-uses, would be an example of competition; to pick a ‘winner’ and have this single 
firm specialize in that type of production insulated from competition would be 
complementary development. 
This is similar to what Hirschman (1969) termed ‘exclusive complementarity’, i.e. 
when a large economy makes its smaller clients structure their production in such a way 
that to diversify away from the hegemon would be costly, if not completely disastrous.  It 
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will later be argued that this is what the Soviets achieved by the industrialisation of 
Eastern Europe, the economies of which could only reproduce themselves through links 
to the USSR.  The specific case of the Hungarian bus manufacturer, Ikarus, will be 
presented as an example of this later.  This is an example of an economic phenomenon 
specific to dependent development in the Eastern bloc which a reformulated DT can 
capture by showing how industrial structures in the bloc need to be explained in the 
context of CMEA linkages. 
 
6. Relations to the World Economy 
 
In order to draw out the distinctiveness of this approach, it is useful to look at how 
DT was understood in the 1980s when the first attempts already discussed to apply DT to 
the bloc were made.  DT in the 1980s was mostly focused on the perceived failure of 
political independence to secure economic development in the Third World (Gilpin, 1987, 
p.273).  This situation implied that international structures were at work fundamentally 
constraining development in these countries, hence the general structuralist focus 
characteristic of much DT (and certainly of WST) at that time.  Although this was a valid 
and important critique of traditional development theory, pushing this too far ultimately 
led DT into a dead-end of global structural determinism.  As such, the question of how 
factors external to the bloc, here relations to the world economy, are to be integrated into 
the account without resorting to determinism must be addressed.  The ideal-type of 
dependent development and the concepts outlined above are to be applied primarily within 
the system of trade under consideration, but it is also necessary to clarify that the structural 
context of the international more generally needs to be taken into consideration.  In 
particular, given that the group of economies in question designated themselves as a group 
of socialist countries within a capitalist world-system, the uneven nature of capitalist 
development outside the bloc needs to be included. 
Earlier in the literature review it was argued that WST overly simplified this by 
making the development of the Eastern bloc little more than a reflection of developments 
in the world economy.  Leys (1996) has pointed to the issue of the unclear nature of units 
of analysis in DT which WST inherited; is the world-system, regional sub-systems or sub-
national entities the main focus?  In order to avoid the pitfall of assuming everything to 
be determined by the world-system and simultaneously to stake-out the significance of 
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ideal-typical method for this issue, points 4, 5 and 6 of the idealisation need to be 
expanded upon.  Point 4 proposed that as the unit designated as a relatively discrete system 
capable of being analysed in its own right got larger, the ability to account for historical 
specificities could be reduced.  This in effect means that the device of discussing the 
specificities of a group, or an individual case, in their own right and then in relation to the 
world economy will be the way in which global concerns will be approached, rather than 
in beginning from the premise that there is a singular world capitalist system and working 
backwards from this macro-conception to local specificities.  The problem with beginning 
from the macro-conception is that it tends to encourage the deterministic view that all 
subsequent phenomena can be explained purely in terms of their position in relation to the 
world-system, and the fact that this leads to minimising the distinctive socio-economic 
constitution of actually-existing socialism has already been argued. 
In terms of the historical content of this thesis, I claim that this approach leads to 
the minimisation, if not total exclusion, of a significant development dynamic internal to 
the bloc driven by the system of subsidised trade.  By beginning from the ideal-type 
specified beforehand, it is possible to form a narrative which allows both factors internal 
and external to the bloc to be integrated into the account in a non-deterministic manner.  
The particular analytical mechanism by which this move is accomplished involves 
focusing on the fact that the application of the ideal-type allows the identification of a 
particular development dynamic internal to the bloc, and that the patterns created by this 
conditioned the way in which influences stemming from the world economy impacted on 
the group. 
Point 5 cautions that this rejection of the position that everything can–and in fact 
needs–to be explained by reference to the world economy alone does not, however, mean 
that global factors external to the main unit are considered irrelevant.  The potentially 
varying relation of the group as a whole and individual members of it to the world 
economy is instead to be approached on the basis that this interrelation could take various 
forms, and if the theoretical framework were to hypothesise about what these might be, 
the ideal-typical approach would have been violated.  This formulation bears some 
similarity to the Political Marxist approach (see Teschke, 2009), but differs in that the 
open-ended nature of these potential interactions is here secured by the alternate method 
of beginning from an ideal-type of suitable character. 
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In terms of how this will play out in the historical chapters, the specific 
formulation of this interrelation most appropriate for the Eastern bloc will be claimed to 
be that the processes of trade and integration internal to CMEA were highly significant 
from the 1950s to the 1980s in terms of affecting the broad outline of development in the 
region, and that this shaped the way in which the increasingly important relations to the 
world economy happened from the 1970s onwards.  These relations underlined the 
contradictory nature of the development process in the bloc.  For instance, the debt 
problem that emerged in the 1980s has to be situated in these terms.  The relative 
international credit-worthiness of the Eastern bloc was due to the fact that basic 
industrialisation had been successfully completed, and so Western banks were prepared 
to lend as there was a real productive basis to the East European economies, but the nature 
of CMEA processes of trade and integration acted to stymie the further development of 
these economies which meant they generally failed to export enough back to the West to 
finance their debt. 
The final clarification necessary in this regard relates to the abandonment of the 
thesis of the development of underdevelopment and the zero-sum conception of trade it 
relies upon.  Once the notion that the development of one part of the system is a function 
of the underdevelopment of another is removed, the issue of potential dynamics of 
reciprocal influence opens-up, and the assumption of the homogeneity of centre and 
periphery is loosened.  This leads to some of the most interesting discoveries of the 
dynamic of dependent development in the Eastern bloc and represents a major departure 
from classical DT. 
 
7. Geopolitics, Trade and Development 
  
  This chapter has accomplished a number of theoretical tasks:  
  
1. An ideal-type has been proposed to serve as the basic description of dependent 
development and to provide a general starting-point from which inquiry into 
centre/periphery systems can proceed without presuming any particular dynamic 
of interaction.  
  
2. Dependent development has been defined in the abstract, and economic surplus 
has been suggested as an object to orient empirical study towards.  
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3. A number of structural features (inter/intra-industry trade, for example) 
identifiable through the application of the concept of economic surplus which 
could serve to help clarify and distinguish different cases of dependent 
development have been put forward, and the importance of considering relations 
to the world economy has been stressed. 
 
Slater (1993) reminds that the attention directed towards the interaction between 
geopolitics and development was one of the most important contributions of classical DT; 
re-examining this interaction in an open-ended way is therefore argued to be useful.  Since 
this thesis argues for the importance of geopolitics in understanding the development of 
CMEA, the final section of this chapter locates geopolitical concerns of relevance to trade 
and development.  Given the methodological commitment to an ideal-typical approach 
which accepts that dependent development can potentially take place in a number of 
ways, and given the inherent determinism in Frank’s DT and later WST, it is important 
that the interaction between geopolitics and socially-contested development paths is 
approached in a manner that is sensitive to historical contingencies and avoids positive or 
logical claims about the ‘necessity’ of any particular configuration.  This could limit the 
applicability of the framework and endanger the transferability of the type, a question that 
is returned to in the conclusion.  For this reason, the treatment of geopolitics is less 
abstract than the ideal-type of dependent development and is tailored more explicitly 
towards the Soviet bloc. 
 Remembering that the centre/periphery paradigm was originally meant to be an 
alternative to the assumption of equal market participants, a key virtue of this political 
economy conception is that room is made for political and geopolitical factors to enter 
into explanations.  This was one of classical DT’s most valid criticisms of mainstream 
development theory, although the international and political dimensions became rather 
compressed in Frank and later in Wallerstein.  Accordingly, here it is necessary to specify 
the relative autonomy of geopolitics as a factor capable of influencing trade and 
development.  In her critique of WST work on the Eastern bloc (Chase-Dunn, 1980), 
Skocpol (1981) makes the important point that geopolitics is not reducible to the capitalist 
world economy–the USSR in particular was a geopolitical superpower whilst relatively 
backwards in economic terms.  As such, geopolitics has to be seen as an influence over 
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economic relations, and not just as a function of them.  However, this is not to say that 
geopolitics is unrelated to the world economy, just that geopolitical influence is not 
necessarily entirely determined by position in the world economy. 
I argue throughout that the geopolitical antagonism of the Cold War was highly 
significant in terms of understanding the Soviet motivation behind the system of 
subsidised trade in the bloc.  As Von Beyme (1987) has pointed out, ‘It should at all 
events be remembered that the cost-benefit calculation of a great power, which has 
committed itself to the growth of world socialism, cannot be assessed solely on criteria of 
economic rationality’ (p.100), and the intra-socialist economic relations this thesis 
focuses on seem to be an excellent example of this.  This ultimately stems from the fact 
that the USSR existed as a socialist state within the capitalist world-system.  The 
perceived necessity of establishing obedient governments in Eastern Europe to achieve 
security in a hostile geopolitical climate meant that after 1947, Stalin forced Eastern 
Europe to adopt the Soviet model of political and economic organisation; the inability of 
this strategy to continue in the absence of Stalin, but the continuing imperative of 
maintaining communist power in the region, led his successors to the introduction of 
substantial economic incentives to assist this.  The fact that this arrangement was 
maintained throughout the Cold War period in the face of rising costs and increasingly 
apparent contradictions can be seen as evidence of the high value attached to the 
geopolitical goal of bloc unity in the eyes of the Soviet leadership. 
As such, although the Cold War in itself is not the object of investigation of this 
thesis, some theorisation of Cold War geopolitics is required since it is a crucial part of 
the puzzle of intra-socialist trade and development.  Essentially, the debate on the nature 
of the Cold War in IR can be simplified to two key positions, commonly termed 
realist/orthodox and liberal/revisionist (see Leffler and Westad, 2012).  The realist 
position holds that Soviet expansionism was the core cause of the breakdown of relations 
between the USSR and the West, and that the ensuing period of world history is best 
characterised by the bipolar structure and strategic competition that resulted from Soviet 
aggression after WWII (see Gaddis, 1987).  The liberal approach shares the view that the 
conflict was about the conflicting post-war objectives of the two superpowers, but stresses 
the role of ideational and domestic political factors alongside military and economic 
considerations (see Koslowski and Kratochwil, 1994).  In addition to these two 
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approaches, a rich stream of Marxist scholarship has sought to cast the Cold War as about 
the fundamentally contrasting socio-economic structures of the two superpowers, and so 
to draw attention to a vitally important dimension side-lined by the other two perspectives 
(see Deutscher, 1960; Halliday, 1982, 1986; Harman, 1988; Saull, 2007; Hobsbawm, 
2011). 
This thesis situates itself within this Marxist tradition by emphasising the distinct 
socio-economic constitution of Soviet power in the context of the superior military and 
economic power of the US.  The fundamentally uneven nature of this confrontation is an 
essential aspect of the geopolitical antagonism of the Cold War and helps to explain why 
the Soviet leadership brought economic incentives into their pursuit of geopolitical goals.  
Relating this to the retreat from the goal of world revolution to generally more achievable 
geopolitical objectives, Westad (2000) writes that while 
Soviet foreign policy was no less fuelled by its key ideas or its understanding of 
what made the world tick [than US foreign policy], the crucial diﬀerence is that at 
most times Soviet leaders were acutely aware of their lack of international 
hegemony and the weakness (relative to the United States and its allies) of Soviet 
or Communist power (p.554). 
 
Most centrally, Cold War geopolitics is significant for this thesis because a key Soviet 
objective in this regard was the maintenance of communist power under Soviet leadership 
in Eastern Europe, and this was what motivated the USSR to seek the dependence of 
Eastern Europe in the 1950s. 
As will be expanded upon in chapter 5, the uneven nature of the Cold War raised 
security concerns for successive Soviet leaderships which meant the development under 
Stalin of the defence industry occupied a unique place in the Soviet economic system 
which it continued to hold through the Cold War. 
 
In this sense military power and coercive militarised relations were defining of the 
USSR through the role of state-sanctioned command and coercion in the 
organisation and operation of the Soviet economy, and also through the way in 
which the Soviet economy was subordinated to the production of the matériel of 
military power (Saull, 2007, p.9). 
 
The security preoccupation growing from the hostile geopolitical situation of the first 
decades of Soviet power could thus be argued to have been coded into the structure of the 
command economy from its inception.  In Carr’s (1973) view, this militarisation of the 
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economy began with the Civil War: ‘The economic aftermath of the civil war completed 
the process which the military exigencies of the war itself had begun.  Already in March 
1920 the slogan ‘everything for the front’ had given way to the slogan ‘everything for the 
national economy’’ (p.393).  Indeed, Soviet sources accepted the intrinsic link between 
Soviet planning and military preparedness, regularly asserting the ‘fundamental military 
superiority of the ‘socialist’ military establishment… [because] central planning permits 
the effective military and military-economic organization of society as a whole’ (Jahn, 
1975, p.191). 
This domestic militarisation was always likely to affect Soviet international 
economic relations.  In particular, the origin of the position that what was good for the 
Soviet state was ipso facto good for the international communist movement needs to be 
discussed, since this fusion of ideology and geopolitics was highly significant for 
international economic relations.  In terms of relating ideology to geopolitics, arguably 
the doctrine of ‘Socialism in one country’ is especially significant in this regard.  First 
proposed in 1924 and made central to Marxism-Leninism in the 1930s by Stalin, 
‘Socialism in one country’ effectively meant that the goal of world revolution as the 
objective of policy was replaced by defence of the Bolshevik Revolution as the core of 
the international communist movement.  This meant that what was good for the Soviet 
state was good for international communism–in this way, ideology and geopolitics fused 
in the retreat from world revolution to defence of the interests of the Soviet state, 
conceptualised as a socialist state constrained within a hostile capitalist world-system 
(Thompson, 1998). 
This inter-linking is fundamental to the way ideology is conceptualised in this 
thesis.  I argue that there is a danger inherent in over-privileging the role of ideology or 
seeing it as a totally independent variable, when instead it needs to be situated in a 
(normally subordinate) role to geopolitics.  For example, Kramer (1999a) argues that it 
was ideological considerations which prevented far-reaching reforms to the structurally 
weak system of economic integration in CMEA, and consequently under-examines both 
the geopolitical and economic development dimensions of CMEA.  A similar overlapping 
composition of objectives which highlights the way ideology was brought into conformity 
with geopolitics, rather than vice versa, can be seen behind the WTO.  Commander-in-
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Chief of the WTO, Marshal Kulikov, writing in the CPSU’s theoretical journal, 
Kommunist, in 1985: 
 
On May 14th 1955, [the Eastern bloc countries] signed the Treaty of Friendship, 
Co-operation and Mutual Assistance, which has entered history as the Warsaw 
Treaty, in which were expressed the wish and aspirations of the fraternal peoples 
for unity, for their collective responsibility to provide for the defence of the gains 
of socialism, for the preservation of peace and international security (quoted in 
Holden, 1989, p.18, emphasis added). 
 
In summary, this section has sketched an understanding of the geopolitical context 
of the Cold War and begun the task of explaining how and why the USSR initiated the 
very particular economic arrangement in the bloc which it did in the mid-1950s.  To be 
clear, this is not supposed to be a possibly transferable or widely applicable theorisation 
as the ideal-type of dependent development could potentially be, but a specific component 
needed in order to address the case of CMEA. 
 
7. Conclusion  
  
  This chapter has tried to reconstruct DT in terms of a return to the concept of 
dependent development re-cast as an ideal-type.  Although acknowledging that ‘there are 
also non-trivial empirical and theoretical problems’, Dunn (2009) believes the decline of 
DT ‘can be read as a symptom of a more general rightward shift in which (neo)liberalism 
involved a renewed determination amongst leading states and institutions to open 
markets’ (p.190).  It can be assumed Dunn essentially had Frank in mind, and on the basis 
of the previous critique the validity of the claim can be questioned; the rejection of DT 
owed more to the flaws in Frank’s formulation and the partial nature of Cardoso’s 
amendments than it did to the revival of neo-liberalism.  
  The key conceptual tools which have been developed and will be applied in the 
subsequent historical chapters are the following:  
  
1. Rather than aiming to identify static and immutable structures, dependency 
analysis should focus on changing relations between centres/peripheries over 
time.  In this way the consequences of centre/periphery relations are not assumed 
to be one-directional and the issue reciprocal influence can be considered.  A 
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major benefit of this is that it allows a far greater range of asymmetrical 
international systems to be treated under a less restrictive dependency frame.  
  
2. The ideal-typical description of dependence should not be considered as an 
exhaustive definition but can serve as a starting-point for constructing specific 
historical narratives.  By avoiding positive assertions, and instead simply outlining 
what characteristics would make any particular international arrangement a 
possible candidate for analysis beginning from this idealisation, the model should 
be flexible enough to cover many asymmetrical situations.  
  
3. The concept of economic surplus, and specific ideas derived from this notion like 
competitive and complementary development, and intra- and inter-industry trade, 
can be used to organise empirical material in order to provide answers to the 
research questions specified in the introduction.  
 
4. Relations to the world economy have been considered in relation to the 
centre/periphery paradigm, and an understanding of Cold War geopolitics has 
been given which helps to explain the Soviet approach to international economic 
relations within the bloc.  
 
The next four chapters aim to demonstrate the value of the framework developed in the 
last two chapters by using them it to generate accounts of trade and development in the 
Eastern bloc.  
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Socialist Dependency in the Eastern Bloc   
  
1. Introduction  
  
The historical part of this thesis moves from considering development across the 
bloc as a whole onto national case-studies.  The object of this chapter is the 
interdependence between trade and development within the Eastern bloc, focusing on the 
relation between the USSR and Eastern Europe.  In this way the chapter aims to 
demonstrate how a coherent narrative of trade and development in the Eastern bloc can 
be produced via the application of a reformulated DT, and that this leads to the 
identification of a particular development process which theories discussed in the 
literature review could not fully capture.  The argument is that the economic links which 
emerged in the 1950s between the CMEA-six and the USSR can be understood as 
generating a unique form of dependent development as defined in the previous chapter.  
Bearing in mind that the reformulated DT was careful not to suggest that a discrete 
centre/periphery system such as CMEA could be analysed completely in isolation from 
the encompassing world economy, the changing relation of the socialist economies to 
uneven capitalist development, and in particular to DMEs and NICs, is also included in 
the account.  This is essential for underscoring the limitations to the process of dependent 
development in the bloc, in that it ultimately proved incapable of supporting the 
ideological project of competing with capitalism.  I argue that the contradictions within 
this development process became increasingly pronounced in the 1970s, before it reached 
its limit in the 1980s when the costs became too great for all participants to consent to, 
and that this was one of the factors contributing to the disintegration of the bloc.  For the 
Soviet Union the cost meant continuing to bear the burden of subsidised trade, while the 
drawback for Eastern Europe was the evident exhaustion of possibilities for development 
within the system.  
This chapter breaks the relationship down into four distinct phases characterised 
by different dynamics.  The consistently high prioritisation of geopolitical considerations 
in Soviet trade policy, sometimes in opposition to and sometimes in concert with 
ideological and technocratic motivations, is returned to periodically as a key part of the 
puzzle.  A major benefit of beginning from an ideal-type is that it allows insights from 
other theoretical frames (particularly the exploitation and subsidisation theses) to be 
included, whilst the concept of dependent development itself provides a central spine to 
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the account.  For this reason the points of the idealisation of dependent development given 
before (1-7) will be referred to as they occur, with the emphasis placed on making explicit 
how these general propositions occurred specifically in the Eastern bloc.  In this way the 
account differs from a purely descriptive chronological account in that the method and 
theory used to order the empirical material are clearly stated, and it differs from the other 
frames discussed in the literature review by using the concept of dependent development 
rather than subsidisation, exploitation, spheres of influence, customs union or 
institutionalism.   
  
2. Stalin and the Creation of Soviet Europe, 1945-1953  
  
In terms of how the formation of the bloc related to economic development, the 
most salient features of the period identified by the dependency framework are as follows:  
  
1. The export of the Soviet model to the People’s Democracies led to the creation of 
industrial structures in Eastern Europe which could only operate and expand 
through interaction with the USSR via CMEA.  Although this model and the 
extensive growth it could provide initially allowed for the rapid development of 
less industrialised parts of Eastern Europe, over the Cold War period the 
contradictions that emerged from its transplantation to Eastern Europe became 
more and more pressing. 
  
2. In the context of Soviet military dominance and the prevalence of Stalinists in the 
East European parties, the USSR was able to unilaterally impose unfavourable 
terms of trade on Eastern Europe.  These observable asymmetries are part of why 
the Soviet Union is considered to have been the centre of the system in line with 
point 6 of the ideal-type.  The significance of the doctrine of ‘Socialism in one 
country’ will be discussed in this regard as it paved the way for a symbiotic 
relation between geopolitics and ideology in Soviet international economic 
relations. 
  
3. CMEA was initially dormant as Soviet policy towards Eastern Europe developed 
along bilateral, rather than multilateral, lines.  This was appropriate given the 
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exploitative nature of intra-bloc economic relations at the time, and the general 
ascendance of Stalin and his supporters in the international communist movement. 
  
First it is necessary to discuss the particular way points 1 and 2 of the ideal-type 
happened in the Eastern bloc.  It is important to emphasise the different levels of industrial 
development in the region at the start of the period of communist power.  Three tiers of 
development can be identified, with Czechoslovakia and East Germany as the most 
industrially developed, Bulgaria and Rumania as the least, and Hungary and Poland in the 
middle.  This meant that the import of the Soviet model had different effects across the 
six; in general, the less developed countries welcomed the fast-track to industrialisation it 
offered, whilst Czechoslovakia and East Germany saw it as a limiting and distorting factor 
in relation to their already achieved industrialisation.  Perhaps in concession to this, 1945-
47 represented a period of ‘co-ordinated diversity’ in the region, with mixed economies, 
non-communists in some government posts and a fairly pragmatic approach to economic 
policy. 
This period of negotiation ended in December, 1947, at the Moscow conference 
of communist parties where Titoism was denounced for, ‘exaggeration of the role of these 
peculiarities (of a given nation) and departure, under the pretext of national peculiarities, 
from the universal Marxist-Leninist truth regarding socialist revolution and socialist 
construction’ (quoted in Skilling, 1964, p.12), and the universal validity of the Soviet 
model was proclaimed.  By 1950, the six had all been aligned with the Soviet system, 
while Yugoslavia, who had begun with this alignment, had gone in a different direction, 
and accordingly Soviet-Yugoslav relations provide an anomaly to the general pattern 
(Brus, 1986, pp.620-1).  It was in the late 1940s that the geopolitical divide in Europe 
seemed to have stabilised and a clear zone of communist power was apparent, and in this 
context a Stalin-dictated orthodoxy involving close replication of Soviet patterns 
emerged. 
Suny (1998) has emphasised how the instigation of the Marshall Plan in 1947 
needs to be seen as a vital part of the explanation for the forced Sovietisation of Eastern 
Europe, in that before this date Stalin had pursued the goal of maintaining the WWII 
alliance and securing favourable governments in Eastern Europe in tandem; after the 
adoption of the Truman Doctrine with its hard-line stance on what it saw as Soviet 
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expansionism, Stalin let the first objective go in favour of the second.  This demonstrates 
how early on in the Cold War the objective of maintaining communist power in Eastern 
Europe became so significant for the USSR.  The question of the reform and reproduction 
of the structures which resulted from this Sovietisation within the soon-to-be CMEA area 
is the topic of this chapter, and accordingly the international economic relations internal 
to the bloc will now be turned to. 
It was therefore symbolic that the first test of intra-bloc relations came when the 
question of the place these countries were to occupy in the world economy became too 
severe to be postponed as the offer of participation in the Marshall Plan was extended to 
Eastern Europe.  The East European rejection of Marshall Aid–enforced by a coalition of 
Stalinist elements within all the ruling parties–crystallised the post-war geopolitical 
settlement just as it effectively made the reconstruction of Eastern Europe into a Soviet 
responsibility.  However, far from reconstructing, at the time the USSR was engaged in 
extracting whatever it could from Eastern Europe.  Marer (1974) has calculated that an 
equivalent amount to what was put into Western Europe through the Marshall Plan was 
taken out of Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union.  Particularly unpopular were the mixed 
companies, which were nominally financed by both the USSR and the East European host 
country on a 50:50 basis, but in reality were administered in Soviet interests.  Soviet stock 
companies set-up in East Germany in 1946 as a means to extract reparations were the 
template for the later companies created across the Eastern bloc, and even in China.  
Having plundered Eastern Europe and impelled the war-torn countries to turn down the 
US loans which were at that time fuelling the capitalist recovery of Western Europe, some 
form of socialist international economics must necessarily now be invented.  The 
culmination of this was the conference held in Moscow in January, 1949, from which 
CMEA emerged.  
  This had been preceded by a series of bilateral treaties of cooperation and mutual 
assistance, but despite early optimism, little happened within the new institution.  At this 
time ambitious plans for achieving regional integration were regularly raised.  It seems 
probable that Stalin was personally involved in halting this first round of debate in 1950 
when it threatened to go beyond the range of his own vision of how the bloc should 
operate–firmly under Soviet leadership (Bloed, 1988, p.7).  By 1950, Eastern Europe was 
then engaged in the first stages of Soviet-type industrialisation geared towards autarchic 
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development; trade necessarily assumed a secondary significance and accordingly there 
was relatively little international exchange.  The issue which soon became apparent was 
that the rush to grow heavy industry in Eastern Europe as had taken place in the Soviet 
Union was no good in terms of fostering the intra-socialist trade needed to cement the 
alliance and boost its economic utility.  Hanson (1981) has termed this ‘under-trading’, 
as regional development actually reduced the incentives to specialisation and exchange. 
The replication of the Soviet model in Eastern Europe was a key part of Moscow’s 
assertion of hegemony in the international communist movement, and of the singular 
conception of socialism on which Soviet leadership of this was premised at this time 
(Skilling, 1964).  However, as a result of the export of the Soviet model, soon everyone 
had similar industrial profiles and the economic rationale for exchange was naturally 
reduced, and accordingly the Sovietisation of the East European economies can be said 
to have had contradictory results in this sense.  Winiecki (1988) has commented that, ‘The 
degree of similarity has, in fact, been so high that we can almost talk about the identical 
industrial structures among [the centrally planned economies] at the end of the period 
[1980]’ (p.111).  I agree with Winiecki’s technical assessment, although his verdict needs 
to be qualified by mentioning that whilst industrial structures may have been very similar, 
the cyclical periods of reform which followed Stalin’s death and reached a peak in the 
mid-1960s meant that nationally-distinct reform processes which aimed at solving the 
common problems of the traditional model in different ways took the socialist states in 
various different directions.  This allowed for substantial differences in terms of control 
mechanisms and organisational structures between the CMEA members. 
Starting to think about how this centre-sponsored industrialisation gave the 
development process in the periphery particular characteristics–which in fact made reform 
necessary relatively early on–the industrial structures created in Eastern Europe following 
the Soviet example tended to be inefficient both in their need for inputs and the use they 
put them to.  That the need for such large quantities of energy and raw materials was 
connected to the emulation of the Soviet model of industrial development was noted in 
the West relatively early; already in 1962 Kindleberger could write that, ‘parallel 
expansion of the capital goods sector in the Soviet bloc threatened to result in excess 
capacity in machinery and equipment, and put great pressure on fuel and on raw materials 
supply’ (p.162).  Lack of specialisation began to be perceived as a problem in the mid-
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1950s, and the institutional history of CMEA over the next four decades was characterised 
by the repeated launch of initiatives aimed at improving this situation.  The application of 
DT can help to explain why these initiatives only achieved limited success by stressing 
the dual political and economic significance of this trade system, and highlighting the fact 
that powerful interests across the bloc saw benefits to its continuance.  
It has already been claimed that ideology need to be discussed alongside and in 
connection to other factors, and so the failure of Marxism-Leninism to produce a theory 
of international trade which could have set parameters to the formation of policy is 
important; Pryor (1962) makes the argument that the marked absence of purely economic 
analysis of trade in the socialist world was not only due to the lack of inherited theory 
from Marx, but also the fact that the USSR’s vast resource endowment made trade seem 
unimportant.  In this sense it was emblematic that Stalin’s final publication, 1952’s 
Economic problems of socialism in the USSR, had nothing to say about trade between 
socialist countries.  To reiterate, there was no inherent reason why socialist states should 
be trade-averse, the actual reality of which during the 1930s and 1940s owes more to 
Stalin’s agency in response to the structural constraint of the geopolitical situation after 
the German surrender.  This theoretical lacuna and the policy gap it created meant that 
under Stalin, ‘just as political bilateralism meant in practice Soviet domination, economic 
bilateralism involved a good deal of exploitation of [Eastern Europe] by the USSR in the 
name of the over-all interests of the Communist bloc’ (Brzezinski, 1967, p.125). 
The fact that an ideological gloss could be given to the pursuit of Soviet material 
interests during the Stalin period as an extension of the doctrine of ‘Socialism in one 
country’ has already been mentioned.  A significant way ideology on its own impacted on 
the development of intra-socialist trade was in terms of the sometimes genuine belief of 
Soviet and other socialist leaders, especially in the 1950s, in the superiority of central 
planning.  The expected final crisis of capitalism meant that a fully developed socialist 
form of trade and integration was unnecessary given the temporary nature of global 
capitalism; history was moving in the direction of full communism, and so the practical 
and theoretical problems raised by trade could in some sense be postponed until later. 
Retrospectively this seems highly unrealistic, but it can be seen as understandable given 
the relatively recent nature of the Great Depression and the intra-capitalist conflict of 
WWII.  Hobsbawm (2011) termed these events ‘The age of catastrophe’, and emphasised 
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how both Soviet and US elites could not have known in the early Cold War years that 
ruptures of this nature would not characterise the following decades.  Arguably by the 
1970s this view was becoming less sincerely voiced, and the necessity of socialism 
existing alongside and in a relatively backwards position in relation to capitalism for the 
foreseeable future was more widely accepted.  This made the lack of a truly autonomous 
price mechanism for intra-CMEA trade a more apparent failing. 
  I argue that the relatively low levels of trade observed in first decade, as much as 
it’s decidedly biased slant, can be seen as the outcome of the interaction between several 
structural factors and the agency of the Soviet leadership personified in Stalin.  Most 
centrally, the desire to extract reparations from former enemies and to restore the 
economy to full productive capacity as quickly as possible–and thus to ensure the Soviet 
state against external threats–made the option to economically exploit Eastern Europe 
attractive.  The fact that international economic relations between the previously isolated 
Soviet Union and the new People’s Democracies took on a form similar to what Frank 
claimed was the normal situation of the world economy is thus explainable as an outcome 
of the convergence of the geopolitical situation in Europe after 1945 and Stalin’s 
particular blend of realpolitik and paranoia. 
Thus the exploitation thesis fits quite well with evidence about the Stalinist period.    
What is surprising and requires a new theoretical framework is that after the death of 
Stalin a radical change was undertaken, one which was to have far-reaching implications 
for the development of the Eastern bloc economies.  The argument of the following 
sections is that these changes created an altered centre/periphery relationship which 
cannot be captured by existing DT frames but which can be made sense of in terms of the 
methodological and theoretical tools outlined before.  This can go further than the 
subsidisation approach which neglected to look into the pattern of historical development 
this trade system set in motion and operated with an overly simplified notion of politics 
and economics which implied Eastern Europe ‘won’ economically and the USSR ‘won’ 
politically.  
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3. Khrushchev and the Transition to Dependency, 1954-1959  
  
The Stalin era is relatively easy to comprehend as the victorious superpower took 
advantage of its dominant position to form a bloc of obedient states whom it compelled 
to accept highly unfavourable economic relations until the mid-1950s.  After this a major 
shift occurred which remade centre/periphery relations in the Eastern bloc.  The key 
historical claims about the ensuing period are as follows:  
  
1. The quantity of trade and other international economic relations within the 
bloc expanded rapidly and became a key determinant of growth and 
development. 
  
2. A historically-unique price formula was created which reversed the terms of 
trade characteristic of the Stalin period.  This structure became of great 
importance for the development of the bloc, the specific nature of which was 
highlighted by (increasingly unfavourable) comparisons to DMEs, and its 
maintenance or reform became highly significant to several social groups. 
  
3. Soviet policy towards Eastern Europe attained a higher level of sophistication 
as the limits to Stalinist military and political domination became apparent.  It 
is important to situate this shift in the context of the general crisis of Soviet 
leadership of the bloc that resulted from Stalin’s death. 
  
4. CMEA was transformed into a complex international bureaucracy providing 
the forum within which these changes were implemented.  As mentioned in 
point 3 of the idealisation, the existence of such institutional structures is held 
to be a signifier of developmental intertwining.  
  
Up until 1954, the USSR intervened to quell any initiatives which proposed to use 
CMEA more actively.  This was arguably because such changes would have infringed 
upon Stalin’s arbitrary exercise of power in relation to Eastern Europe.  However, even 
before the General Secretary’s death in March, 1953, parallel economic development 
within the bloc had become a problem, and thus the increased use of CMEA seemed 
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desirable.  The post-Stalin activation of CMEA was accompanied by a shift in doctrine as 
economic policies in the region began to move towards cooperation and away from 
autarchy.  Whilst it was now admitted that autarchy had been inefficient (Laird and 
Hoffmann, 1980, p.403), cooperation did not necessarily mean full integration.  Disputes 
over the range and depth of cooperation was to be one of the key battlegrounds over the 
successive rounds of negotiation dedicated to expanding the role of CMEA.  These 
contestations are relevant to this thesis’ reformulation of DT since they provide 
illustrations of how it aims to conceptualise structures as socially-contested and so 
potentially subject to change based on the resolution of these contests. 
Evidently, if cooperation was to make any progress it must begin with the 
coordination of national plans, and so one of the first new bodies to emerge were the 
Standing Commissions created to oversee the regional coordination of production through 
the synchronisation of national 5-year plans.  As such the start of CMEA’s re-birth was 
the March, 1954 meeting where plan coordination was seriously discussed for the first 
time.  Further details were agreed at the 7th session of the Council in May, 1956.  Held in 
Berlin, another important development was that this was the first time non-members 
(China and Yugoslavia) had been permitted to attend an official CMEA session, and this 
also seemed to suggest to the smaller members that a move away from Soviet 
unilateralism was taking place. 
The political significance of these inclusions should be stressed, especially given 
that one of CMEA’s first functions was as a co-ordinating centre for the Soviet-led 
economic blockade against Yugoslavia (Von Beyme, 1987, p.98).  As such, the fact that 
the re-opening of relations with Yugoslavia involved their partial inclusion in CMEA was 
highly symbolic of the Soviet attempt to re-frame CMEA as an economic organisation at 
the centre of post-Stalin intra-socialist relations.  Yugoslavia went on to become the first 
country to enter an official co-operation agreement with CMEA, and eventually 
participated in 21 of 32 CMEA institutions.  This suggests that the inclusion of China and 
Yugoslavia can be seen as evidence of two things: firstly, that the Soviets accepted that 
leading the international communist movement after Stalin necessarily involved accepting 
other socialisms; and secondly that they hoped some sort of hegemonic position could 
still be maintained by attempting to make organisations like CMEA the forums in which 
socialist diversity could be managed under Soviet primacy.  The argument that the Soviet 
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leadership was coming to see intra-socialist economic relations as a key means of both 
distancing itself from Stalinism, whilst simultaneously maintaining its leading role in a 
redefined way, is further supported by another significant development of the period: the 
voluntary abrogation of the USSR’s right to collect reparations.  These instances show a 
post-Stalin USSR seeking to engage Eastern Europe in a more nuanced manner and 
accepting the impossibility of continuing with Stalin’s approach without Stalin. 
 
3.1 Post-Stalin Crisis 
 
Having begun to outline the fundamental nature of the changes in CMEA post-
Stalin, the most significant being the move to negotiated and periphery-favouring 
international prices, it is now necessary to situate this shift in the context of the general 
crisis of Soviet international authority, both within Eastern Europe and as leader of the 
international communist movement more generally, which followed Stalin’s death.  This 
needs to be focused on since it was in response to this crisis that the system of subsidised 
trade emerged.  This crisis also had domestic aspects, in the sense that fundamental 
features of the Stalinist system, including political centralization and centralized 
command of the economy, terror, purges, and legitimacy derived from the position of the 
leader, arguably could not be maintained in their pre-1953 form in the absence of Stalin. 
Different responses and prescriptions to this situation distinguished the senior 
party figures who competed for power in the mid-1950s; regardless of who took over, 
something would have had to be done about relations with Eastern Europe.  The main 
candidates all held Presidium posts: Malenkov was Prime Minister, Khrushchev was First 
Secretary, Molotov was Foreign Minister, Bulganin Minister of Defence, and Beria was 
Minister of Internal Affairs.  However, Beria and Molotov were too closely associated 
with Stalinism, and Bulganin lacked enough support within the party to be a serious 
candidate for the top job, and this made Malenkov and Khrushchev stand-out within the 
group.  Both were equally distant from Stalinism and shared an open acceptance of the 
need for reform; accordingly the main contours of the debate about the direction of the 
USSR after Stalin emerged between Malenkov and Khrushchev.  The divergences 
between the two will be discussed around the two key interrelated axes of significance for 
this chapter, international policy and economic reform. 
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Beginning with international affairs, change in Soviet foreign policy was long 
overdue before and especially after Stalin’s death in terms of relaxing tensions both the 
capitalist world and within the bloc (Rosser, 1969, p.280).  In this way Khrushchev’s 
adoption of the policy of peaceful co-existence was an attempt to move away from the 
antagonistic character of the early Cold War and to scale down superpower tension.  
Khrushchev was very active in terms of foreign policy, and it is notable that it was his 
initiative to re-open relations with Yugoslavia–as clear an indication of moving away 
from Stalinism and towards an implicitly pluralist conception of socialism(s) as could be 
found in this respect–which cost him the support of Molotov.  In general, the increased 
international presence of the USSR in the 1950s can be attributed to Khrushchev, the 
significant reform of economic relations with Eastern Europe being one part of this trend 
(Medvedev and Medvedev, 1977, p.81).  Khrushchev saw clearly that the way Stalin had 
managed the bloc was one of the least successful parts of Stalinism and that there was a 
need to find a new, more stable basis for Soviet relations with other socialist states.  It is 
this aspect which is significant for the subject-matter of this thesis, but it is important to 
emphasis the changes in intra-bloc relations were part of a wider pattern of ‘normalising’ 
Soviet foreign policy. 
In terms of relating changes within the bloc to Soviet international policy in 
general, as well as being about the confrontation of the two superpowers, it is significant 
that all the foreign policy crises of the Khrushchev era were ultimately crises of the 
socialist bloc and of intra-socialist relations–unrest in Poland and Hungary in 1956; in 
Berlin in the late 1950s; the Sino-Soviet split beginning in 1960; and finally the Cuban 
missile crisis of 1962 (Roberts, 1999, p.43).  Kramer (1999a) has argued that the re-
activation of CMEA was explicitly linked to the Polish and Hungarian crises of 1956, 
which exemplified the instability inherent to managing the bloc as Stalin had, and the 
widely perceived need for a new approach which had been a problem since Stalin’s death.  
I argue that the extremely high valuation placed by the Soviet leadership on its position 
at the head of the international communist movement, and the central significance of 
maintaining communist power in Eastern Europe to buttress this claim, can be read from 
the introduction of subsidised trade at this time.  As such, the role CMEA came to play 
over the Khrushchev period and the pattern of trade and development it facilitated has to 
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be seen as a key component of the re-construction of Soviet authority in the bloc after 
Stalin. 
Moving on to the question of economic reform, the recurring issue of heavy versus 
light industry in the allocation of investment resources needs to be mentioned, since this 
feature of the Soviet economy had important implications for intra-CMEA trade patterns.  
It is necessary to emphasise in line with the depiction of the immediate post-Stalin period 
as one of general crisis that this struggle was not an opposition between orthodoxy and 
reform; Khrushchev and Malenkov were both reformers but from different perspectives 
and in different ways.  However, in terms of economic reform, it is telling that Khrushchev 
and Malenkov differed fundamentally in their attitudes to heavy industry and armaments 
production as a specially privileged sector within this category.  As Ploss (1980, p.83) 
notes, only weeks after Malenkov proposed switching to the development of light industry 
at an equal rate to heavy industry, Khrushchev openly refused to endorse the proposal in 
his report to the Central Committee, instead claiming the raising of agricultural production 
to be the key economic issue.  Accordingly, it is worth saying something about 
Malenkov’s proposed consumer policy and what potential repercussions this could have 
had for CMEA. 
The replication of the Soviet model and its preference for a faster rate of expansion 
of heavy industry has already been commented upon for leading to parallel development.  
It is also significant that the maintenance of this approach in the USSR became highly 
important to allow the export of such capital-intensive products as energy resources and 
raw materials to Eastern Europe.  Malenkov had been one of the first to push for an 
increase in the production of consumer goods to be financed at the expense of heavy 
industry coupled with a general lowering of the rate of investment.  In particular, 
Malenkov wanted the military sector of industrial production to diversify into the 
production of consumer goods (Cooper, 1991, p.6), and this questioning of the privileged 
position accorded to that sector represented a fundamental challenge to the established 
pattern.  Khrushchev, on the contrary, regularly depicted the US as a plotter of surprise 
attacks on the USSR (see press quotations cited by Horelick and Rush, 1965, pp.31-34), 
and did not attempt to curb the military procurement budget, the socio-economic 
significance of which for the centre-periphery relationship within the bloc will be returned 
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to again in the next chapter.  The support of the military for Khrushchev, although this 
was receded after Cuba, was vitally important in his victory over Malenkov. 
The pro-consumer policy, which was briefly trialled, was not continued after 
Malenkov’s fall.  The stifling of such a natural policy at a time when many already 
admitted the old focus on heavy industry was out-dated might seem surprising, but it can 
be explained by the well-known power of the old industrial lobby within the Soviet 
institutions and by the fact that the USSR was at the time consciously erecting a deeply 
unbalanced structural exchange between itself and Eastern Europe premised upon the 
existing division of investment between heavy and light industry.  In this way, the 
unnecessary fall of Malenkov could have had necessary consequences for Soviet 
subsidised trade if Malenkov had succeeded in raising consumption and lowering 
investment in the USSR.  This is one example of how the internal characteristics of the 
Soviet political economy–the propensity towards investment over consumption, and the 
tendency to minimise investment in consumer goods industry–had implications for 
international economic relations, and in the Soviet case-study the significance of 
geopolitical factors in conditioning these preferences will be addressed. 
 The issues of international policy and economic reform came together in the 
question of international economic relations within the bloc.  To the extent that 
Khrushchev was deliberately trying to dismantle the Stalinist system, his personal 
significance is indispensable in accounting for the change in trade prices described in 
previous chapters, although this also needs to be set in the context of the general crisis of 
Soviet authority.  See Khrushchev’s declaration in Pravda, 31st of October, 1956, which 
stressed that there was need for a new post-Stalin strategy in terms of economic relations 
within the bloc as well as in other areas (Hanak, 1972, pp.173-175).  The Secret Speech 
further reinforced this impression of taking seriously the need to de-Stalinise intra-bloc 
economic relations, and the speech can also be seen in retrospect as the signal that 
Khrushchev had won-out in his struggle with Malenkov, the change being finalised in 
June, 1957, when Malenkov was demoted from heading-up the whole of Soviet industry 
to being director of a power station in Central Asia. 
One policy Malenkov and Khrushchev had been in agreement on was the so-called 
‘New Course’, in which East European communist parties were urged to mould their 
policies to fit local conditions.  This move was made explicitly in response to the unrest 
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set loose by the death of Stalin, but the question of just how autonomous each country 
was is questionable.  As Ulam (1980) has posited, this ambiguity was in some ways ‘the 
reflection of internal dissension and uncertainty within the Kremlin circle itself’ (p.145).  
This relaxing of Soviet-dictated orthodoxy over this period needs to be connected to the 
argument that the introduction of economic incentives in the form of subsidised trade were 
meant to ensure the continued unity of the bloc by means other than Stalinist domination, 
and therefore a greater degree of divergence could be tolerated.  The Secret Speech 
seemed to signal that genuine autonomy was being granted by the USSR, and over the 
next few years Khrushchev’s acceptance of national roads to socialism led to a fluid 
situation in which a negotiated range of diversity was allowed in terms of moving away 
from the traditional model of planning.  Khrushchev effectively conceded that the Soviet 
party could no longer demand and receive absolute leadership of the international 
communist movement as it had under Stalin. 
During this period of unclear contours to intra-socialist relations, Tito envisaged 
a free and voluntary alliance of completely autonomous communist states; Khrushchev 
wanted limited autonomy in line with an acceptance of Soviet primacy and leadership.  
These similar but distinct ideas became irreconcilable given the international significance 
of events in Hungary in 1956.  This was resolved in November, 1957, when leaders of the 
East European and Asian communist parties arrived in Moscow to sign a declaration 
naming the USSR as the leader of the international communist movement.  This 
effectively brought the period of crisis beginning in 1953 to an end.  However, China had 
succeeded in attaining a level of  independence from Moscow by now which could never 
be rescinded, and polycentrism in the international communist movement became highly 
likely from this point on, even before the onset of the Sino-Soviet split in 1960 (London, 
1962, p.411). 
The ‘victory’ over the Chinese party, in that more parties affirmed loyalty to the 
CPSU in 1957, thus came at a high cost in that co-ordination in the context of polycentrism 
became significantly harder to achieve.  Already by this time, Soviet authority in Eastern 
Europe was no longer synonymous with leadership of the international communist 
movement as a whole.  This led to a shift in the political significance of CMEA and the 
WTO, in that after this point in time they became organisations less associated with 
international communism in general, and instead associated more particularly with Soviet 
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hegemony in Eastern Europe as a specific (and no-longer quite as central) component of 
international communism. 
Having challenged the Stalinist edifice, Khrushchev ultimately fell back to a 
middle-point; he went on the attack against ‘revisionism’ and made the amendment that 
not every road to socialism was valid–the Hungarian road, for instance, was argued to 
have been leading back to capitalism (Deutscher, 1960, p.48).  Staar (1971) emphasises 
the problems inherent to Khrushchev’s middle-way, where common policies could be 
found through discussion, albeit guided and circumscribed by the USSR (pp.266-8).  Two 
contradictory tendencies were set loose by this: the centrifugal force of national 
communism, and the centripetal force of bloc solidarity backed-up by Soviet economic 
and military power.  The contradiction between nationalism and communism was thus 
very important for the system of trade within the bloc, given that it was consciously 
designed to promote bloc unity by non-military means. 
 
3.2 Bloc Trade and Development 
 
Behind these policy debates and conflicts within the Soviet leadership and the 
international communist movement, an extremely significant economic process was 
going on in which a structural intertwining of East European industry and Soviet supplies 
and final markets developed, financed by Soviet-subsidised trade.  In this thesis Soviet 
trade policy towards Eastern Europe from this point on is understood as representing a 
medley of overlapping political and economic motives; arguably the geopolitical 
imperative of bloc stability was the primary concern which motivated the trade price 
reforms in the mid-1950s and their continuance till 1991.  In Jones’s (1977) words, the 
‘Soviets wanted the East European parties to have the appearance of autonomy, but not 
the reality’.  Jones goes on to argue that the instigation of long-term trade and other 
economic relations within the bloc should be seen as a post-Stalin strategy for ensuring 
the unity of the bloc.  I agree with this and argue that the concept of dependent 
development is essential to fully articulating the consequences of this. 
The domestic angle of these policy debates should also be emphasised.  Just as 
Malenkov’s attempt to limit the resources going into heavy industry and defence 
  
111  
  
production ran up against serious opposition from these sectors, Khrushchev’s proposals 
also faced opposition from vested interests.  As Sanchez-Sibony (2010) has noted,  
 
The locus of initiative in [trade] expansion, of course, did not lie with Soviet industry; 
the boom and continued intensification in Soviet foreign economic relations [in the 
1950s] was a testament to the will and wishes of the Kremlin.  From the time of 
Khrushchev, it was the leadership who saw foreign trade’s many benefits, and it is 
they who struggled against the Soviet system itself to see their wishes come to fruition 
(p.1575).  
  
This struggle took the form of a contest between factory managers concerned to meet their 
quantitative targets and make sure such targets were not raised, and so for whom extensive 
trade inside or outside CMEA was to be avoided, and the party leadership who saw the 
significance of trade for achieving growth (in terms of acquiring Western capital goods) 
and security (in terms of cementing the unity of the socialist bloc).  Sanchez Sibony 
(2010) quotes reports based on factory inspections which explicitly named plant managers 
as responsible for this reticence to open-up trade.  
In a related development, the period also saw a major shift in the composition of 
investment towards energy production.  Khanin (2003) states that electric power capacity 
grew from 19.6 million kWh in 1950 to 66.7 million kWh in 1960, in other words an 
increase of more than three times (p.1197).  Similarly massive increases in the quantity 
of oil and gas being produced were also achieved: between 1958 and 1965, the first 
coordinated plan period following the price reform, oil production (in million tons) went 
from 113 to 242.9, and gas (in milliard cubic metres) from 29.9 to 129.3 (Nove, 1988, 
p.355).  The relative changes in emphasis within the energy sector can be seen from table 
2 in the appendix, from which we can see that the overall rise was mainly accounted for 
by petroleum and natural gas. 
By the end of the 1980s the Soviet Union was the world’s largest producer of oil 
(since 1974), of natural gas (since 1983), and held third place in coal production after 
China and the United States.  This structure of production facilitated a particular mode of 
exchange between the USSR and the six which generated a form of development for the 
next two decades.  Returning to the earlier definition, this was the period, and energy the 
specific resource, which bound the various national economies of the bloc together into a 
system in which the historical process of expanded reproduction came to be intrinsically 
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international and asymmetrical in terms of the size of the economies involved and the 
resource distribution across them.   
  
3.3 Eastern Europe in the World Economy  
  
Just as the change in intra-socialist economic relations in the mid-1950s was 
situated in the context of the crisis that followed the death of Stalin, the changing structure 
of the wold economy in terms of the post-war pre-eminence of the US, most notably as a 
major influence behind West European economic integration, needs to be included as a 
factor relevant to the reactivation of CMEA.  Whilst earlier the WST over-emphasis on 
relations to the world market was criticised for leading to the under appreciation of the 
significance of the bloc dynamics focused on here, it is still useful to make individualising 
comparisons with DMEs.  This is how point 4 of the ideal-type is used here to take account 
of the global context in which these changes took place.  The international political and 
economic context outside of the bloc is important for two reasons: firstly, I argue the 
dynamics of intra-bloc trade, in which the USSR voluntarily subsidised Eastern Europe 
from the mid-1950s onwards, are only explicable by reference to the supreme geopolitical 
significance the USSR attached to the maintenance of communist power under Soviet 
leadership in the region, and secondly because the development path that this system of 
subsidies propagated is argued to have resulted in a number of contradictions which are 
best brought into focus through East-West comparison 
Beginning with how international context is essential to the origins of the CMEA 
project, the significance of the US-supported integration efforts in Western Europe needs 
to be mentioned.  In 1957 the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) 
signalled the increasingly successful recovery of Western Europe and the firm 
commitment of America to fostering free-market economies to counter-balance Soviet 
influence.  The answer from the East came two years later with the 1959 adoption of the 
CMEA official charter (the organisation had been functioning in the absence of any sort 
of official code for the first 10 years of its existence).  I agree with Priestland (2009) who 
has argued that the success of the EEC was a direct factor influencing the decision to 
expand the role of CMEA in order to continue to compete economically with capitalism.  
Similarly Gilpin (1987, p.295) and Fejtö (1971) have emphasised the significance of the 
two superpowers for understanding the integration achieved by the EEC and CMEA.  At 
this time Europe was a central theatre of Cold War antagonism, and the two economic 
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organisations can be seen as parallel projects of the superpowers organising the economic 
structure of their alliances. 
These external developments are conceptualised as representing a structural factor 
which influenced Soviet perceptions of possibilities for CMEA.  Bearing in mind the high 
growth rates of the period, and the general appeal of the Soviet model across the 
developing world at the time, there is something to be said that the rhetoric of catching-
up and eventually out-competing capitalism via a qualitatively different form of trade and 
development was taken seriously at this time.  Arguing for the meaningful role of ideology 
in the early years of this trade system, Kirby (2006) claims: ‘Yet in the 1950s these [price] 
negotiations were also marked, much more often than not, by a sense of solidarity.  The 
concept of “brother countries” was taken seriously, and the broader cause of building 
socialism appears to have been a factor facilitating compromise’ (p.887).  The key fact is 
that at the time such ideological considerations were perfectly consonant with the Soviet 
geopolitical goal of binding the bloc together through preferential economic agreements. 
The existence of substantial trade flows within CMEA which the Soviet Union 
engineered at great cost to some extent insulated Eastern Europe from pressures stemming 
from the world market, but CMEA never was and should not be understood as entirely 
isolated from the world economy.  However, as already mentioned, once the system of 
subsidised trade was in place, two contrasting Soviet ideals of developing CMEA linkages 
along either technocratic or geopolitical lines vied for priority; the resolution of this 
conflict usually in favour of geopolitical concerns until the late 1980s meant that CMEA 
cooperation and specialisation tended to be arranged along complementary rather than 
competitive lines.  This meant structures of production were ill-suited to the task of 
exporting outside CMEA, and this comparative disadvantage played a major role in 
reinforcing dependence on selling to the USSR.  In this way it can be argued that the way 
Eastern Europe engaged with the world economy was fundamentally constrained by 
CMEA participation, and in this way the key significance of relations to the world 
economy, when viewed from the theoretical perspective developed earlier, is that they 
allow further light to be shed on the possibilities and limits inherent to the dynamic 
internal to the bloc which will be examined in further detail in the case-study chapters. 
The fact that from the 1970s onwards East-West trade became increasingly 
significant for Eastern Europe, partly due to the economic inadequacies of the socialist 
bloc, is one of the key contradictions in the development process which CMEA fostered.  
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In other words, the type of development CMEA encouraged from the 1950s onwards 
moulded East European economies in such a way that a wide divergence opened-up 
between the criteria of success in exporting within or outside CMEA.  A technocratic 
alterative was possible, but this ran-up against interests within the USSR (notably 
industrial managers and the party elite) as well as economic agents in Eastern Europe who 
preferred subsidised intra-bloc trade.  DT, reformulated to allow a substantial explanatory 
role for geopolitics as an influence over trade, seems to be capable of explaining both why 
these structures were brought into existence in the first place, and why concerted efforts 
to alter them always fell-short since the sub-optimal nature of them assisted in achieving 
the goal of keeping the six dependent on the USSR.  Ultimately, CMEA proved ineffectual 
at supplying the East European regimes with the high-grade materials, quality capital 
goods, and technological expertise required to take development further (Staar, 1971), 
and the attainment of these was a prerequisite of loosening dependence on the USSR. 
By the late 1950s CMEA had undergone a momentous transformation–all the way 
from a hollow shell whose sole purpose was to rubber-stamp Stalin’s predatory actions 
towards Eastern Europe–to a transnational bureaucracy capable of managing international 
trade across a vast geographic expanse and in a similarly huge array of products.  This 
change has been situated in the context of the need to move away from Stalinism, as well 
against the backdrop of the example of successful capitalist integration represented by the 
EEC.  Allied to the quantitative increase of intra-CMEA trade went a shift in the 
qualitative dimensions of this trade.  The consequences of this system of economic 
relations for the development of the bloc over the next decades will now be discussed. 
  
4. Dependent Development in the Eastern Bloc, 1960-1980  
  
 The eventual adoption of the official charter in 1959 provides a convenient 
marker from which to date the completion of the institutional framework of Eastern bloc 
trade.  By this point the structural transformation begun in 1954, and developed 
particularly in 1956 both at the 20th Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) 
congress and the 7th CMEA session in Berlin, had been consolidated.  Under a DT frame, 
the story of Eastern bloc trade from here on is one of the intended and unintended 
consequences that resulted from this.  I argue that this period represented the high-point 
of dependent development in the bloc, in which a development dynamic internal to the 
bloc predicated on the exchange of raw materials and manufactured goods between the 
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Soviet Union at the six at prices which systematically favoured the six can be identified.  
However, the full consequences of this need to be elaborated by setting this development 
dynamic in the context of uneven capitalist development which exposed the structural 
limitations of this development process.  This unfavourable comparison emerged in the 
1970s and became more acute in the 1980s.  The key themes of this section all relate to 
how point 7 of the ideal-type was actualised in the Eastern bloc and are as follows:  
  
1. Firstly, this period saw the full emergence of a pattern of economic change best 
characterised as dependent development.  
  
2. Specifically, the maintenance and expansion of structures of production and 
consumption in Eastern Europe became dependent on the continuance of a 
particular trade regime within the bloc.  
  
3. This trade regime cannot be explained by entirely reference to the international 
division of labour in the world market, but was instead specific to the socialist 
bloc and must be approached on these terms.  
  
4. Although the development dynamic of the planned economies owed much to their 
internal organisation and patterns of regional interaction, the fact that CMEA as a 
whole was embedded in the world economy needs to be taken into account as well.  
The significance of the oil shocks and the unintended rise in the Soviet subsidy 
they implied is one of the most obvious ways this manifested itself in this period. 
 
5. The fact that the USSR chose not to capitalise on this, either by diverting oil 
exports away from the six and onto the world market, or by immediately raising 
the price it charged to Eastern Europe, is further telling evidence of the 
geopolitical, extra-economic significance of trade within the bloc.  However, the 
fact that a partial amendment of the price mechanism in 1975 did take place also 
shows that the technocratic agenda was slowly beginning to win some support 
inside the Soviet state. 
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The early 1960s were an auspicious time for CMEA and the Soviet-led project of 
socialist integration.  Following the price reforms under Khrushchev, trade surged ahead 
and the ratio of exports to national income continued to rise (Lavigne, 1991, p.14).  
 
Table 3  
  
   USSR Bulgaria Hungary Poland GDR Romania Czechoslovakia  
1967  3.9  28  40  20  22  17  30  
1980  8  40  54  31  33  27  29  
1986  8  42  58  32  33  20  32  
 
  
The only exceptions to this are Czechoslovakia, whose exposure to trade remained fairly 
constant at a level somewhere in the middle of the spread across the six, and the USSR, 
whose size insured it against the kind of trade dependence which can be demonstrated for 
all other CMEA members.  The 1960s saw the first attempt at plan coordination in 1961-
5 as the USSR sought the further structural intertwining of development in the bloc.  
Further progress was made in 1962 when the policy document, Basic Principles of the 
International Socialist Division of Labour, was adopted, which endorsed a more-or-less 
standard Ricardian notion of the gains to be had from specialisation and stressed the 
organisations mission to equalise levels of development (see Kaser, 1965, p.195). 
The arrival of Castro’s Cuba into the Soviet camp at this time also represented a 
substantial geopolitical victory, although it would prove an economic burden like so many 
other Soviet geopolitical gains.  The 22nd CPSU congress held at this time can be seen in 
retrospect as a high-point of optimism in Soviet communism.  It was here that Khrushchev 
delivered his famous boast that the USSR would overtake the US in all fields of economic 
performance within 20 years.  However, the limits to the Soviet model were becoming 
more and more apparent in Eastern Europe.  Having opened the door to national roads to 
socialism and accepted some degree of autonomy in economic policy for the East 
European parties–although the intervention in Hungary had shown this to be far from a 
blank-cheque–the 1960s saw the issue of fundamental economic reform return with 
international consequences. 
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4.1 Domestic and International Reform Within CMEA 
 
The intersection between domestic and international economic reform is highly 
significant for the study of dependent development in the bloc.  Specifically, the reforms 
are useful to consider since they open-up several concerns central to the project of 
reformulating DT and using it to provide an account of trade and development in CMEA.  
Firstly, the reforms illustrate the diversity of the six–especially after the Sino-Soviet split 
and the near inevitability of polycentrism that followed from this.  The need for DT to 
accept the non-homogenous nature of regions designated as peripheral is essential to 
moving beyond the determinism already criticised.  Secondly, the early beginning and 
fluctuating implementation of the reforms speaks of the structural and fundamental nature 
of the economic problems facing the planned economies over the period in question.  
Thirdly, the fact that decentralising reforms were often inconsistent with CMEA 
requirements shows the contradictions inherent to the dependent development that took 
place within CMEA. 
Stalin’s insistence that his policies be adopted throughout the bloc had given a 
clear criteria of obedience.  Since few had systematically transgressed and instead 
consented to implementing unpopular policies, ‘this had the effect of so alienating the 
peoples of Eastern Europe that the party leader in each country and the party itself became 
even more dependent on Soviet support to stay in power’ (Jones, 1980, pp.561-2).  
However, de-Stalinization had changed the complexion of the East European parties.  The 
structural context of centre/periphery within the bloc under Stalin had effectively limited 
the East European parties to a choice between two strategies: accept and obey Stalin’s 
will, or isolate from the bloc.  Since the second option involved excessive risk, it is not 
surprising that only Yugoslavia took this path given the strong, independent communist 
party in power there. 
As Skilling (1964) has stressed, the accession of Khrushchev opened-up 
significantly more possibilities for socialist policy, as signalled especially by the 
rapprochement with Belgrade and the willingness to accept alternative socialisms this 
implied to Eastern Europe.  Although Khrushchev in the late 1950s reasserted the primacy 
of the Soviet model, the centrifugal tendencies already unleashed proved hard to keep in 
check, despite the substantial economic incentives available within CMEA.  The reform 
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period, which reached its height in the mid-1960s, is significant for the project of 
examining dependent development in the bloc in that it arose partly in response to the 
problems inherent in the export of the Soviet model to Eastern Europe, the negative 
implications of which for the initial development of trade in region has already been 
addressed, and because it throws light on another way the system of CMEA trade served 
the geopolitical objective of securing the bloc by placing restrictions on how far reform 
of the traditional model could go. 
The 1960s saw the East European economies diverge from each other as 
nationally-specific reforms were launched and followed through various courses.  These 
reforms need to be treated somewhat differently to the previous ‘New Course’; as 
Asselain (1984) has pointed out, the reforms after 1953 were generally decentralising but 
did not question the basic model, and their cyclical implementation reflected the struggles 
in all the parties of the region between reformers and the remaining Stalinists.  The later 
reforms went further than this in that it was now accepted fundamental institutional 
change needed to go along with the redefinition of economic objectives–Hungary 
provides the key example of this and will be discussed in more detail in chapter 6. 
 Szelenyi (1989) has categorised two types of reform which were put into practice 
in the 1960s: rationalisation of the bureaucratic-distributive mechanism, and 
decentralisation, with the first type involving the development and application of more 
sophisticated planning techniques, and the other arguing that only decentralisation and 
the introduction of some market elements could provide the remedy.  This general 
dichotomy remained of significance throughout the period in question and makes it 
relatively easy to categorise the CMEA members.  East Germany was the most in favour 
of rationalising the planning mechanism and systematically attempted to do this.  The 
East German reforms tried to delegate a wide range of planning responsibilities to 
intermediate organisations (of which there were 80 created) who would report to the 
central administration on this and closely supervise firms by sector (Asselain, 1984, 
p.151).  The USSR, Poland and Rumania were similarly inclined to the Germans although 
much less thoroughgoing in the design of their reforms.  Meanwhile, decentralising 
reforms were proceeding in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.  In most countries a general 
lack of coherence in these measures was a recurring problem, as well as the fact that 
centralised price determination actually became even more essential once some decisions 
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had been decentralised but without creating the genuine market conditions upon which 
this decentralised decision-making could be successful. 
It is important to point out that the differing levels of development in the region 
meant that the problems being solved by each party differed (Hohmann, 1975, p.546), 
and thus the diversity of the reforms acted as a visible reminder that there was no standard 
Soviet-approved model for a reformed centrally planned economy as there was for a 
traditional one.  Further to this, they remind us that given the diversity of the CMEA 
members it was extremely improbable that the cumbersome system of trade and 
integration could be maintained indefinitely in view of these diversifying tendencies.  
This made the Soviet geopolitical project of maintaining communist power in the region, 
partly through a particular system of trade, more precarious than it had been before, and 
further underlined the geopolitical significance for the USSR of CMEA as a potential 
centre of co-ordination. 
A common aspect of the reforms of significance in this regard was that most 
CMEA countries, excluding the USSR, moved towards some links between domestic and 
wmps.  This move, made out of the growing necessity of trading outside the bloc, cut at 
a key foundation of the CMEA system and the Soviet Union’s central role within it, 
namely the highly distinct nature of prices within the bloc and the transfers of surplus 
from the USSR to the six this allowed.  In mid-1960s, Poland, Czechoslovakia and 
Hungary were the most open to trade with the West, and it is significant that these were 
also the CMEA members most in favour of fundamental reform.  The higher degree of 
openness to international trade outside CMEA meant the contradictions of the 
development path available within CMEA were more clearly seen in these countries, and 
this is an example of the essential tension between reform–and decentralising reform in 
particular–and CMEA (Colombatto, 1983). 
However, this divergence was counter-balanced by a striking continuity across the 
region of the priority given to heavy industry in the traditional model.  In fact, the gap 
between the growth of producer and consumer industries grew over the reform period in 
all countries except Hungary (Asselain, 1984, p.101).  This is an example of the fact that 
industrial policies across the region diverged much less than other areas, notably 
agriculture where a whole range of public/private mixes were tried.  The strategic 
significance of this prioritisation of heavy industry for the Soviet Union as the centre of 
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CMEA has been raised earlier and will be returned to in the next chapter in more detail, 
and it seems plausible that CMEA in general tended to reinforce the preference for 
investment in heavy industry, perhaps on account of the need for members to commit to 
long-term barter deals requiring investment resources to be made available in well 
advance. 
These reforms began in the context of Khrushchev’s general revamping of bloc 
relations, when a wider array of strategies became open to Eastern Europe, and from this 
point on East European agency is essential to explain the continuance of subsidised trade.  
Already by the Moscow conference of August, 1961, when Khrushchev proposed that 
CMEA be invested with the powers of a transnational planning authority capable of 
directing a regional-wide investment plan centred around expanding raw material 
extraction and processing capacities, East European leaders felt strong enough to oppose 
this move.  East European party leaders opposed this on the grounds that it would have 
represented a growth of Soviet influence over their economies, and this makes it clear that 
there were limits to how much control the Soviets managed to get in return for the 
subsidies other than the maintenance of the bloc.  For instance, resistance from Rumania 
was key to blocking 1960s’ Soviet attempts to make CMEA decisions binding (Marer and 
Montias, 1980).  Rumania has to be seen to some extent as a distinct case among the six, 
especially after Ceaușescu’s rise the power in the mid-1960s and his construction of a 
Stalin-like cult of personality (Verdery, 1995).  Rumania’s relative independence in terms 
of international policy certainly correlates with significantly smaller (and sometimes non-
existent) subsidies than were received by the rest of the six, although the fact that Rumania 
was not so dependent on Soviet oil must also be considered a factor in this. 
However, just as the Soviet’s saw their plans frustrated by recalcitrant parties who 
were not necessarily dominated by obedient Stalinists any more, they were themselves 
equally able to block proposals when they came from other members and would have 
loosened Soviet control of trade flows, for example, the Hungarian proposal that 
multilateral trade replace the bilateral system.  This instance of the Soviets blocking a 
proposal for reform coming from one of the smaller members provides a good example 
of the kind of structural power which the USSR exercised within CMEA: when something 
was proposed which displeased the Soviets they were capable of making sure it went no 
further, but they seem to have encountered tremendous difficulty in sallying forth from 
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their outwardly impressive position whenever they tried to get the East Europeans to 
commit to further integration which might have reduced the subsidies.  Hamilton (1990) 
gives the instructive example of car manufacturing, where Soviet-led initiatives to allow 
this specialization to be concentrated in Czechoslovakia resulted in East Germany 
expanding production of Wartburg and Trabant models, Poland to import Fiat technology 
and begin production under license, and Rumania to make a similar deal with Renault 
leading to the production of Dacias (p.245). 
The Soviets were by now more-or-less forced to accept genuine polycentrism in 
the international communist movement due to China’s successful assertion of 
independence from Moscow (Jones and Kevill, 1985, p.157), and arguably this made 
CMEA and WTO as key supports of the Soviet claim to (some sort of) leadership of the 
international communist movement more important, although it simultaneously increased 
the possibilities of diversity within the bloc.  It is significant that the climax of the reform 
period coincided with this other centrifugal development, the finalisation of the Sino-
Soviet split.  Thompson (1998) argues that from 1965 the differences between the Soviet 
and Chinese parties could no longer be reconciled, and therefore the world communist 
movement was forever sundered.  Both the varying East European reform processes and 
the exit of China from the Soviet camp emphasised to the Soviet leadership the mutable 
nature of their leadership of international communism and further reinforced the 
importance of subsidised trade. 
 
4.2 Recentralisation and Development in the 1970s 
 
By the late 1960s the reform tide was beginning to ebb and instead a strong 
tendency towards re-convergence on the traditional model could be identified.  Two 
international factors were key to this: the political tension within the bloc as evinced by 
the events of 1968, and the dramatic rises in the price of oil on the world market after 
1973.  Given the focus on international economic relations and the special role of the 
pricing of Soviet oil exports to the six, the oil price rises of the decade are argued to be 
the most significant way economic developments external to the bloc impacted on the 
internal relationship, with debt appearing a little later as a significant linkage.  The role of 
the oil shocks as enforcers of closer ties to the USSR, and in turn as enforcers of the 
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traditional model of planning, will be discussed in this context.  A strong case can be 
made that CMEA membership played a role in hindering domestic economic reforms in 
general, and this was especially true following the first oil shock when the benefits of 
trade within the bloc became considerable.  With oil prices rising so rapidly on world 
markets, the choice of strengthen economic links to the USSR via CMEA looked more 
appealing than ever, and thus the dependence of the six was probably deepened by these 
external economic events.  The recentralisation in the 1970s coincided with the oil shocks, 
and this is significant in line with the theme of diversifying reforms–or in this case their 
stalling–relating to CMEA.  Thus it can be concluded that the re-tightened of economic 
relations between the USSR and the six as a result of the growing magnitude of the Soviet 
subsidies after 1973 significantly correlated with the re-convergence on the traditional 
planning model, and this further reinforces the argument that bloc trade tended to be a 
factor counting against fundamental reform. 
The events known as the Prague Spring also have to be considered as a factor 
influencing the relative recentralisation within the bloc in the 1970s as compared to the 
1960s (Hohman, 1975, p.544).  The intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, made when 
the reforms seemed to the Soviets to be going too far, is particularly important for several 
reasons.  Firstly, it showed that the negotiated range of diversity in terms of reform had a 
very definite limit, and secondly the resort to the use of force by the USSR even after the 
strategy of subsidised trade was in place reminds that the introduction of economic 
incentives had not removed the contradictions of Soviet power in Eastern Europe.  
Deutscher (1960) has talked about the ‘inertia of Stalinism’ as a possible explanation for 
the continuance of military interventions, and certainly the continuing primacy of the 
geopolitical objective of maintaining the bloc intact by any means necessary seems to 
have been an example of this.  Importantly, the Soviet party was not alone in this regard; 
East German leader, Walther Ulbricht, was especially vocal in calling for intervention.  
This reminds us that Stalinism was not confined to the USSR, although Stalinists were 
increasingly minorities within the East European communist parties. 
The intervention in Czechoslovakia has to be considered a more serious 
indictment of the essential failure of post-Stalin Soviet leaderships to find new ways to 
ensure the unity and stability of the bloc other than through force than that in Hungary, 
which was made before the system of subsidised trade was initiated.  Returning to the 
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debate about the relative weight of ideology and geopolitical concerns behind Soviet 
actions, the military intervention of 1968 can be argued to confirm that by this time the 
balance had tipped fully in the direction of the later.  Kramer (1999a) quotes a Soviet 
politburo-approved report which stressed the centrality of geopolitics in the decision to 
invade.  The report called the intervention a success and urged the leadership to keep 
‘interfering as decisively as possible in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia and keep 
exerting pressure through all channels’, despite the public line of non-interference (p.546).  
So, ideological concerns were voiced, and to some extent constrained policy choices–and 
certainly it would have been preferable from the Soviet point of view if the development 
possibilities enabled by subsidised trade had been enough to convince Czechoslovakia to 
remain close to the USSR and to the Soviet model–but ideology ultimately had to conform 
to geopolitical concerns, and not the other way around.  Just as ‘Socialism in one country’ 
had facilitated this move before, a slightly altered formulation was developed after 1968 
in which the independence of the national communist parties was respected by Moscow 
but in relation to the global class struggle; in other words, if the actions of a party put this 
greater good at risk, collective intervention by the rest could be justified (Thompson, 
1998, p.151).  From late 1960s onwards, the ideology of socialist economic integration 
was a similar case, and arguably the final arbiter of the secondary significance of ideology 
in relations to geopolitics for intra-bloc relations has to be the sheer level and range of 
types of conflict that characterised the bloc, military force being the most extreme. 
Shortly after the invasion of 1968, the Brezhnev doctrine, as it was known in the 
West, stipulated that all communist states must abide by the doctrines of Marxism-
Leninism as interpreted by Moscow.  This had significant international repercussions both 
inside and outside of the bloc.  Firstly, the commitment to international intervention put 
the USSR firmly outside the UN-sponsored international legal consensus against 
interventionism, which all members officially agreed to.  The Soviet claim for justifiable 
interventionism was made in respect of the potential need for future interventions to 
maintain the bloc, but it represented a barrier to participation in the Western-dominated 
international organisations.  As such, it stood for a firm commitment on the USSR’s part 
to the international significance of maintaining communist power in the bloc over 
completing the normalisation of international relations begun by Khrushchev (Hill, 2003).  
It could also be argued that this signified serious doubts on the part of the Soviet 
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leadership about whether economic incentives alone would be enough to maintain the 
bloc in the future. 
This was the context in which the contestation around the 1971 Comprehensive 
Programme, adopted at the 25th session in Bucharest, needs to be seen.  Just as with the 
debates over domestic reform, the same two opposed stand-points on the future direction 
of CMEA were apparent: the market/decentralising approach and the advocacy of more 
sophisticated quantitative co-ordination and planning methods (Stone, 1996).  That the 
Programme represented an uneasy compromise between the two was symbolic of the deep 
split in all the parties over reform and helps to explain its very limited implementation 
and effects (Lavigne, 1991).  The Programme defined integration rather narrowly as 
progress towards production and trade specialisation and the expansion of joint 
investment projects organised via CMEA.  Importantly it focused on the region-wide 
development of energy resources (a key Soviet concern) and set the following priorities 
for energy policy within CMEA: 1) extensive geological surveys, 2) rational development 
and location of energy intensive industries, 3) more atomic energy plants, 4) cooperation 
in energy production and its long-range transmission, 5) extension of pipelines for Soviet 
oil and gas. 
In regard to achieving this final objective, the necessity of trade with the West was 
openly acknowledged by the USSR who undertook to import gas-pipeline technology 
from Western companies with more advanced technology than socialist equivalents.  The 
US actually opposed European companies being involved in this trade but was not able to 
prevent this taking place since European manufacturers saw potential for profitable 
exports to the USSR (Boardman, 1994, p.450).  This reminds that the international 
interests of the US (just as those of the USSR) operated in two ways during the Cold War; 
both in terms of  opposing the Eastern bloc and in terms of asserting US primacy and 
competitive leadership of the capitalist world.  This is an example of how the contrasting 
social systems of the two superpowers are essential to explaining the dynamics of 
geopolitics during the Cold War (Saull, 2007, p.158). 
If the US was far from capable of setting limits to the West Europeans, the USSR 
was equally incapable of dictating policy to the East Europeans.  The defensive ability of 
East European agency in CMEA negotiations is demonstrated by the fact that although 
the Programme tried to deepen plan coordination as technocratic elements within the 
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Soviet party-state wanted, the 1971-75 period saw the East Europeans able to prolong the 
old ad hoc methods of coordination, and little progress was made towards the 
modernisation sought by some elements in the Soviet party (Kiss and Hajdu, 1976, p.16).  
The fact that even after the tumultuous events of 1968 it took a full two years to get a 
programme drafted, debated, and accepted, and one which Stone’s (1996) evidence shows 
few had any sincere intentions of adhering to, seems to be a stinging indictment of the 
utility of Soviet power and its ability to achieve Soviet policy goals in CMEA.  In this 
light, the economic incentives on offer appear to have been capable of holding the bloc 
together, but the level of domination Stalin had previously exercised could not be 
recaptured. 
The two axes around which debate over the Comprehensive Program revolved 
were the related issues of whether the perfection of the planning mechanism or the 
introduction of market elements was to be the preferred remedy to the ills of the command 
economies, and how best to enable regionally balanced development to take place.  These 
concerns are relevant for this thesis precisely because CMEA tended to discourage 
fundamental reforms of the planning mechanism, and so the diversity of the Eastern bloc 
economies, whilst remaining within CMEA, needs to be situated in relation to the tension 
between the need for reform and the continuity of traditional methods encouraged by 
CMEA.  This issue is especially pertinent for DT, which was earlier argued to easily lapse 
into generalising too far.  As was usually the case, the Hungarians were the main 
advocates of radical, market-oriented reforms with the Soviets and Germans arguing for 
more sophisticated planning techniques.  However, neither side achieved any fundamental 
change to the structural relations within the bloc at this time. 
Significantly, the CMEA that emerged from the new round of talks and 
agreements was an inter-national, and emphatically not a supra-national, entity.  The East 
European preference for a CMEA to continue to deal with and between governments had 
won out over the Soviet preference for a CMEA empowered to act above the heads of 
member governments.  The backdrop to these debates was at this stage still a general 
sense of optimism.  All the CMEA economies were growing at satisfactory rates, basic 
industrialisation had been completed, and living standards were rising, and this thesis has 
argued throughout that Soviet-subsidised trade was a key component of these successes.  
However, as will be returned to later, the 1970s did see the slowdown in growth rates 
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which with the benefit of hindsight can be seen to have prevented the economies of the 
bloc from regaining their previous levels of growth. 
This was by no mean specific to the East, with the 1970s appearing as a general 
period of crisis in the world economy (see Dunn, 2009).  Specifically, the 1970s were a 
period of crisis for the US hegemony established after WWII, especially after the 
abandonment of dollar-gold convertibility in 1971.  However, as Asparturian (1980) 
notes, this relative US decline did not necessarily mean a symmetrical rise in Soviet 
power, but rather a move towards a less bipolar international environment.  That said, the 
1970s were a period of relative success for the USSR internationally; with the US 
weakened and demoralised by Vietnam and the economic crisis, a number of communist-
led and Soviet-supported revolutions took place in the Third World.  As Saull (2005) has 
commented, these events gave some support to the classical Soviet ideological belief in 
capitalism as a weak and crisis-prone system, and for a time the global balance seemed to 
be moving in the USSR’s favour, although Moscow’s increasing pursuit of a truly global 
policy in the 1970s became a major strain on Soviet economic resources. 
It is telling that the Moscow principle of price formation came in at this time, 
arguably signifying a relative decline in the geopolitical significance of Eastern Europe 
as the USSR expanded its interests elsewhere.  For example, Kirshin (1998) stresses how 
willing the USSR was to engage in preferential arms deals at this time, and occasionally 
to transfer arms for no payment at all, just so long as some geopolitical goal was being 
furthered.  This cost was accepted for the political influence it bought and because it fitted 
with the ideological proposition that the direction of history was flowing towards full 
communism (Roberts, 1999, p.63).  Steele (1985) also argues that the largely continental 
focus of the Khrushchev era gave way under Brezhnev to a more global perspective.  This 
brought new major economic costs for the Soviet economy to bear alongside and in 
addition to subsidised trade with Eastern Europe. 
 
4.3 Constraints on Eastern Europe  
  
In addition to geopolitical considerations, there were several purely technical 
constraints on East European agency in terms of their ability to change their trade relations 
stemming from CMEA involvement which are significant.  The two most important were 
the financial system and the shared infrastructure.  Beginning with the financial 
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arrangement within CMEA, the most notable feature was the absence of active money, by 
which is meant the holders power to influence the allocation of societies resources via its 
use.  Trade was carried out through a clearing system and in a purely fiction unit of 
account.  The lack of hard currency that resulted from non-convertibility effectively 
limited the quantity of trade Eastern Europe could conduct with partners outside CMEA, 
and it was not uncommon for the Soviet Union to exert pressure (chiefly in the form of 
the potential restriction of future energy supplies) on East European governments to bear 
part of the costs in hard currency of regional infrastructure or material extraction projects. 
The common bloc infrastructure also acted to reproduce this system by making 
the quick switching of markets or sources of supply extremely risky.  Van Brabant (1990) 
has underlined the severe infrastructural costs associated with reducing CMEA trade 
(p.163).  Most significant was the existence of substantial energy infrastructure projects 
such as the Mir electricity grid which linked all the national electricity grids of Eastern 
Europe through infrastructure primarily owned and operated by the Soviet Union, along 
with the various pipeline projects with similar ownership structures.  Essentially, Eastern 
Europe had no other options for securing essential energy and raw material imports in the 
1970s than closer integration with USSR via CMEA (Von Beyme, 1987, p.105).  
Arguably this meant that as industrialisation progressed, because of the way it progressed, 
dependence deepened, and Eastern Europe was bound closer into ties of dependence on 
the USSR. 
  
4.3 Growth Slowdown and CMEA  
  
Part of accounting for the slower rates of growth of the 1970s was the general rise 
in the cost of raw material extraction and processing, which in turn led production costs 
to rise.  This became a major issue in the wake of the oil crises, and the course of CMEA 
developments over the next decade must be interpreted in this context.  In market 
economies this rise in costs could either eat into profits or set-off a round of inflation 
depending on fiscal policies, the supply of credit, levels of effective demand, etc.  The 
central control of prices changed the appearance of both the ‘illness’ and the ‘remedies’ 
in the Eastern bloc.  Most importantly, the gap between wholesale and retail prices, the 
former being established through reference to production costs while the later were the 
dual objects of social policy and the attempt to plan for equilibrium between supply and 
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demand, meant that a single unit of national currency could have two arbitrarily different 
values in retail or wholesale situations.  
If the extent of domestic inflation was thus difficult to measure, the yard-stick of 
hypothetical wmps for CMEA exports served to highlight the growing dimensions of the 
voluntary Soviet ‘loses’ from consenting to supply CMEA with energy and raw materials 
at the price structure described previously.  This accentuated the conflict within the Soviet 
party-state apparatus between those advocating the technocratic reform of intra-bloc 
trade, and those pushing for the continuance of geopolitically-motivated subsidies.  As 
wmps rose for many Soviet exports, the implicit subsidy expanded at a pace that could 
hardly have been imagined when the structure of exchange within the Eastern bloc was 
initiated in the 1950s.  The crisis of the world economy, partly brought on by oil price 
rises orchestrated by the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), further 
underlined the structural imbalance characteristic of the bloc, since these developments 
represented a major gain to the USSR as a net energy exporter in contradistinction to the 
six. 
In this way the intended consequences of making East European economic 
progress dependent on Soviet largesse was supplemented by the unintended consequences 
that the maintenance of this structure came to represent  a non-negligible burden on the 
USSR.  Living standards in Eastern Europe were now rising faster than in the USSR 
(Dornberg, 1995), and accordingly the opportunity cost from trade with Eastern Europe 
became harder for the Soviet leadership to consent to as more of the party and bureaucracy 
apparatus became aware of the costs of subsidised trade.  The fact that part of what 
financed this rise in living standards from the 1970s onwards was borrowing from 
Western banks, leading to the rise of credit dependency on the West overlapping with the 
already described processes of dependent development in the bloc, will be covered in 
chapter 6.  Kurierov (1998), a member of the Research Institute of the Ministry of Foreign 
Trade, claims that the scale of the subsidies only came to the Soviet leaderships’ attention 
in a serious way in 1983-5 when export growth rates declined.  This suggests that before 
this date the broad outline of trade policy with Eastern Europe had not been subject to 
regular revision but rather that a pattern established earlier had simply been allowed to 
continue on the premise that it served an important geopolitical purpose. 
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4.4 Trade and Waste  
  
As Köves (1981, 1983, 1991) and other East European economists pointed out, 
the plentiful availability of cheap industrial inputs from the USSR encouraged the use of 
extremely wasteful production methods in Eastern Europe.  In 1970 there was a strong 
correlation between economic growth and environmental pollution (a symptom of 
inefficiency); by the 1980s this link was being broken in the West but a similar delinking 
showed no signs of occurring in the East (Janicke et al, 1989).  This was due to the type 
of industrial development which Eastern Europe was locked into which I argue was 
crucially reinforced by the nature of trade and integration within CMEA.  The absence of 
incentives to economise on inputs both harmed the competitiveness of Eastern Europe 
relative to NICs and DMEs and also strained Soviet supplies.  The gulf in terms of energy 
efficiency between Eastern and Western Europe can be seen from table 4 in the appendix.  
This can be argued to have been a direct consequence of processes described previously 
and fundamentally handicapped the Eastern bloc economies as they sought to engage with 
the world economy. 
As costs mounted the Soviets encouraged their East European partners to secure 
some of their oil from other sources so as to lessen the burden on the Soviet Far East.  
This is an example of the technocratic policy agenda which sought to maximize the 
economic utility of trade relations, and so was in direct contradiction of the geopolitical 
agenda which emphasized the need to secure Eastern Europe within the bloc, and so 
sanctioned subsidized trade at almost any cost.  In this way, Soviet attempts to reform 
their economic relations with the six from the mid-1970s onwards tried to find a middle 
way between these two positions; it can be concluded that the geopolitical approach had 
more support within the party leadership due to the fact that the Soviet’s ultimately 
consented to continue the extant pattern.  These technocratic initiatives are described by 
Goldman (1980), who quotes Soviet sources speaking about the inevitability that CMEA 
countries will need to meet part of their oil requirements from the Middle East (p.61), and 
Lavigne (1991) highlights to Soviet attempt in the 1980s to push Eastern Europe to 
restructure production towards less energy-intensive methods (p.94).  This implies that 
the structure of exchange within CMEA was not totally under the control of the Soviet 
party, within which technocratic and geopolitical views competed, and supports the 
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contention that Eastern European agency was highly significant in maintaining the 
unequal exchange within the bloc.  
The crisis of profitability faced by East European industry after 1991 is the best 
evidence that the growth of the Cold War era was dependent on the skewed prices 
characteristic of CMEA.  The poor quality of Eastern European manufactures can be 
interpreted as evidence of a serious structural weakness in the socialist economies partly 
related to CMEA and socialist economic integration.  This link is a point that emerges 
clearly from the application of a reformulated DT.  It is well-known that there is a strong 
correlation between growth in the production of (higher quality) consumer goods and the 
attainment of a higher level of economic development in general.  In this way the failure 
to develop consumer goods industries in the Eastern bloc gave the socialist countries the 
status of permanently developing countries, ‘in the sense that their industrialisation 
process [was] never completed and they [were] not destined to become mature industrial 
economies under the Soviet system (in spite of GNP per capita increases)’ (Winiecki, 
1988, p.127).  This represented a limit to the type of dependent development bloc 
integration cold promote and emphasises that CMEA ftps encouraged the following of a 
particularly inefficient development path, the drawbacks to which became all the more 
apparent in the final decade. 
  
5. Stagnation, Crisis and Collapse, 1980-1989  
 
The final years of CMEA trade were characterised by the following features:  
  
1. In general these years witnessed by the continuance of tendencies identified over 
the previous decades, with the addition of the perception that costs were coming 
to outweigh benefits for all participants.  
  
2. In terms of the institutional developments of the period, the meetings and sessions 
which were held were now pervaded by a different atmosphere–the rules of the 
club were still being observed, and certainly after Gorbachev’s ascension a new 
willingness to listen to proposals from other members could be seen on the part of 
the Soviet Union, but the mission of ‘perfecting socialism’ along with the other 
slogans of socialist solidarity were no longer voiced with much sincerity.  
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3. The 1980s saw the rapid development of new high-tech sectors in the West and 
the NICs.  The failure of the East to keep-up emphasised the growing technology 
lag and the out-dated nature of traditional planning in this new context.  As will 
be returned to in chapter 8, the Yugoslav economy proved more competent in this 
regard, and this is part of what makes it an interesting comparative case for a DT 
study. 
 
In this final phase, the process of development of previous decades, during which 
the socialist bloc could claim to have been in competition with the West for economic 
supremacy, was increasingly looking like a failed model.  As such, the relation of East to 
West, and the visible superiority of the West, needs to be included as it highlighted the 
structural flaws inherent to the dependent development of the bloc.  As Laird and Hoffman 
(1980, p.399) note, by now Eastern bloc economists were openly recognising that the 
ability of an economy to participate in the advanced international division of labour was 
vital for securing further economic development, and that the domestic characteristics of 
the planned economies were fundamentally ill-suited to this.  1981 was after all supposed 
to be the year in which the USSR surpassed the US economically; by now this promise 
had been quietly forgotten.  In fact, the 1980s saw the unprecedented move of the USSR 
moving away from its previous critical stance on the international financial institutions 
established at Bretton Woods and towards reconciliation.  Few more obvious signifiers of 
the serious economic problems faced by the socialist states could be pointed to, and as 
such the developments of the 1980s can be seen as representing a final admission on the 
part of socialist leaders of the superiority of developed capitalism. 
From the 1940s to early-1980s, the USSR had led the Eastern bloc in criticizing 
the IMF and World Bank on ideological grounds and put forward proposals in the UN for 
the radical restructuring of world economic relations.  In this period, the Soviet Union 
tried to be the industrialised state that spoke in the interests of the developing world.  
However, in the long-run, this goal of a stable East-South partnership was not achieved.  
Some sort of reconciliation with the Bretton Woods institutions was considered alongside 
the critical stance, but only in the mid-1980s did this gain in prominence (Boardman, 
1994).  This reversal is all the more startling when it is remembered that when Rumania 
gained membership of the IMF in 1972 this was seen gesture of independence and even 
rebellion against Moscow, who had continually attempted to dissuade the East Europeans 
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from seeking membership of organisations outside and contrary to CMEA (Lavigne, 
1991, p.350). 
In 1980s, East European states openly requested more Western interaction as they 
wanted technology, capital, and were increasingly aware of the constraints of CMEA.  
Membership of the international financial organisations was seen as crucial to securing 
this.  As the most reformed of the six, Hungary led the way and achieved membership of 
the IMF in 1981, accepting that Rumania’s joining in 1972 should be seen as a special 
case.  By the late 1980s, East European politicians were openly complaining about the 
socialist world’s isolation from the Bretton Woods institutions (Boardman, 1994); much 
as the USSR had tried to make CMEA a viable and attractive alternative, by the 1980s it 
was looking like this project had failed.  Likewise, several of the six sought and achieved 
membership of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), with Hungary, 
Poland, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia all having joined by mid-1980s. 
The contrast between enthusiasm for participation in these institutions and the 
general malaise around CMEA is striking and suggestive of the irresolvable problems the 
organisation faced by now.  This was symbolised by the Moscow meeting of the Council 
in June, 1984, which was convened to address the issue of the lack of progress made 
towards industrial cooperation, where debate largely re-ran old lines and consensus 
evaded the participants.  If CMEA had been an indecisive institution before, it was now 
one which appeared fundamentally incapable of reforming itself in any substantive way.  
This inertia had been masked to some degree through earlier decades by high growth rates 
and the social progress this made possible, but the inability to keep-up in the new high-
tech sectors was a major issue which exposed the increasingly anachronistic nature of 
structures of production and exchange within the bloc, structures which had been vitally 
reinforced by CMEA processes.  
   
5.1 Technology and Production   
  
A key contradiction in the dependent development of the bloc already discussed 
was the tendency towards technological stagnation.  The general question as to whether 
any form of planning was compatible with the scientific and technological revolution 
emerged relatively early in the bloc (see Richta, 1969).  The final decade did see the 
adoption of the ‘Comprehensive Programme on Science and Technological Progress of 
CMEA member countries up to the year 2000’ in 1985.  In contrast to the grandiose 
  
133  
  
designs of before, this program focused on five areas alone–nuclear, automation, new 
materials, electronics, and biotech–where there were genuine synergies to be had from the 
combination of Czechoslovakian and East German industrial capabilities with the vast 
Soviet network of world-class research facilities.  The necessity of moving from extensive 
to intensive development seems to have been well appreciated in the East (Laird and 
Hoffmann, 1980, pp.387-8).  However, few tangible results were achieved.  One 
fundamental issue was always that enterprise managers were not interested in new 
technologies due to the risks involved in switching production techniques.  Only central 
planners could have enforced innovation, but they equally often had preferences for the 
status quo.  This will be explored further in next two chapters where the agency behind 
Soviet and Hungarian production will be discussed. 
  The use of DT directs attention towards possible links between national and 
international processes, and so the high concentration of production typical of the Eastern 
bloc can be related to the relatively unchanging nature of trade within the bloc and how 
this disincentivised innovation.  In her comparison of structures of industrial enterprises 
between East and West in the 1980s, Ehrlich (1985) concluded that enterprise structure 
grew faster in the East than the West, and that the socialist economies were characterised 
by enterprises generally much larger in relation to the size of their national market than 
was common in the West (pp.284-5).  These large firms preferred the stability provided 
by CMEA to the uncertainties of exporting to the West and the technological innovation 
this required.  Further, the size of socialist firms enabled them to effectively struggle 
against party measures designed to encourage them to modernise or raise their 
performance.  The general failure of socialist firms to export profitably outside CMEA 
was a key part of the debt crisis of the 1980s, which will be discussed in chapter 6. 
Going further into why CMEA tended to discourage technological progress, the 
large nature of orders and undemanding final markets need to be emphasized.  
Competition among East European countries for Soviet deliveries of raw materials, with 
the method of competition being in terms of the quality of products delivered in return 
(Brus, 1979), was encouraged by the Soviet Union.  This was due to the fact that the  
Soviet’s made it clear from the 1970s onwards that they were not satisfied with the quality 
of imports from Eastern Europe.  However, this competition only went so far:  
  
Nevertheless, the satellites exported the same models to the Soviet Union without 
modification for many years, cut corners by using poor-quality materials, and 
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provided a poor assortment of goods... The Soviet Union launched a plethora of 
programs to raise quality standards, to promote new products, and to develop 
science and technology.  In principle, the satellites applauded these initiatives, but 
in detail, they fought to retain outmoded models and resist technological progress 
(Stone, 1996, p.8).  
  
Wasowski (1969) predicted these factors would lead Eastern Europe to drift down the 
Soviet priorities for oil export–that this did not happen implies the high value the CPSU 
leadership placed on maintaining Eastern Europe in a condition of dependence.  
Bunce (1985, pp.15-7) has emphasised how the Soviets acquiesced to economic 
reform in Eastern Europe partly hoping that it would raise standards and lead to better 
quality exports.  The maintenance of communist rule did not necessarily mean Moscow 
was opposed to economic reforms in the periphery, and in fact saw the benefits they could 
offer (Nation, 1992, p.223).  This can be understood as an attempt to make up for the fact 
that there was no ‘test of the home market’ due to permanent excess demand (a sellers’ 
market).  This contributed to poor export performance, especially in final products and 
technologically sophisticated items.  DT seems to be capable of explaining both why these 
structures were brought into existence in the first place, and why concerted efforts to alter 
them always fell-short since the suboptimal nature of them assisted in achieving the goal 
of keeping the six dependent on the USSR, and throughout the Cold War this geopolitical 
objective was held to be extremely significant. 
  
5.2 The Denouement  
  
The narrative of the final years of CMEA and their instability have to give a central 
place to Gorbachev’s reforms, which he first articulated in 1986.  Part this involved a 
wholesale reversal of the previous policy towards the IMF and World Bank, which had 
been on the cards since the early 1980s, culminating in the USSR formally applying for 
membership.  This was a crystal clear signal that the technocratic agenda was starting to 
come into ascendance over the geopolitical one in terms of foreign economic relations 
both inside and outside of the bloc.  This move was based on a realistic assessment of the 
Soviet economy, its problems and needs.  In 1987, Gorbachev’s reforms finally spilled-
over into CMEA as convertibility of the rouble was broached by the Soviets for the first 
time.  The spur to move towards full convertibility was the steady rise in the importance 
of trade with the West. 
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By now the everyday functioning of CMEA linkages were beginning to 
deteriorate; time-lags in delivery were creeping in from 1988 and became increasingly 
common the following year.  This coincided with a shift towards looking for solutions to 
economic problems which no longer assumed CMEA as the context within which the 
solution would be put into practice.  An increasing consensus was emerging that the 
economic problems of the planned economies could be solved only by closer links to the 
world economy, and not within CMEA.  By 1989, which happened to be the 40th 
anniversary of CMEA, but became year of ‘indecision, vacillation, and recrimination’ 
(Van Brabant, 1990, p.21), it was looking bleak.  Perhaps symbolically, the Soviet Union 
underwent a complete reversal of its prior role of buttressing continuity and made a last 
ditch attempt to bring support together around the theme of radical reform.  Despite this 
final attempt, in 1990 it was decided Eastern bloc trade would be conducted in dollars and 
at wmps.  As Swain and Swain (2003) have pointed out, this vitiated the whole rationale 
for the organisation, and on the 28th June, 1991, at a summit in Budapest the Council was 
disbanded signalling the end of dependent development in the Eastern bloc. 
I argue that this sudden and rather undramatic end to the system of trade and 
development this chapter has focused on is extremely revealing of the profoundly 
geopolitical significance of CMEA.  In a purely technical sense, there was no reason why 
the organisation should cease operate just as East-West antagonism was being overcome; 
it was a regional trading organisation, the members of whom continued to trade with each 
other after the Cold War.  However, this misses the fundamental point that CMEA only 
existed and operated in the way it did because of the geopolitical context of East-West 
antagonism.  The winding-up of the Council so shortly and with such little resistance after 
the fundamental global shift marked by the end of the Cold War is thus excellent evidence 
of the basic thesis that Soviet geopolitical objectives are essential to understanding both 
the existence and peculiarities of this trade system.  CMEA literally could not exist outside 
the context of Cold War geopolitical antagonism which gave it its purpose, direction and 
key characteristics.  
 
6. Conclusion  
  
Having divided up the key developments into four phases of intra-socialist 
economic relations, it is now time to draw conclusions.  The case of dependent 
  
136  
  
development in Eastern Europe is a peculiar and theoretically interesting situation–as 
industrialisation progressed, dependence on the USSR deepened as Soviet raw materials, 
energy resources, and (to a lesser extent) technical expertise were increasingly required.  
This appears to be what the Soviets accomplished in pushing industrialisation a la Russe 
on their satellites; the East European economies of CMEA were designed to function only 
through close links to the USSR.  The central analytical focus of this thesis was on the 
interrelation between trade and development within the bloc, and the use of this historical 
case for reformulating DT.  I have argued that it was the geopolitical antagonism between 
East and West during the Cold War which is a key part of the explanation for the why the 
USSR sought a dependence relationship within the bloc as a (flawed) resolution of the 
crisis of Soviet authority after Stalin.  This meant that the international context outside 
CMEA had to be interwoven into the narrative, as it was this external pressure which led 
the Soviet Union to adopting a strategy of subsidised trade to be the material underpinning 
of ideological, diplomatic, and geopolitical security and status. 
I argue that the East European economies were indeed distorted in their 
development due to participation in an international economic system, but since this 
system brought into being structures of industrial production this cannot be considered as 
underdevelopment in the sense meant by Frank, and neither can it be considered as 
dependent development as it was formulated by Cardoso.  This can be argued to be a type 
of dependent development which is not treatable within existing DT approaches; by 
beginning from the idealisation in chapter 3 coherent narratives of such atypical examples 
can still be produced.  As such, the key theoretical point this chapter has substantiated is 
that the replacement of implicit and explicit positive statements about how 
centre/periphery relate to one another by an ideal-typical approach allows a significantly 
more diverse range of asymmetrical international economic relations to be analysed.  The 
next three chapters offer national case-studies which cast light on how these general 
tendencies manifested in Hungary, Yugoslavia, and the USSR itself.  
  
 
 
 
 
  
137  
  
Socialist Trade and the Soviet Economic System  
  
1. Introduction  
  
As has been argued in chapter 3, a key problem with DT was the ease with which 
the categories of centre/periphery were reified into a-historical structures.  Crucial to 
moving past this is the reconstitution of these basic categories in such a way that reciprocal 
dynamics of international systems can be identified and analysed.  This chapter explores 
links between CMEA and Soviet development with the aim of questioning the static 
notion of ‘centre’ as something unchanging over time and unaffected by the international 
nature of development.  To investigate this, two themes will be pursued.  The first is to 
uncover those elements within the Soviet economic system that contributed to the 
geopolitical approach to international economic relations during the Cold War, and 
secondly to show how the structural relations established in the 1950s influenced the 
development and gradual economic deceleration of the USSR.  The claims which this 
chapter attempts to substantiate are the following:  
  
1. Developments internal to the USSR in the 1930s when the Soviet model was being 
formed are highly significant for understanding the expansion of international 
economic relations in the 1950s.  As such, study of the earlier period helps to 
explain why integration within CMEA took place in the way it did.  I argue that 
the two key features of the earlier period for understanding the later are primitive 
socialist accumulation, and the position of the defence industry in the Soviet 
economy.  Both these characteristics of the Soviet industrial model are 
symptomatic of tendencies within the Soviet political economy which later were 
to influence the manner in which CMEA operated. 
  
2. The system of exchange between the members of CMEA played an important yet 
normally under-emphasised role in the Soviet economies ability to generate 
surplus and the uses it was put towards.  This chapter will attempt to substantiate 
the claim that the structure of production in the USSR was severely affected by 
CMEA trade which, (1) provided a further impetus to hold down domestic 
consumption in favour of investment, and (2) gave a requirement that increasing 
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quantities of the sum available for investment went to the energy and extractive 
industries and the extensive infrastructure they needed. 
 
The theoretical significance of these points is that they over-turn the assumption 
implicit to classical DT of the ‘centre’ as a homogenous entity benefiting unconditionally 
from the system around it.  This was both an empirically problematic statement, and one 
which made the theory irrelevant to such an obviously asymmetrical relation as that within 
the Eastern bloc.  This chapter thus stands in an analogous relation to chapter 4 as will the 
later chapter on Hungary, with the theoretically-significant difference that here we are 
concerned with analysis of how the ‘centre’ was influenced by the dependency relation 
between itself and the ‘periphery’.  This is a major departure from traditional DT; by 
historicising the development of the centre as well as the periphery, the ideal-typical 
approach fundamentally distinguishes itself from classical DT by taking seriously the 
postulate that an internationalisation of development takes place within centre/periphery 
systems and as such should have consequences for both.  
   
2. Development  
  
The angle from which I examine the Soviet economic system here is that from 
which the development of the structures identified in previous chapters can be seen 
clearly; i.e. I bring into focus those historical developments in the USSR which can be 
argued to have prepared for the mode of exchange internal to CMEA.  It will be argued 
that the two key legacies which acted as harbingers for the deliberate, geopolitically-
motivated unequal exchange between members of CMEA were the birth of the command 
economy through coercive means, and the establishment of defence production as a 
privileged sector.  
  
2.1 The Birth of the Command Economy  
  
The structural transformation of both the Soviet economy and the institutions 
which managed it after 1929 represent a significant legacy of the early Soviet period for 
understanding later developments within CMEA.  It is important to emphasise in line with 
the framework put forward before that the way the transformation of the Soviet economy 
was carried out by Stalin is conceptualised not as dictated by historical necessity, but as 
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the result of contested political decisions.  I argue that the way this happened in Stalin’s 
USSR and the structures it brought into existence had a long legacy for the Soviet political 
economy, and that they significantly influenced the perception of international policy 
options later when the question of intra-socialist economic relations became pertinent.  
There are a number of reasons why theories developed to explain market economies 
cannot be applied as they are to planned economies.  This question has already been 
addressed through the sections considering SCT, CU and WST, and similarly the sections 
explaining the mechanisms by which intra-CMEA ftps were derived serve to highlight the 
extreme dissimilarity between the two systems.  In this light the ideas of Preobrazhensky 
(1966, 1980) on the production of surplus and its directed use by the state are of particular 
relevance since they provided the theoretical grounding for Stalin’s forced, ‘top-down’ 
industrialisation of the USSR. 
One of the old Bolsheviks who eventually fell foul of Stalin during the Purges, 
Preobrazhensky was one of the first contributors to the industrialisation debate of the 
1920s to argue that some form of unequal exchange enacted via the price mechanism was 
the most effective tool available for achieving the economic objectives that the Soviet 
state had set for itself.  The momentous debate which preceded collectivization and the 
break-neck industrial development of the 1930s is brilliantly interpreted and deciphered 
for a Western audience by Erlich (1960).  Preobrazhensky’s solution began from the 
observation that the historical origins of capitalism and socialism differ fundamentally.  
Capitalism can develop within feudal society before gradually overcoming the power of 
the land-owning classes; ‘The socialist system, on the contrary, begins its chronology with 
the seizure of power by the proletariat… This fact is of colossal significance for 
understanding not only the genesis of socialism, but also the entire subsequent process of 
socialist construction’ (1966, pp.79-80). 
As such, the early methods of accumulation by which European capital first began 
to go through expanded reproduction were not available to a socialist state.  Like 
developed capitalism, Preobrazhensky reasoned, socialist production would one day be 
capable of accumulating from its own resources.  Accordingly Preobrazhensky 
distinguished between two stages of accumulation:  
 
By socialist accumulation we mean the addition to the functioning means of 
production of a surplus product which has been created within the constituted 
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socialist economy and which does not find its way into supplementary distribution 
among the agents of socialist production and the socialist state, but serves for 
expanded reproduction.  Primitive socialist accumulation, on the other hand, 
means accumulation in the hands of the state of material resources mainly or partly 
from sources lying outside the complex of state economy (p.84).  
  
Preobrazhensky’s legacy was to have argued at length that the optimum way for this to 
take place was by utilizing the state’s control of prices to enforce an obligatory unequal 
exchange between town and country as the products of the peasants were systematically 
undervalued as they exchanged against the products of state-owned industry.  This 
provided the Soviet state with investment resources at the expense of the populations’ 
immediate consumption. 
Other theoretical issues allied to other political agendas were under consideration 
at the time, some of which are raised here to emphasise the contested nature of the path 
that was actually chosen.  Coeval with Preobrazhensky, Yushkov had been concerned 
with the efficient allocation of investment; i.e. how to make best use of what was already 
available.  Although such concerns would later resurface with the rise of the mathematical 
school, at the time this was understandably less pressing than the problem of finding 
resources for investment in the first place (Ellman, 1972, p.193).  In many ways the 
preoccupation with scale over efficiency which arose in this period was to plague the 
Soviet economy for the rest of its existence.  In part the continuous preference of Soviet 
industrial managers for quantitative targets rather than qualitative improvements can be 
traced back to the structure of command economy set-up by Stalin.  This will be returned 
to in section 3.3.  
Another theoretician, Katsenelenbaum, agreed with Preobrazhensky that the 
countryside could be the source of the resources needed for industrialization but proposed 
the stimulation of voluntary savings and channelling them into investment projects via 
state credit institutions as the way to affect the transfer (Moravcik, 1961).  This would 
undoubtedly have been a more popular way of accomplishing the same objective, but may 
well have been slower than Preobrazhensky’s idea for the state to intervene directly, and 
so it was Preobrazhensky’s ideas, less than Yushkov or Katsenelenbaum’s, that found 
audiences at the top of the party hierarchy.  Importantly, Preobrazhensky’s scheme suited 
Stalin’s needs, as it seemed to make both the Soviet party-state apparatus the essential 
tool of progress, and to justify the wielding of coercive power by this party-state fusion 
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in the name of material progress, regardless of the suffering this entailed in the short-term 
(Nove, 1988). 
The hostile geopolitical environment facing the USSR also needs to be mentioned 
as a factor urging haste, and therefore probably some measure of coercion, rather than a 
gradualist approach to industrialisation.  The centrality of power and coercive authority 
in the foundation of the planned economy will be returned to in the next section where the 
implications of this for international economic relations will be further discussed.  As 
such, the coercive nature of Soviet industrialisation, and in fact of the Soviet economic 
system in general, which began to emerge in this period and remained a feature of its 
operation until 1991, has to be stressed as emblematic of the set of geopolitical and 
security priorities prized by successive CPSU leaderships.  The fact that part of Stalin’s 
response to the hostile international context was the doctrine of ‘Socialism in one country’ 
is also significant in this regard, since the built-in predisposition towards autarchy this 
imparted to the Soviet model also caused serious problems in the post-war decades once 
this model was transplanted to the smaller socialist states of Eastern Europe. 
Given the international context and Stalin’s preferences, it is not difficult to 
understand why the choice for Preobrazhensky’s scheme of rapidly increasing the overall 
mass of resources at the states disposal was given precedence over other approaches.  This 
resulted in the institution of a form of unequal exchange between town and countryside 
in terms of the prices which would have prevailed under ‘normal’ market conditions.  The 
first key point for understanding later subsidised trade is that the practice of squeezing the 
production of consumer goods in order to provide the resources for (geo)politically-
motivated transfers of surplus significantly antedated CMEA and was always likely to 
influence the mode of engagement the USSR was to initiate with the East Europeans.  The 
second key point is that although the degree to which resources transferred in this manner 
were responsible for the investment needed for Soviet industrialisation is debated (see 
Ellman, 1978), the top-down imposition on Soviet society of a coercive economic 
apparatus–designed to insure the rule of the party against both domestic dissent and 
external geopolitical threat by facilitating the development of a powerful military sector–
left a lasting mark on the Soviet economic system, one vital manifestation of which will 
be turned to in the next section. 
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2.2 Geopolitics and the Soviet Defence Industry 
  
One more legacy of 1930s which needs to be accounted for in terms of being a 
relevant antecedent to post-war developments relates to the special status and role of the 
defence industry.  There are two ways this highly significant feature of the Soviet 
economy could have potentially impacted on CMEA trade: either in terms of the 
commodity structure of the trade itself, or in terms of the structure of the political 
economies which made up the bloc.  Beginning with the first possibility, military 
equipment formed a relatively insignificant part of intra-CMEA exchanges.  As has 
already been established, trade in manufactures, raw materials and energy resources were 
the key motors of exchange within the bloc.  In fact, the overwhelming importance 
attached to geopolitical, and in this case specifically security concerns, by the Soviet 
leadership even in dealings with ‘fraternal’ socialist states is further demonstrated in the 
case of advanced weaponry; despite complaining about Czechoslovakian and East 
German reticence to share their relatively advanced industrial technology within the bloc, 
the Soviet Union carefully guarded its monopoly of satellite, space and advanced military 
technology within CMEA (Von Beyme, 1987). 
However, this is not to say the special role of the defence industry in the Soviet 
economy was irrelevant to CMEA.  The heavy influence of geopolitical concerns in terms 
of the position of the defence industry within the USSR is instead significant for the 
problem of understanding dependent development in the bloc due to several things it 
makes clear about the Soviet model as it was practiced in the USSR and the consequences 
of its export to Eastern Europe.  As an unconditionally privileged sector, the defence 
industry has to be considered as the main beneficiary of the non-market, centrally-
administered system; in Cooper’s (1991) words, ‘the very core of the administrative 
system’ (p.5).  As such, the position of this sector from the 1930s onwards at the centre 
of the planned economy has to be seen as significant for both the political economy of the 
USSR itself and for the later replication of the Soviet model in Eastern Europe and the 
system of intra-socialist trade that developed. 
In terms of the politics of situating the defence industry at the core of the 
traditional administrative-command apparatus, and thus as a fundamental constituent of 
the socio-economic constitution of the USSR, attention has already been drawn to the 
coercive way the system of planned economy was established under Stalin.  Namely, the 
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required destruction of the nascent institutions of capitalism–private property, market 
relations, formal separation of politics and economics, rule of law, etc.–if the socialist 
system was the exist.  I agree with Saull (2007) that a fundamental source of the Cold 
War has to be sought in the contrasting socio-economic constitutions of the two 
superpowers; the attempt to construct the material foundations of socialism and of the 
security of this system ensured through a colossal military establishment in the manner 
in which it was undertaken by Stalin thus gave the Soviet economy what has been termed 
a ‘militarised’ character (Holden, 1991).  The continuance of military interventions into 
Eastern Europe after Stalin, notably Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, would 
seem to be the strongest indicator of how this domestic characterisation manifested in 
terms of international relations, but in general the prevalence of geopolitical and security 
concerns behind the design and operation of CMEA linkages also has to be seen as an 
example of this. 
There is a wide spectrum of opinions on the economic significance of defence 
spending for the USSR.  One of the most extreme assessments is Agursky and Adomeit 
(1978), who famously claimed that there is, ‘a core of truth in the aphorism that “the USA 
has a military-industrial complex, the USSR is a military-industrial complex”’ (p.6).  
Counterbalancing this position is the more moderate take of Barber et al (2000), who 
argue that despite its size, central role, and monopoly of access to the best resources, ‘this 
does not mean that the whole [Soviet] economy should be seen as just a supportive 
apparatus for the defence industry and nothing more’ (p.24).  Finding a middle point 
between these positions and locating the core motivation behind the privileging of the 
sector in geopolitical terms, Saull (2007) argues that it was precisely the nuclear and 
strategic inferiority of the USSR in comparison to the US exposed by the Cuban missile 
crisis that cemented the already established perception of the necessity of putting such a 
large portion of the national surplus towards military purposes; US ‘strategic nuclear 
advantage forced a humiliating public Soviet climb-down, which was to have profound 
consequences for the future of the Cold War and the long-term health of the Soviet 
economy in particular’ (p.117).  It is ironic and symptomatic of the fundamentally uneven 
nature of the Cold War that the stationing of missiles on Cuba was seen as a means to 
redress the global nuclear balance, but the subsequent need to back down in the face of 
superior strategic power just made this more pronounced. 
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Although acknowledging that there is substantial debate over the economic 
implications of defence spending in general (see Dunne, 1990), this thesis agrees that the 
special status enjoyed by the sector needs to be understood as representing a burden of 
some degree to the rest of the economy alongside and in addition to that associated with 
subsidised trade, and makes the further argument that, most essentially, the role of the 
defence industry is important as it signifies the firm and enduring commitment to the 
model of industrial development which saw heavy industry as the key to growth.  With 
the export of the Soviet model to Eastern Europe after WWII, this militarised economy 
was reproduced on much smaller scales but the same fetishism of heavy industry, and 
defence as the core within this category, was repeated (Spechler and Spechler, 2009).  
This resulted in the replication of heavy industrial sectors elsewhere in the bloc, the 
negative consequences of which for trade and development have already been discussed. 
The solid Soviet commitment to the defence industry thus served to sharpen the 
contradictions already highlighted, the costs of this sector being very hard to reduce given 
the political power of the sector itself as well as that of the KGB, military officials and 
the general geopolitical mind-set of the party leadership (Allen, 2000, p.77).  This inter-
related with a number of themes already raised in relation to dependent development, 
especially reform and technological stagnation.  Indeed, the close relationship between 
senior party and state officials and the military sector represented a formidable bulwark 
against reform in general which acted to effectively restrain technocratic elements (Lane, 
1985).  In terms of technology, Castells (2010) has argued that the privileging of the 
defence industry can be related to low levels of technological innovation, in that defence 
firms only had to satisfy one customer, the Soviet military, whose needs were far removed 
from those of the civilian economy.  This resulted in ‘a technological trajectory 
increasingly removed from the needs of society and from the processes of innovation of 
the rest of the world’ (p.29).  Only under Malenkov’s brief period of leadership was the 
issue of fundamentally cutting the military and defence industries share of state resources 
seriously raised, and by the 1980s the costs of the pre-existing pattern had come to be 
accepted as a structure almost beyond questioning. 
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3. Disintegration  
  
The second part of this chapter traces the consequences of CMEA trade for the 
Soviet economy.  Once the post-Stalin introduction of substantial economic incentives in 
intra-bloc trade was established as a key component of Soviet hegemony in the region, 
the regime’s high valuation of the geopolitical stability this buttressed helped to ensure it 
was maintained despite the mounting costs.  As was argued previously, this system 
ensured a form of dependent development in the post-war decades, the intrinsic limits to 
which were increasingly revealed after the 1970s.  A key turning-point came when the 
wmp of oil started to increase exponentially.  This put an acute policy dilemma to the 
Soviet leadership in the form of what to do with the Soviet hinterland’s vast endowments 
of oil and other exportable resources; either to continue with the geopolitically-motivated 
practice of subsidised trade with Eastern Europe, or to follow the technocratic prescription 
and export outside the bloc at significantly higher prices and for convertible currency. 
The way this choice was actually made had serious development consequences for 
the Soviet economy, consequences which logically followed from its role as the centre of 
the bloc.  This area of analysis cannot be opened-up by classical DT but can by the 
reformulation proposed here.  The choice took the form of how much to export out of 
total domestic product, and secondly how much to export to the USSR’s two main trading 
partners: the developed Western economies and the European members of CMEA.  By 
now détente had led to a significant increase in East-West trade, so much so that it had 
come to outweigh the negligible amount of East-South trade.  The choice thus presented 
itself in the form of either exporting profitably for hard currency to the West, or at a loss 
to the East for transferable roubles.  The dimensions of this exchange relation are made 
clear by tables 5 and 6 which show the commodity composition of Soviet trade as 
percentage of total value (Lydolph, 1990, p.410).  To emphasise the relationship between 
the two key categories, rows describing other commodity types have been removed.  
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Table 5 – Soviet exports:  
  
  1950  1960  1970  1975  1980  1983  1985  1987  
Machinery  12.3  20.7  
and 
equipment  
21.5  18.7  15.8  12.5  13.6  15.5  
Fuels  and 3.9  16.2  
electricity  
15.6  31.4  46.9  53.7  52.8  46.5  
  
Table 6 – Soviet imports:  
  
      
  1950  1960  1970  1975  1980  1983  1985  1987  
Machinery  22.4  31.1  
and 
equipment  
35.6  33.9  33.9  38.2  37.2  41.4  
Fuels  and 11.8  4.2  
electricity  
2.0  3.9  3.0  5.6  5.3  3.9  
  
This choice can be conceptualised as resulting from a series of inter-locking international 
structures which made certain options available to the USSR; i.e. wmps and the existing 
structure of CMEA ftps both represented structures to which the Soviet leadership had to 
act in response to, the choice essentially standing for a trade-off between the economic 
gains to be had from trading with the West, and the political gains to be had in terms of 
bloc stability which could be secured by trading with the East.   
 
3.1 CMEA, Consumption and the Allocation of Investment  
  
Having already focused on the geopolitical concerns that led the USSR to choose 
to continue to subsidise Eastern Europe, I argue that DT can identify two main 
consequences which followed from the continuance of subsidised trade but are not 
commonly related to this; further pressure was added to keep the overall rate of investment 
high, and secondly there was increased need to allocate investment in a particular way.   
Total social product can be divided into two parts, consumption and 
savings/investment.  Although it is not necessary to go into detail here, it is well-known 
that Stalin enforced a high rate of accumulation on the Soviet population in the 1930s in 
the name of investment today for prosperity tomorrow.  Stalin referred to this rather 
euphemistically in the following way: ‘as a result of the advantages of socialism, the 
increment in effective demand of the masses of the Soviet Union always exceeds the 
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increment in production, pushing it forward’ (quoted in Kaser, 1970, p.120).  The fabled 
age of socialist abundance never arrived, and the Soviet Union continued to consume less 
and invest more than other societies of comparable levels of development.  The fact that 
a very large share of this went into the defence industry has already been commented 
upon, as has the fact that this prioritisation signified a geopolitical mind-set which was 
highly significant for understanding Soviet international economic relations.  Given the 
central role of energy resources in intra-bloc trade, this section proposes an analysis of 
how the situation within CMEA fed back into the Soviet economic system and reinforced 
this pre-existing tendency for geopolitical considerations to impact on economic relations. 
Earlier it was discussed how Preobrazhensky gave a particular social interpretation 
to the fact that accumulation must come at the expense of consumption.  The unequal 
exchange he suggested moved resources from private to public sector, thus putting an 
increasing share of the surplus at the planner’s disposal.  Whilst neither the objectives nor 
the methods of central planning changed substantially between Stalin and Khrushchev, a 
new imperative seems to have been added to the system in the mid-50s, one which we 
must assume carried the authority of a plan directive.  Plan directives were the 
bureaucratic mechanism by which ministries communicated their priorities to enterprises 
which were compelled to act in accordance with them if they were to keep the favour of 
their superiors in the nomenklatura.  The most well-known directive was the privilege 
accorded to the military sector which enjoyed access to the best materials, technologies, 
workers, locations, etc.  Kirshin (1998) reminds how sophisticated the sector was in 
international terms, and this is reinforced by considering Zisk’s (1997) study, which has 
shown that, unlike every other sector, defence enterprises managed to survive the 
turbulence of the post-Cold War transition with their structures relatively unchanged.  
This implies they were capable of surviving in the new economic climate after 1991 in 
their Cold War forms, partly due to the advantages they received due to their privileged 
position in the Soviet political economy. 
Berliner (1957) quotes a Soviet source as saying:  
  
Suppose three supply expediters came to me.  Who gets the pipe first will depend 
upon who is the most important firm.  If it is a choice between a soap factory or a 
military factory, the latter will get it.  Usually the director himself decides.  If there 
is a quarrel the ministry or the Party will be called in (p.200).  
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In other words, it was not possible to ensure that the plans for any of the thousands of 
controlled commodities were entirely consistent.  This meant that when contradictions 
appeared, it was the pecking order of sectors that determined their access to resources.  It 
is noteworthy that in complaints East European’s had about their links to the Soviet 
Union, late or incomplete deliveries were mentioned significantly less than by domestic 
Soviet purchasers, for whom the inefficiencies of the planned economy often meant 
production having to be stopped due to materials not arriving on schedule (Sanchez 
Sibony, 2010, p.1561).  Although lack of documentary evidence still shrouds the business 
of foreign trade, production for export to CMEA seems to have been held as a higher 
priority than many domestic uses.  In this way both military production and energy can 
be seen as sectors of the Soviet economy whose status and share of surplus needed to be 
situated in terms of international relations.   
An interesting comparison can be made between how the USSR traded with 
CMEA versus with the rest of the world which underlines the theoretical argument that 
trade and development within CMEA was of a highly specific nature.  There was a 
substantial divergence between the proportions of intra-industry trade in the USSR’s 
exchanges with non-CMEA partners compared to with CMEA members (see table 7).  
The consistently higher proportion of intra-industry specialization in trade with the rest 
of the world is evidence of the greater utility of this trade (from the economic point of 
view) and reminds that the scale and nature of exchange within CMEA was a product of 
the geopolitical project of maintaining communist power in Eastern Europe first and 
foremost. 
  One consequence of this imbalance was that so long as the project of solidifying 
the bloc through economic integration sweetened by the inclusion of preferable terms of 
trade was pursued, the ratio between consumption and investment in the USSR’s national 
accounts must remain heavily tilted in favour of the latter.  This was because the provision 
of below wmp hard goods necessitated enormous capital outlays for their production and 
transportation, and the subsequent export of such a large share of them essentially reduced 
down to the indirect export of capital.  Sobell (1984, p.46) quotes Soviet calculations of 
the capital/output ratio in crude oil extraction in the 1960s as around 8.5 times higher than 
in manufacturing, and that one rouble obtained through the export of iron-ore, coal or 
electricity cost 5 to 8 times as much in fixed assets when compared to engineering exports.  
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These figures show that Soviet export sectors were more expensive to operate than less 
export-intensive sectors like engineering, and most significantly the same report claims 
that the capital intensity of Soviet fuel exports to CMEA was about 3.5 times greater than 
the capital intensity of the manufactured goods imported in return.  
It is no exaggeration to say that the systematic exchange initiated in the 1950s with 
the smaller European members of CMEA had important consequences for Soviet 
economic development both in adding a new and intractable weight to the side of the 
scales pushing to maintain the high rate of investment over improving opportunities for 
consumption, and secondly in prescribing that a substantial amount of this investment be 
directed to projects in specific industrial sectors and geographical regions.  DT deepens 
the analysis of these tendencies by linking them to international processes within the bloc 
which reinforced them, and also to international processes outside the bloc, which 
underlined their contradictory nature.  The next section will develop this further by 
uncovering the dynamic losses this system implied for the Soviet Union. 
  
3.2 Socialist Economic Integration and the Soviet Economy  
  
It is difficult to assess what the impact of any policy was or will be; these generic 
difficulties are amplified when dealing with the Soviet Union.  A first difficultly is the 
degree to which official figures can be trusted.  The origin of the belief that the Soviet 
leadership had been exaggerating growth figures was the post-Cold War US controversy 
in which the CIA was accused colluding in this myth.  The explanation for this accusation 
was that the CIA had made the Soviet threat seem larger than it really was to ensure the 
security services enjoyed increases to their budgetary allocation.  For the sake of 
establishing the extent to which the relevant data can be quoted with confidence, it suffices 
to note that if this had been the case one would expect a consistently skewed perspective 
on Soviet economic achievements to have been offered by the CIA, and this does not 
match-up with the record.  Two obvious examples are the CIA’s downgrading of Soviet 
growth in 1963 from the official 4.2% to the (below US) 2.5%, a phenomenon repeated 
at regular intervals, and the 1977 prediction that the Soviet Union would be net oil 
importer by 1985 at the latest.  As Millar et al (1993) conclude in their survey report, it is 
contradictory to see CIA economic reports casting aspersion on Soviet growth during the 
Cold War, and then to claim in the early 1990s that quite the opposite had been going on.  
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In conclusion, the problems found with Soviet statistics should not be considered 
unassailable, especially given that this thesis is concerned with long-run historical trends 
rather than statistical analysis.  
The DT focus on linking international processes to national development reveals 
that filling CMEA orders compelled the Soviet planning authorities use a substantial part 
of the surplus available to them in a particular way; to allocate the maximum potential 
resources to the energy and mineral extraction sectors in order to be able to continue the 
existing export regime.  To this end a dual strategy of both opening up new production 
sites in Siberia and restricting domestic consumption was employed, and in this way the 
Soviet state was provided with the necessary exportable resources.  The opportunity cost 
to the Soviet citizenry in terms of forgone consumption cannot be precisely estimated but 
should be considered to have been substantial.  In this sense, the investment requirements 
of CMEA trade acted to reinforce the pre-existing tendency already identified originating 
in the prioritisation of defence industry for investment over consumption, and both sectors 
held this special status partly due to the influence of geopolitical factors on Soviet 
development. 
  The high and rising costs of oil extraction due to geographical and climactic 
factors should also be considered when taking account of the costs.  Even after the 
extensive modernisation of Russia’s privatised oil industry, Blinnikov (2011) estimated 
that in the late 1990s one barrel of Russian oil cost between 10 and 15 dollars to produce 
while a Saudi barrel could be produced for just 1 dollar (p.265).  This contributed to a 
general drag on capital assets which provides the context in which the need to continually 
re-invest in extractive industries in the far eastern regions should to be seen.  Opinions on 
how severe the shortage of capital goods was vary considerably; Khanin is one of the 
more pessimistic who evaluates that, ‘[f]ixed capital, especially equipment, was aging.  In 
some sectors, structures and equipment were kept beyond their normal life, because by 
the end of the 1970s, the volume of newly commissioned fixed assets at best barely 
equalled the volume of assets scheduled for retirement’ (1992, p.76).  The fact that as 
resources were used-up, extractors were forced to move further and further east can be 
inferred from the dramatic increase in Soviet freight movement in billion tons-kilometres 
between 1960 and 1980 seen in table 9.  
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  The increase in oil pipeline freight is significant as this shows the extent of the 
pipeline network needed to move oil from the fields deep in frozen Siberia into European 
Russia and from there on to Eastern Europe.  An early move in this direction was the 10th 
session of the Council in Prague, 1958, where delegates agreed to cooperate on the 
Druzhba pipeline.  Almost completed by 1962, a full two years ahead of schedule, it was 
significantly extended by the installation of a parallel line in 1969-72 as the single line 
was unable to meet demand.  The point is that none of the final recipients could have 
hoped to receive as much oil as they did had they been paying in hard currency and at 
wmps; in other words, had their procurement and use of oil not been conditional on being 
within CMEA and its particular centre/periphery relation.  This can be demonstrated 
beyond all doubt by the fact that the Adria pipeline, which goes north from the 
Yugoslavian port of Omisalj with the intension of supplying Hungary and Czechoslovakia 
with Middle Eastern oil, came on stream in 1977 but all parties quickly found they could 
not afford to buy oil at the planned quantities in hard currency.  The project thus stands 
in stark contrast to the active system of exchange fed by Druzhba. 
The final burden to the Soviet economy stemming from CMEA was the losses of 
hard currency and gold entailed.  Although the Soviet economy was not dependent upon 
hard-currency for its day-to-day operation, the treasure expended could have been put to 
more profitable uses than simply being poured away to preserve the integrity of the bloc in 
the face of serious structural contradictions.  Unclassified data from the CIA on the USSR’s 
hard currency balance of payments shows a rather mysterious item ‘net errors and 
omissions’ which includes ‘hard currency assistance to and trade with Comecon countries, 
credits to developed Western countries to finance sales of oil, and other non-specified hard 
currency expenditures’ as well as estimated errors in other lines of the account.  It seems 
reasonable to assume the first item in this itinerary was the most substantial, and the data 
can therefore provide a rough estimate of hard currency aid extended to CMEA members 
by the Soviets.  Net errors and omissions in million US dollars (Steinberg, 1992, p.20):  
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Table 10  
 
Integrating this analysis of economic development with relations to the world 
economy, the spike in 1981 can be accounted for by Soviet hard currency provision to 
Poland, then facing a major crisis brought on by increasingly unmanageable debt 
repayments to Western creditors.  This provides evidence of the variable extension of aid 
to CMEA partners depending on circumstantial considerations:  
  
In 1981, for example, Poland received raw material and energy supplies from the 
Soviet Union which were valued at about $6.7 billion but which cost the Poles 
approximately half that amount. Indeed, in that year the Soviets charged the Poles 
one-half of the OPEC rate for Soviet oil; the charge to the rest of the bloc was 70  
to 80 percent of OPEC prices (Bunce, 1985, p.17).  
  
Jefferies (1990) argues that the import-led strategy followed by Poland in the 1970s was 
seen by the party as a short-to-medium term substitute for fundamental economic reform; 
by the early 1980s the debt that resulted from this had itself become a serious problem on 
a par with the problems of the planning mechanism.  This instance helps to substantiate 
the theoretical point that the transfers of Soviet surplus to Eastern Europe were not merely 
the outcome of structural relations, but crucially depended on the continual reproduction 
of these relations by agents acting in response to changing situations.  Further to this, the 
situation in Poland in the early 1980s highlighted the fact that by now credit dependency 
on Western lenders was so advanced that the stability of the Polish economy depended at 
least as much on interest rates in foreign capital markets as it did on intra-CMEA trade. 
This aid was given in defence of bloc stability which was seriously threatened by 
the unrest and was the subject of a special CMEA meeting in Sofia in July, 1981 
(Summerscale, 1981, p.595).  Critics of the subsidisation thesis who have argued that 
Eastern Europe was never an economic burden on the USSR, Spechler and Spechler 
(2009) have claimed that, ‘The pattern of subsidies was probably accidental, rather than 
intentional, but followed the trade profiles of the countries involved, rather than any 
plausible evaluation of their contributions or needs in any short period’ (p.1647).  This 
was not the case here as Soviet economic policy towards a particular East European 
country clearly demonstrates both the capability and willingness to use Soviet economic 
1979  1980  1981   1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  
- 2416  - 1754  - 5043  - 1328   - 3219   - 4540  - 2006  - 3177   - 4378   - 2550  - 1105  
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resources to affect specific outcomes, notably the stabilisation of the Polish economy and 
the maintenance of Poland within the bloc.  This reminds us of the need to consider CMEA 
both in terms of the centre/periphery relation within the bloc, as well as in terms of 
relations to the world economy which highlighted the particular nature of the dependent 
development in the bloc.  In effect Spechler and Spechler are claiming the subsidises to 
be entirely structural in character in that they were determined alone by the trade profiles 
of the countries in question, while this thesis instead argues both East European and Soviet 
agency is essential to understanding them.  
The same CIA source also provides estimated figures of Soviet gold sales, another 
source of hard currency for the Soviet Union besides sales of oil.  Again there is a sharp 
increase in 1981, and the major increases seen from 1986 onwards can be read as a 
symptom of the growing severity of the problems faced by the Soviet economy and 
increased demands from Eastern Europe.  Gold sales in million dollars:  
  
Table 11  
  
  
As such, it should not be forgotten in assessing the costs to the USSR of maintaining 
Eastern Europe’s dependence that the implicit subsidies were along-side and in addition 
to explicit grants which constituted a further transfer of economic surplus.  The 
contradictions within the Soviet strategy are fully exposed by noting that this financial 
aid was given precisely to allow Poland to finance their external debt with lenders outside 
the bloc, and thus lends credence to the characterisation of the 1980s as a general crisis 
of actually-existing socialism, the pronounced contradictions within the Soviet-subsidised 
dependent development of the bloc being one facet. 
  
3.3 The Remilitarisation of the Cold War 
 
In terms of situating the costs of the CMEA trade system for the USSR within the 
broader context of the Cold War, the return in the 1980s to a much more militarised 
dynamic of global confrontation between the US and the USSR needs to be mentioned.  
Given that it has been shown how the role of the USSR as the centre of the dependent 
1979   1980   1981   1982   1983   1984   1985   1986   1987   1988   1989   
725  1580   2700   1100   750  1000   1800   4000   3500   3802   3665   
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development of the bloc implied major costs in terms of the provision of hard goods at 
politically-determined prices, the remilitarisation of the Cold War in the 1980s and the 
resultant costs in terms of arms expenditure this implied have to be seen as a further severe 
drain on Soviet resources which arose at a time when the Soviet economy was already 
struggling. 
The events which resulted in the ending of détente can be recounted quite quickly.  
On the Soviet side, the decision to invest in a new generation of nuclear missiles to be 
based in Eastern Europe–thus underlining the continuing Soviet commitment to the 
region–eroded the progress of the previous decade in terms of arms limitations treaties 
and the diplomatic fluency this had helped to create; on the US side, the election of 
Reagan in 1980 signalled the re-emergence of a US policy agenda intent to roll back and 
contain the USSR which had fallen out of favour after Vietnam.  The high-point of détente 
had seen the signing of the Helsinki Declaration, in which the USSR secured Western 
recognition of the territorial status quo in return for a weak commitment to allowing the 
free(er) flow of people and less censorship.  As Asparturian (1980) has pointed out, this 
fundamentally contradicted the Brezhenev doctrine, and thus the seeds of the ending of 
détente can be found in the 1970s as the Soviet Union would ultimately always have faced 
a choice between the commitment to maintaining communist power (in Eastern Europe 
and potentially elsewhere), if needs be through force, and the desire to normalise 
international relations. 
Arguably it was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 in support of the local 
communist government, and the US decision to arm and train the Islamist resistance there, 
in which this came to a head and finally ended détente.  This made it easy for the Reagan 
administration to portray the USSR as a military threat–a ploy which served several 
purposes given the US objective of restoring its leadership and economic hegemony over 
the Western world so fatally damaged by the crisis of the 1970s and the unravelling of 
Bretton Woods (Saull, 2007, pp.157-8).  Just as Vietnam would come to represent a 
terrible cost to the US in human, economic and morale terms, the same fate awaited the 
USSR in Afghanistan (Hill, 2003).  Although not directly related to CMEA, the failure of 
the Soviet intervention to maintain the Afghan communist party in power was none-the-
less symbolic of the difficulty and costs the USSR faced in supporting domestically 
unpopular but geopolitically-aligned regimes. 
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The pressure this shift in the 1980s geopolitical climate put on the Soviet economy 
was considerable, especially given the emphasis now placed on advanced technologies 
and nuclear capabilities.  Steinberg (1990) notes how the Soviet defence burden went 
from around 12-14% of gross national product in the late 1970s to 15-17% in the late 
1980s.  This large share of national surplus going into the defence sector necessarily 
undermined the ability of the Soviet economy to meet the consumption needs of the 
population as effectively as it otherwise could have.  This was part of the explanation for 
the social tensions which came into the open after Gorbachev’s reforms began and 
fundamentally destabilised the Soviet system.  As such, the costs of subsidised trade and 
of intensified military competition in the 1980s were related in that both ultimately 
derived from the global geopolitical context of East-West antagonism, and both 
represented severe costs to the USSR made in pursuit of geopolitical goals. 
 
3.4 Soviet Perspectives 
  
This section assesses Soviet perspectives on the phenomena identified above and 
tries to uncover the agency behind economic relations within the bloc.  It seems to have 
been the case that trade with Eastern Europe led to a debate in the USSR between 
technocratic elements of the bureaucracy and party concerned with the efficient use of 
resources, and the party leadership concerned with geopolitics and bloc stability.  
Although ideology was also identified as a significant factor in the initial decades, this 
thesis argues that after approximately 1970 ideology was a minimal influence on policy.  
Ladygin (1998), a consultant on CMEA trade to the Central Committee of the CPSU from 
1970-90, has made it clear that the implicit subsidies were,  
  
to the great displeasure of Soviet economic officials.  Their attitude was shared by 
the sectorial departments of the [state].  CMEA and other joint economic 
institutions of the socialist countries were derogatively called “plant management 
with no plants”, “parasites”, and “despoilers of the Soviet Union”.  Behind-the-
scenes, criticism of CMEA was allowed and even became fashionable (p.285).  
  
The bureaucracy’s negative view of CMEA was presumably informed by an awareness 
of the scale of the subsidies.  Ladygin goes on to claim the attempts of these two groups 
to achieve their opposed goals amounted to a ‘veiled struggle [which] was the 
manifestation of a conflict between economic officials defending domestic interests and 
  
156  
  
top politicians, together with the military-industrial complex, the KGB, and the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, making geopolitical considerations their top priority’ (p.285). 
Before reform period of the mid-1960s, the Soviet nomenklatura tended to 
accumulate roles based on the ideological conformity of the individual.  As Lane (1985, 
p.88) has pointed out, this was partly in response to the fact that despite their power, the 
party-state elite, as well as industrial and technical managers who were normally members 
of the nomenklatura were, unlike capitalist owners, ultimately dependent on occupation 
for their income.  This further reinforces the distinction between the socio-economic 
structure of actually-existing socialism and Western capitalism.  After reforms began it 
became harder of individual members of the nomenklatura to hold multiple positions 
simultaneously, and thus the scope for conflicts of interest within the elite structure got 
wider.  This provided room both for traditional elites to delay reforms, and, as detailed 
above, for technocratic elements to resist what they saw as the arbitrary use of Soviet 
economic resources. 
  An interesting example of the conflict between the two agendas is the fate of 
politically-motivated moves towards extending further hard currency and gold assistance 
to Eastern Europe.  
  
At the end of the 1970s, afflicted by constant requests for hard currency credits, 
the Politburo decided to set-up a hard currency fund of CMEA members… 
However, the idea was killed before it hatched.  The Finance Ministry, supported 
by Gosplan and the Department of Financial and Planning Organs of the Central 
Committee, [deliberately] failed to find the hard currency necessary to start the 
fund… Actually, these organizations feared that pressured by the CMEA 
countries, the Soviet leadership would extent them subsidized hard currency loans 
(p.285).  
  
The implication is that these sections of the bureaucracy acted in concert to limit how far 
the leadership could go in this regard, since table 10 shows the leadership was in fact 
siphoning sizeable quantities of the Soviet surplus in the form of hard currency assistance 
to Eastern Europe.  I assume these figures would have been even larger had the 
bureaucracy not acted as it did, and so the actual size of the total subsidies represents a 
kind of crude metric describing the relative influence of the two agendas.  Specifically, 
this evidence seems to suggest that technocratic agency before the 1980s was essentially 
confined to limiting, but not reversing or over-turning, geopolitically-motivated 
international economic policy.  Much like the intellectual strata of Hungarian society to 
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be discussed in the next chapter, technocrats wanting to reform Soviet international 
economic relations only got a large enough share of state power to seriously combat the 
old agenda when change in the system was already inevitable as the only way out of a 
serious crisis of the system (Lengyel, 1996). 
 In addition to the bureaucracy, another group which needs to be included are the 
managers responsible for the daily economic activity of their plants.  Sanchez-Sibony 
(2010) has uncovered evidence of considerable divergence between the interests of the 
party leadership and those of Soviet industrial managers in his archival work.  Although 
his focus is exclusively on the response of Soviet industrial leaders to the Kremlin’s desire 
for increased Soviet involvement in the world economy, the power relations involved are 
substantively the same as those at play in terms of Soviet engagement with CMEA.  
Essentially, party elites wanted economically beneficial trade with the West, and 
politically beneficial trade with the East, while industrial mangers wanted achievable 
targets and stability. 
The knowledge that various social groups would have opposed the policy of 
subsidized trade had they known its extent explains why when data expressing just how 
much the USSR was donating was produced it was confined to the upper echelons and 
was not made public.  
  
Foreign aid climbed as the USSR made concessions on the prices of exports and 
imports, provided subsidized loans, free professional training, and technical 
assistance.  When at the beginning of the 1980s the amount of foreign aid was 
calculated according to UN methods, it came out at about 2% of Soviet NMP.  The 
Party and the economic officials were shocked at this figure and decided not to 
publish this statistic at home (pp.292-3).  
  
The implicit subsidies extended to Eastern Europe would appear to be an excellent 
example of this.  
  
4. Conclusion  
  
This chapter offered a historical analysis of certain features of the Soviet economic 
system which can be seen to have prepared for the peculiar system of trade internal to the 
Eastern bloc.  I argued that centralised planning itself–established via the forced transfer 
of surplus and the creation of a coercive command apparatus–and privileged position of 
defence production within this political-economic structure were especially significant in 
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this regard.  The consequences, both intended and unintended, of the reorganisation of 
CMEA in the mid-1950s for the Soviet Union were then discussed emphasising the 
material costs of securing economic dependence in Eastern Europe for the Soviet 
economy.  Throughout effort was taken that structures and tendencies were identified 
along with a focus on the agency that either enabled or questioned their continuance.  The 
theoretical significance of seeing the development of the centre as affected by the 
processes of trade and integration characteristic of the system is the result of beginning 
from an ideal-type which does not make specific claims about how the two parts 
interrelate.  
In this way the CMEA price reform in 1956, which is comprehended as resulting 
partly from the crisis of Soviet authority in Eastern Europe after Stalin’s death and the 
widely-accepted need to set intra-bloc relations on a different footing, can be seen to have 
had profound consequences for both Eastern Europe and the USSR as economic surplus 
was redistributed between them.  These consequences emerge from the application of the 
reformulated DT framework and show how the removal of the static notion of ‘centre’ 
allows for the crafting of historical narratives that can account for reciprocal influence.  
Having shown how the ideal-type can serve as a starting-point for the construction of a 
narrative of development across the bloc in chapter 4, this chapter has shown how DT 
ideas can be used to destabilise the reified conception of centre prevalent in classical DT, 
and in so doing to conceptualise international development processes in a more 
multifaceted manner.  The next chapter will continue the analysis of the interrelation 
between trade and development in the bloc, this time looking at a part of the ‘periphery’.  
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Hungarian Development within the Eastern Bloc  
  
1. Introduction  
  
Having discussed how the development trajectory of the Soviet ‘centre’ was 
influenced by CMEA, the focus is now on the consequences of this international relation 
for a part of the ‘periphery’.  Hungary has been selected as a case-study not because it 
was typical of the six, but because it is a good place to investigate the contradiction 
between reform and tradition in planning mechanisms in relation to both CMEA and East-
West trade.  The ideal-type would expect one of the six to be relatively more dependent 
on international conditions due to the observable asymmetries that characterised the bloc.  
The regional and global context for this national case-study has been given in chapter 4, 
and three main theses will be advanced:  
  
1) From ambitious beginnings, the raft of reforms known as the New 
Economic Mechanism (NEM) ended-up creating little more than a new arena in 
which pre-existing power struggles between party, bureaucracy and large 
enterprises played out.  Ultimately the reforms left untouched the basic power 
relations of Hungarian society, although they did substantially alter the parameters 
within which the actors maneuvered.  
  
2) DT can contribute by suggesting links between internal and external 
factors, specifically that CMEA membership was a key factor in conditioning the 
reforms.  The most significant feature of this was the continuation of the 
inefficient exchange of over-valued yet outdated manufactures against under-
valued Soviet resources.  
  
3) This constituted a form of dependent development in that the Hungarian 
economy’s ability to produce the surplus necessary for development was 
conditional on CMEA membership, both in the sense of the qualitative expansion 
of new products and industries, as well as the sheer quantitative expansion of 
existing industries.  
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2. Hungarian Economy and Society, 1945-1955  
  
After WWII Hungary received similar treatment to the rest of Eastern Europe as 
trade was conducted on Soviet terms and joint-companies under Soviet directorship 
established.  For present purposes it is necessary to just insert a discussion of several 
features which were particularly heightened in Hungary.  It has already been discussed 
how the geopolitical situation of Stalin’s USSR influenced the Soviet model of industrial 
development, and how contradictions arose following its transplantation into Eastern 
Europe, especially after 1947 when the adoption of the Soviet model became mandatory.  
Firstly, Hungary was a small, landlocked economy with a high degree of openness to 
international trade.  This meant that the autarchy of the first decade was particularly badly 
received in Hungary given the recent imperial past and experience of participation in the 
central European division of labour.  These international links had previously served to 
ameliorate the developmental handicap of a small domestic market and a comparatively 
poor resource endowment; under autarchy the negative implications of both became clear.   
Secondly, the issue of the consumption/investment ratio had a different history in 
Hungary.  From the first years of socialism, Hungarian society reacted extremely 
negatively to this development schema.  The tension that resulted between the necessity 
of maintaining a high rate of investment for growth encouraged by Moscow and the 
Hungarian welfare-centred conception of socialism served to further underline the 
problems inherent in the project of exporting Soviet socialism to Eastern Europe.  As an 
example of the unusual social context of the consumption/investment debate in Hungary, 
it can be pointed out that General Secretary of the Hungarian party, Mátyás Rákosi, had 
initially pushed under Stalin’s tutelage for a high rate of investment as a vital component 
of socialist construction.  His replacement, Kádár, reversed the policy in favour of 
consumption and all subsequent leaderships felt obliged to maintain the consumer-
oriented policy.  Accordingly there was a higher level of consumer satisfaction in Hungary 
than elsewhere in the Eastern bloc.  Kornai (1997) has termed this ‘Goulash communism’.  
These two factors combined to make Hungary the East European country least suited to 
Soviet-type industrialization.  Likewise, the cultural and educational priorities of 
Hungarian society were at first poorly suited to undergoing Soviet-type industrialisation, 
although these were quickly realigned: in 1938, 40% of Hungarian students did law or 
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theology; by 1970 over 50% were doing engineering, agronomy, or economics (Berend 
and Ránki, 1985). 
In the years when Stalin’s influence was still being established, (which 
conclusively ended in 1949 when the communist party stood its candidates unopposed in 
national elections), a number of embryonic schemes to overcome these deficiencies at the 
regional level were hatched.  In 1947 plans were laid for Hungarian-Yugoslav cooperation 
in the development of an aluminium industry capable of serving both markets and 
potentially exporting as well.  When Stalin’s leadership of the bloc became 
unquestionable, and after the split with Tito encouraged the severing of links with the 
Balkan heretic, Stalin was able to personally intervene to terminate this example of 
socialist economic integration on the grounds that it would not centre round the Soviet 
Union.  I argue this scheme can be seen as potentially viable alternatives to the Soviet-
centred network which eventually emerged and thus serve to underline the contested 
nature of the way regional integration did actually go ahead and how important Soviet 
geopolitical objectives are for understanding this. 
One important feature of the organisational structure of Soviet society which was 
later exported to Eastern Europe was the system of nomenklatura appointments.  The 
classic treatment of the question of the nomenklatura in Hungary is Konrad and Szelenyi 
(1979, pf.186), where the system of nomenklatura appointment is seen as a particular type 
of bureaucratic management structure.  The form that the nomenklatura took in each East 
European country, as well as its relations to other social groups, varied and needs to be 
investigated as this provides a good illustration of the specificity of dependent 
development in Hungary as opposed to the general nature of the phenomenon.  Given the 
emphasis placed on conceptualising development processes as fundamentally contested, 
the nomenklatura as a specific form of communist elite, where advancement was accorded 
based on largely politically-evaluated achievements, needs to be introduced into the 
narrative here. 
The early Hungarian nomenklatura had followed the Soviet approach and been 
recruited almost exclusively from the working class and farmers, with intellectuals and 
scientifically educated people excluded on the ideologically-dictated necessity of 
diversifying the social origins of those entering official appointments.  The establishment 
of the nomenklatura system of appointments went hand-in-hand with the nationalisation 
of industry, since this required both a new system of central control and a new elite to run 
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it, and initially allowed for a dramatic rise in social mobility.  This initial stock of 
nomenklatura was later joined after 1968, and again even more so after 1980, by a rise in 
the proportion of technically-educated and privileged (i.e. from families with professional 
backgrounds) people entering its ranks.  Thus the changing social basis of the Hungarian 
nomenklatura to some extent correlated with how prominent the reform agenda was over 
time–for instance, after 1968 a sudden rise of educated and privileged people as a 
proportion of the nomenklatura can be observed, and in general these new recruits were 
more open to the reform agenda (Eyal and Townsley, 1995).  At first, the requirements of 
national nomenklatura’s were still given by Cominform, and in this way the reproduction 
of the Soviet-originated system of appointment elsewhere was one of the key ways the 
Soviet political-economic model was spread.  The conflicts of interest which developed 
between traditional and reform-minded elements of the nomenklatura will be returned to 
periodically as one way to highlight what was specific to dependent development in 
Hungary. 
  The high rate of investment over the first plan-period yielded a larger surplus 
available to planners than would have been available otherwise and facilitated the rapid 
development of a series of heavy industrial branches, all of which were highly dependent 
on imported materials and energy.  Enyedi (1976) has established that 32% of the raw 
materials needed for all national production were imported.  In the new industrial sectors 
this figure was even higher; in chemicals it was 52% and 50% in iron and steel production.  
This propagated a configuration of imports and exports which necessitated a substantial 
bilateral relation with the USSR via CMEA.  Summarising tables 12 and 13, we can see 
that fuels, energy, raw materials, and semi-manufactures constitute well over half of all 
Hungarian imports, (the percentage share averaging 64.3 between 1950-80), and that this 
was paid for by the export of machinery, consumer goods, and foodstuffs, many of which 
were produced by industries consuming the aforementioned imports as inputs.  This is by 
now a familiar story in which Eastern Europe saw the development of a particular type of 
productive economy which could only exist, let alone grow, on the basis of a politically-
motivated trade regime with the Soviet Union.  
  
3. Revolution and Intervention, 1956  
  
This system of international trade was only just beginning to emerge at the time 
of the most serious threat to Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, and it is in this light that 
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the events of 1956 will be discussed.  The Hungarian uprising demonstrated both the level 
of popular discontent with Soviet involvement in Eastern Europe, as well as the Soviet 
leaderships willingness to use force if deemed necessary to maintain the bloc.  In this way, 
it provided a graphic example of the contested nature of the centre/periphery relation in 
the bloc, and the crisis of Soviet authority which followed the death of Stalin.  The 
Warsaw Pact, signed into effect in 1955, was at the centre of such concerns as Hungary 
had intimated it might withdraw and attain neutral status as next-door Austria had.  From 
the Kremlin’s point of view, this would have represented a massive geopolitical set-back 
at a time when the unity of the bloc seemed to be seriously in question. 
However, archival work conducted after the Cold War has conclusively proved 
that, far from acting unilaterally as was assumed in the West at the time, the Soviet 
leadership was to some extent responding to pressure from other parties when the decision 
to invade was taken.  Other East European leaders feared the break-up of the WTO, which 
essentially guaranteed both their domestic supremacy and external security, and pressed 
the USSR to take action (Granville, 1998).  This is another instance where East European 
agency must be taken into account alongside Soviet decisions if relations within the bloc 
are to be explained.  Thinking about how 1956 related to the broader dynamics of East-
West antagonism, it also needs to be mentioned that at the time of the Hungarian uprising 
the Western camp was split over Britain and France’s invasion of Suez against American 
wishes.  As such, Western intervention is support of Hungarian sovereignty was always 
unlikely, and this possible gave the Soviet Union confidence to use force within the bloc 
(Rosser, 1969, p.303). 
The significance of this for a reformulated DT is that it highlights the complex 
interrelation of domestic and international factors implied by the centre/periphery system, 
which served the interests of the local parties by helping to secure their domestic 
ascendance and legitimacy, if not yet at this stage the economic growth which further 
assisted these aims.  Rákosi had always been the most ardent Stalinist of the East 
European autocrats, and this culminated in his forcing through the disastrous policy of 
full collectivisation of agriculture in spite of the lack of enthusiasm or preparation in the 
countryside.  This provides a good example of an East European country re-structuring 
its production away from an area it had a pre-existing comparative advantage in and 
towards the Soviet model.  Accordingly, Stalin’s death posed a severe threat to Rákosi 
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and others who based their legitimacy squarely on their obeisance to Stalin.  Mirroring 
the struggle that gradually began to unfold in the Kremlin between would-be reformers 
and men loyal to Stalin’s conception of socialism, Imre Nagy, a popular and reform-
minded leader, soon emerged as Rákosi’s main rival.  
As potential leaders of a periphery ruling party, neither Rákosi nor Nagy could 
hope to gain and hold onto power in Hungary without the support of Moscow, and the 
meandering implementation of the ‘New Course’ over the next three years to some extent 
reflected the struggle going on in the Kremlin (Fejtö, 1971; Brown, 2009).  As Malenkov 
and Khrushchev emerged as the main contenders to take-over after Stalin, their own 
alternative prescriptions for the Soviet Union bore a growing relevance for Hungary.  As 
the most in favour of fundamental economic reform and an advocate of reorienting the 
economy towards consumption, Malenkov’s fate inevitably linked with that of Nagy.  
Khrushchev’s victory thus sent out a mixed message to the bloc.  On the one hand he did 
not share Malenkov’s opinion on the importance of raising the level of consumption 
currently enjoyed by socialist citizens, the prime opinion signalling an interest in 
economic reform at that time, but he was equally distant from the group centred round 
Molotov who wanted to continue as Stalin had left off.  However, any doubts about 
Khrushchev’s resolve when he felt the integrity of the bloc was threatened were dispelled 
when the Red Army intervened on the 4th of November in support of the Hungarian police. 
Whilst the ferocity with which the 17 Soviet divisions demolished central 
Budapest before moving on to pacify other major cities shocked the world, the military-
strategic aspect of the Soviet response is of secondary importance for this discussion in 
comparison to the string of major financial concessions granted to Hungary by the USSR 
in the wake of the invasion.  This was in response to the centrality of perceived economic 
injustices in the demands of the protesters, and is significant because post-Stalin 
leaderships tried–although ultimately failed–to reduce the need to enforce communist 
power in Eastern Europe by military means.  International economic concerns, and 
especially of relations with the Soviet Union, took prominent places in the first demands 
of the Writer’s Union submitted on 22nd October, 1956:  
 
We want an independent national policy based on the principles of Socialism.  Our 
relations with all countries, and with the USSR and the People’s Democracies in 
the first place, should be regulated on the basis of the principle of equality.  We 
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want a review of inter-State and economic agreements in the spirit of the equality 
of national rights (quoted in Harman, 1988, p.125).  
  
In an example of Soviet economic surplus being used to secure bloc stability, in 1957 the 
USSR gave $190 million to Hungary, of which 50 million was in highly prized free 
exchange.  This extraordinary amount signals just how highly the geopolitical imperative 
of preserving the bloc was valued.  In addition, the Soviets cancelled the remainder of the 
debt the Hungarian state incurred in buying back the mixed companies and declared a 
moratorium on debt service (Kaser, 1965, p.70).  
  An interesting international dimension to the intervention which is of relevance 
under a theoretical frame that attempts to be sensitive to the qualitative characteristics of 
agents, was that it clarified the understanding of society and social relations that the 
Hungarian communist party implicitly adhered to.  One feature of the rebellion had been 
the spontaneous creation of worker’s councils, on the same model as the original Soviets 
of 1917, which succeeded for a short while in coordinating economic activity 
independently of the party or central institutions.  Interpretations of the councils differ 
widely but are worth mentioning since they go some way towards untangling the agency 
at work.  One perspective sees such institutions as rivals to traditional forms of social 
organisation, harbingers of a future society in which central authorities of any political 
persuasion will be negated.  Thus according to Harman (1988) the workers support for 
the revolution manifested in the form of workers councils, ‘gave Kádár a fright he never 
dared to forget’ (p.125), and the pro-consumption policy he advocated was therefore just 
a strategic concession made by a leader encased in an elite party which feared the 
demonstrated viability of greater degrees of autonomy for the subaltern masses it 
managed.  
  Another assessment of the significance of the councils runs this way:  
  
The conflict between the two systems, the parties and the councils, came to the 
fore in all twentieth century revolutions.  The issue at stake was representation 
versus action and participation... For the parties, the need for action itself was 
transitory, and they had no doubt that after the victory of the revolution further 
action would simply prove unnecessary or subversive.  Bad faith and the drive for 
power where not the decisive factor [behind the reassertion of party authority]... 
[The East European communist parties] agreed that the end of government was 
the welfare of the people, and that the substance of politics was not action but 
administration (Arendt, 1990, p.273).  
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These diverging conceptions determine how the reintegration and subordination of the 
revolutionary councils within the party structure should be interpreted.  Arendt’s analysis 
is more consonant with the approach developed in previous chapters in that it points to 
the inherently international character of the relevant social forces, which cannot be 
comprehended independently of the centre/periphery system–not only was the Hungarian 
communist party only in power on the back of the Soviet military presence since 1945, 
but the very conception that the party held of its role and relations to other social elements 
was Bolshevik in origin.  This conception set the Hungarian party apart from the 
Yugoslavian party to be discussed in the next chapter.  However, if the party and its 
administrative conception of socialism had won out, and the blatant imbalances of the 
first decade of Stalinist policy towards Eastern Europe were being reversed, the issue of 
how to proceed with some sort of economic reform could not be avoided for long. 
A significant component of the Kádár regime’s program to stabilise Hungarian 
society was to move towards a compromise with the intellectual and technocratic 
elements within society who had joined the rebellion.  These groups resented their 
structural exclusion from the nomenklatura, which was consequently opened to the 
offspring of intellectuals on the tacit condition that they restricted themselves to 
piecemeal reforms (Eyal and Townsley, 1995).  The regimes reconciliation with the 
intellectuals had begun as early as the show-trail of László Rajk, who had publically 
opposed the subordination of the Hungarian party to the CPSU, in 1949, when a tacit 
agreement between the party and intellectuals emerged which suggested their loyalty to 
the system would be rewarded with a certain degree of independence (Huszar, 2005, 
p.23).  This tendency for the party to prefer to coopt, rather than directly suppress, the 
intellectual strata of Hungarian society gathered pace with the relaxing of the social 
conditions necessary for entry into the nomenklatura in the 1960s.  From this point 
onwards, the Hungarian nomenklatura was relatively unusual in that intellectuals and 
technocrats, normally opposed to the arbitrary and inefficient nature of nomenklatura 
management, were given increasing opportunities within the system, sometimes by 
actually joining the nomenklatura themselves and sometimes in extensive consultation 
roles and participation in relevant committees. 
The inclusion of the technical strata into the Hungarian nomenklatura to a far 
greater degree than was the case in the USSR and elsewhere in the bloc was thus an 
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unusual feature (Szelenyi and Szelenyi, 1995) and needs to be taken into account in 
discussing the Hungarian reforms.  However, this compromising move did not mitigate 
the essential conflict between the older, traditional nomenklatura and the new technical 
entrants, since these two groups tended to have divergent opinions on reform, but actually 
heightened it in the sense that both agendas were increasingly articulated from within the 
ruling structure (Lengyel, 1996, p.50). 
 
4. The New Economic Mechanism, 1968  
  
The various reform processes across the bloc in the 1960s were earlier claimed to 
be relevant for this study for three reasons: they illustrate intra-socialist diversity; 
underline the fundamental nature of the economic problems facing the planned 
economies; and they show the increasingly evident contradiction between the orientations 
towards either CMEA or the world economy.  As the most radically reformed economy 
in the bloc, Hungary is an excellent case-study to look into the interrelation between 
reform and CMEA.  I argue that the manner in which the reforms played-out was 
fundamentally conditioned by the social relations of the Hungarian economy, and these 
were in turn influenced to a significant extent by the bilateral relation with the USSR.  
Hungary stands out as the first CMEA member to make substantial decentralising 
reforms, and the Hungarian reforms were also exceptional in that there was initially a 
broad consensus there that change was both possible and necessary.  The three most 
influential collective actors, the party, state bureaucracy, and the large enterprises, all 
initially saw a common interest in the pursuit of reform, and the path the reform process 
took can be explained by reference to the changing relations between these actors and the 
international pressures that acted upon them from both within the bloc and outside. 
This broad agreement is evinced by the fact that such a radical set of reforms was 
prepared for by almost two years of minor changes to ease the transition, and care was 
taken not to drastically alter output and trade patterns overnight.  The most important 
change ushered in by the reform was the massive restriction of direct administrative 
control.  NEM put an end to both annual and quarterly instructions and went on to make 
a number of other fundamental changes to the production process.  These included 
changed production prices; the introduction of a charge on capital of 5%; the 
decentralization of some investment decisions; the granting of licenses to some 
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enterprises allowing them to trade abroad independently; and the wage structure was made 
more flexible.  These changes to the structure of the Hungarian economy will be discussed 
below in terms of how they related to the agency of party, bureaucracy and large 
enterprises and the structures of trade characteristic of CMEA. 
 
5. Market Socialism within CMEA  
  
This section draws together the material of the preceding sections and evaluates 
the impact of the bilateral relation with the USSR within CMEA.  Three particular topics 
have been singled out through which the possibilities and problems with establishing 
market socialism within CMEA can be discussed within a DT frame: the results of the 
reforms; the relation between trade and energy-use; and the nature of specialisation within 
the Eastern bloc.  In order to make it clear that the Eastern bloc was not a self-contained 
and singular entity, a discussion of Hungarian credit dependency and technological 
backwardness which highlights how the dynamic of development within CMEA 
handicapped Hungary in terms of the potential to diversify international economic 
relations is also included. 
  
5.1 The Reform Process in Retreat  
  
The interrelation between the Hungarian reform process and CMEA was complex 
and multifaceted.  As mentioned above, the diverse solutions proposed for the problems 
of the planning system fostered a decade of divergence as Eastern bloc economies moved 
into various positions between the two ideals of free markets and command planning.  By 
the mid-1970s, however, all Eastern bloc economies re-converged towards the traditional 
model with its extreme centralisation of decision-making.  In Hungary this process 
happened slowly but steadily.  The first sign came in 1969 as the newly introduced 
management bonus structure was changed to allow workers’ wages to rise in line with 
managers.  Similar piecemeal reversals followed until in 1974 central control over 
investment was dramatically increased and Rezső Nyers (1986), a key reformer, was 
removed from office.  This signalled the changing of opinion at the top, and the reform 
path was not re-entered upon until 1980. 
Several factors contributed to this reversal.  Part of the explanation is that more 
traditional elements of the nomenklatura saw a link between economic, market-oriented 
  
169  
  
reform and an inevitable push for political liberalization (Eyal and Townsley, 1995).  In 
this light it is notable that the phrase ‘economic mechanism’ itself implied that the reforms 
would not go beyond the technical sphere of resource allocation; i.e. and therefore would 
not imply any change to the system of single party rule.  This is partly true, but 
organisational conservatism alone is not enough to explain the inability of the reforms to 
substantially alter the performance of the Hungarian economy–the agency of the large, 
autonomous enterprises must also be integrated and set in relation to the centre/periphery 
relation within the bloc.  In the early 1960s, in order to prepare for the reforms, 1,300 state 
enterprises were amalgamated into 850, and this meant the devolved autonomy came 
down to large, powerful units (Brus, 1979).  From this point on the Hungarian economy 
was characterised by an unusual degree of concentration, so much so that in 1971 73% of 
Hungarian workers were employed in enterprises with over 1,000 employees, while in the 
West only Netherland’s had a figure over 40% (Radice, 1981).  The concentration of 
productive capacity was so great that almost 75% of output was produced by large 
companies.  Due to their size and the decentralizing nature of the reforms, these 
enterprises exercised a large amount of power in relation to other parts of the 
nomenklatura in the party-state apparatus. 
The contest internal to the party between reform-minded and traditional factions 
could also be found in the state bureaucracies.  In order to understand the role of the 
bureaucracy in the reform process it is necessary to decompose it into two distinct groups 
with divergent interests: the branch ministries responsible for individual sectors and 
generally representing the interests of the large enterprises on the one hand, and the central 
planning and financial institutions on the other.  The tradition/reform cleavage was thus 
significantly more pronounced in Hungary than elsewhere in the bloc, in that after 1968 
the social basis of the nomenklatura moved towards the inclusion of more and more 
people from educated and privileged backgrounds who were more likely to be invested in 
the reform project.  Szalai (1982, 1991) has argued that the relations between these two 
sections of the bureaucracy and the party and the large enterprises is the key to 
understanding the path the reform process took.  However, she fundamentally 
underestimates the international influences acting upon and through these actors.  This is 
peculiar as Szalai at one point explicitly recognises the significance of CMEA 
membership as a factor counting against reform (1991, p.296), but does not go on to relate 
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this to her analysis of the interactions of party, state and enterprises.  The result is local 
developments are viewed in isolation from the international context which brought them 
forth and significant components of the interests and material basis of these groups in 
terms of their access to and control over surplus relating to CMEA linkages are 
downplayed.  
The point is that whilst the party and upper-level bureaucracy needed stability and 
growth to legitimize their rule, the large enterprises wanted to secure their economically 
privileged position and ensure the redistribution of surplus from other sectors to their own.  
In particular, resources were channelled away from small firms who did not enjoy the 
protection of the branch ministries.  One important way the large enterprises managed to 
do this was by monopolizing CMEA deals where profit margins were high and consumer 
demands low.  In this way the coalition of lower-level bureaucracy and large enterprises 
acted to bolster their position at the expense of small and medium sized enterprises. 
From the enterprises’ point of view, this mix of vertical (administrative) and 
horizontal (market) regulation represented the structural context within which they 
operated.  Kornai (1986) writes,  
  
The firm’s manager watches the customer and the supplier with one eye and his 
superiors in the bureaucracy with the other eye.  Practice teaches him that it is 
more important to keep the second eye wide open: managerial career, the firm’s 
life and death, taxes, subsides and credit, all financial “regulators” affecting the 
firms prosperity, depend more on the higher authorities than on market 
performance (p.1700).  
  
This seems to be a good example of the way the nomenklatura system itself, even 
regardless of what type of people entered it, could incentivise behaviour contrary to the 
aims of the reforms.  Szalai (1991) agrees with Kornai’s characterisation but disagrees on 
the question of the distribution of power between these groups.  For Szalai, Hungary in 
the 1970s and 1980s was instead an economy with a weak centre (i.e. party and state 
bureaucracy), where enterprises were sufficiently powerful to suppress moves towards 
genuine market competition and ‘to blackmail the hierarchy of the party and the state’ 
(p.289).  This conflict of interest was more pronounced in Hungary than elsewhere due to 
the decentralising nature of the reforms and the increasingly inclusive nature of the 
nomenklatura over the period in question.  Given that it was the central bureaucracy and 
upper party echelons who pushed most consistently for reforms, Szalai’s conception 
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seems more accurate when the significant reversals of the reforms in the interest of the 
large enterprises are taken into account.  A reformulated DT can be sensitive to these 
nuances of agency in the periphery and how they related to the over-all centre/periphery 
relationship because it begins from an ideal-type which doesn’t presuppose any particular 
interrelation of domestic and international factors. 
The contradictory nature of dependent development in Hungary can be read 
through the shifting conflicts of interest between these different factions of the 
nomenklatura.  On the issue of how far the reforms should go towards creating true market 
relations, the party and top bureaucracy thus had diametrically opposed interests to the 
large enterprises and the branch ministries.  The conflict between these two agendas took 
place on a rather uneven footing:  
Due to the fact that the large companies represent significant economic and 
political power, they are able to impede the assertion of central management’s 
goals of creating free market relations and eliminating individual regulation [i.e. 
patronage networks encompassing branch ministries and enterprises] (Szalai, 
1991, p.293).  
  
In its quest for growth and stability, the party made itself too reliant on the oligopolies 
without which they could achieve neither.  Halpern and Molnár (1989) and Colobatto 
(1983) have both argued that the structure of prices and accumulation in the Hungarian 
economy were not significantly changed by the reforms, thereby preventing the desired 
transformation of the economy.  I agree with this structural diagnosis and argue that a 
significant portion of the blame for this can be laid at the door of the large enterprises.  In 
this way the changing structures of the Hungarian economy can be conceptualized as the 
outcome of social struggle, with CMEA giving the broad context within which these 
developments need to be situated since it was soft CMEA contracts that provided a large 
part of the autonomous firms’ power. 
  One of the international manifestations of this clash was the debt problem that 
emerged in the 1970s as decentralized decision-making allowed Western imports to rise 
quickly.  By 1978 it had become apparent that the large enterprises were failing to export 
enough back to the West to raise the hard currency needed to keep the external debt in 
check.  This spurred reform-minded elements of the party and bureaucracy to launch a 
series of measures intended to limit the power of the large enterprises.  These included in 
1979 a restriction on imports, consumption, and investment activities, and in 1980 the 
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branch ministries were amalgamated into a single Ministry of Industry in an attempt to 
minimize the influence exerted by large firms.  At the same time Generalimpex was 
created to manage the import and export of many commodities through a single 
department to curb import orders by large firms. 
Szelenyi and Szelenyi (1995) argue convincingly that importance needs to be 
attached to the fact that, just as had happened after 1968, a further influx of technically-
educated people into the nomenklatura occurred in the early 1980s, and this reinforced 
sections of the party and central bureaucracies who wanted to reinvigorate the reform 
process and the ‘rationalisation’ of socialism against the interests of the large enterprises.  
This exacerbated the ongoing struggle between the old nomenklatura and the reform-
minded elements who were generally younger, better educated and more technically-
oriented.  In this way, in the early 1980s the old nomenklatura’s agenda of stability and 
continuity ran-up against a renewed determination to revive and renew the institutions of 
socialism through reform (Kulcsar and Domokos, 2005).  Importantly, this new round of 
reforms stressed the vital importance of forging successful links outside CMEA as a 
necessary condition of Hungary’s further development.  This agenda was central to the 
sixth 5 year plan (1981-85), which was framed in a very energy/export-centric way.  The 
expanding influence of technocratic and reformist elements at the time can be seen in the 
fact that this plan explicitly emphasised integration to world markets alongside CMEA 
and stressed the need to improve services like marketing needed to do so successfully. 
However, reformers within the central authorities were restrained in their tussle 
with the large enterprises by the ongoing necessity of meeting CMEA export 
requirements, for which the capacity of the large enterprises was essential.  The large 
enterprises saw their interests as aligned with CMEA rather than with further exposure to 
competitive Western markets (Richter, 1989).  In this way the relative power of the large 
enterprises is essential to explain why NEM ultimately stopped short of questioning the 
general policy of extensive development, large-scale production, and long-term contracts 
within CMEA (Csaba, 1988).  A less CMEA-centred growth path would have meant 
lessening dependence on the USSR, but this was not in the immediate interests of the 
large enterprises for whom dependent development meant security and stability. 
The 1970s wmp rises for oil and the ensuing Western recession led to balance of 
payment problems for most Eastern bloc countries as exports to the West receded but 
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imports remained unchanged.  This applied especially to post-reform Hungary where 
central planners had ceded much to the large enterprises.  Comisso and Marer (1986) have 
argued that CMEA membership was a major constraint on the reforms from 1979 onwards 
given the changed conditions on the world market.  These developments exposed a 
contradiction between international obligations to CMEA and the requirements of 
domestic economic reform made apparent by the increased interaction with the West.  The 
fact that the Bucharest principle used in setting CMEA ftps allowed for a substantial lag 
between wmp rises and the time when they filtered through to CMEA effectively sheltered 
Hungarian producers and consumers from the need to adjust, and therefore represented a 
major short-term benefit conferred by the USSR on her partners.  The prices facing 
Hungarian oil-users in the late 1970s, (i.e. after the switch to the Moscow principle of 
price formation), can be seen in table 14 below showing crude oil prices in dollars per 
barrel (Csikós-Nagy, 1984, p.249).  
 
Table 14  
  
  Domestic 
production  
CMEA 
import  
Saudi oil  Wmp average  
1976  3.62  7.25  11.6  12.5  
1978  3.98  11.9  12.9  13.8  
1980  5.15  15.2  28.2  30.4  
  
This feature of CMEA pricing had the effect of bolstering those groups who 
wanted to limit the implementation of reforms, since the rewards of trading bilaterally 
with the USSR, and therefore of maintaining existing structures of production, were so 
abundantly evident.  The international political consequences of this fed back into both 
the domestic struggle between the groups discussed above and into the international 
debate over specialization within the bloc (Radice, 1981, pp.140-1).  Hungary advocated 
changes to CMEA relating to increasing the role of markets in matching supply to demand 
within CMEA, proposals for the multilateralisation of bloc trade agreements, and calls for 
the convertibility of the rouble.  This was a long-standing theme in Hungarian reform 
debates.  Already in the mid-1960s, Vajda (1966) was arguing that non-convertibility, and 
thus the absence of active money, was a serious fetter on the development of trade and 
growth within CMEA.  Given the position of strength from which the large enterprises 
confronted the party and central bureaucracy who were more open to such international 
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reforms, to say nothing of Soviet disapproval, such proposals were unlikely to ever get 
very far.  
  
5.2 Trade and Energy Use  
  
Having analysed the particular nature of the Hungarian nomenklatura and how 
conflicts of interest between different section of it conditioned the reform process, the 
theme of contradictions within the dependent development of Hungary will now be further 
drawn out.  Here the argument that the politically-motivated exchange of (undervalued) 
Soviet energy and raw materials against (overvalued) Hungarian manufactures had a 
number of negative side-effects only partially compensated for by gains from terms of 
trade will be developed.  Most obviously, the maintenance of energy-inefficient, 
uncompetitive industries was encouraged which could potentially have been modernised, 
and this limited both the economy’s ability to generate surplus and the type of uses it was 
put towards. 
Despite the de-centralisation begun in 1968, energy usage remained a concern of 
the state.  In terms of national perspective planning, there were two key decisions taken 
on energy-use: in 1964 hydrocarbons were preferred over coal, until 1979 when coal and 
atomic fuel replaced hydrocarbons as preferred energy sources.  The first decision to 
import more hydrocarbons was accompanied by policy initiatives to develop less energy-
intensive sectors.  This is in instance where the interests of the Soviet leadership who 
wanted to keep the subsidy in manageable proportions, and the leadership of an East 
European party who wanted to modernise and diversify the economy, ran in the same 
direction.  The 1979 decision reflected the belated recognition that Hungarian producers 
needed to respond to the changed wmps.  This action came in the wake of the inability of 
more moderate reforms to prompt re-adjustment, measures including the introduction of 
speed limits, restrictions being put on shop window and advertising energy usage, and 
heating limits for firms and households. 
By the early 1980s, the slow growth in factor productivity and general inefficiency 
were acknowledged as serious structural problems (Román, 1985).  The long-standing 
issue was that the industrial base established in the first plan periods was both extremely 
energy-thirsty and energy-inefficient.  In 1950s, for instance, to achieve 1% growth in 
national income the extra energy required was 1.23%, whereas in the West this coefficient 
  
175  
  
was far lower, between 0.3 and 0.7% (Csikós-Nagy, 1984, p.244).  This energy 
inefficiency was a major source of Hungarian non-competitiveness on the world market, 
and thus reinforced the need to export to CMEA which in turn reinforced the pattern of 
dependent development.  The lack of competitiveness of the Hungarian automobile 
industry on the world market can be seen from the greatly differing levels of success these 
firms achieved in the Soviet market as compared to OECD markets (see table 16). 
With growth dependent on CMEA trade, it is important that the DT frame draws 
attention to how participation in CMEA encouraged maintaining traditional planning 
because the transferable roubles obtained could only be spent within CMEA, and trading 
within the bloc encouraged the continuance of existing structures of production.  The 
delayed registering of the oil price rises further reinforced this trend (Köves, 1981, p.56).  
Importantly, the fact that numerous attempts were made to alter this structure but failed 
to do so is understood to be testament to the organisational power of agents who supported 
the reproduction of this structure; in the case of Hungary these were the large enterprises 
and sectorial elements of the bureaucracy.  
 
5.3 Socialist Economic Integration and Hungarian Specialisation  
  
The question of how to interpret the impact CMEA specialisation had on 
Hungarian development will be opened-up by returning to the distinction between 
complementary and competitive development paths given in chapter 3.  It is important 
that complementary rather than completive specialization tended to characterize 
integration processes within CMEA.  In order to make direct comparisons possible, the 
related distinction between intra-industry and inter-industry trade which clarifies these 
notions can also be used.  It is generally accepted that intra-industry trade is an indicator 
of higher levels of technological development and signifies more sophisticated and 
diverse production capabilities (Drabek and Greenaway, 1984, p.448).  This raises the 
question as to whether CMEA trade was conducted on a primarily intra- or inter-industry 
basis; given the peculiarities of CMEA it could be expected that Hungarian trade within 
CMEA would be characterized first of all by inter-industry specialization on account of 
the complementary patterns of development fostered by CMEA cooperation.  
  However, the story told by the data is not so simple, as can be seen from table 15 
comparing Hungary and Czechoslovakia in 1964 and 1977 in terms of the percentage of 
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their CMEA trade conducted on the basis of inter- or intra-industrial specialization.  This 
is surprising given that the pre-eminence of Czechoslovakian industry would have 
suggested that Czechoslovakia would display more intra-industrial specialization.  
Moreover, in each category the Hungarian figure improved over the period in question, 
sometimes quite dramatically, while this was not always the case with Czechoslovakia.   
In fact Hungary’s 1977 intra-industry specialization figures were higher than some EEC 
countries (Balassa, 1986).  
Several case-specific factors are needed to explain this notable instance where the 
Hungarian case varies from the rest of the bloc.  Firstly, the decentralization of decision-
making over what to produce and how to do so granted Hungarian firms room to 
manoeuvre which was not available to their counterparts elsewhere in the bloc.  Secondly, 
the fact that Hungary had over 500 firms engaged in East-West industrial cooperation, 
mostly doing light engineering with West German firms, suggests that Hungary had a 
comparative advantage in light industry, a sector well-suited to intra-industry 
specialization.  This exposure to cooperation with firms from DMEs was higher than 
levels of cooperation achieved by the rest of the bloc, and has to be related to the reformed 
and relatively decentralised nature of the Hungarian economy which made economic 
relations outside CMEA significantly easier to achieve.  Finally, the Standard 
International Trade Classification (SITC) category which reached the highest proportion 
of intra-industry specialization, SITC 7, includes transportation equipment.  As will be 
argued later, the production of such equipment in Hungary owed a great deal to CMEA, 
the sector being, in fact, an outstanding example of the possibilities and limitations of 
dependent development as it happened in the Eastern bloc.  Accordingly, part of the 
Hungarian success in fostering intra-industrial specialization in this sector can be 
accounted for by the interaction of international processes socialist economic integration 
(specifically the Soviet desire to develop a region-wide division of labour and the 
concomitant willingness of the USSR to delegate almost exclusive rights to produce 
particular products to individual CMEA members), and the domestic process of reform 
which created over-sized companies dependent on large, stable contracts within CMEA.  
Summarizing their findings, Drabek and Greenaway state that USSR-CMEA trade 
is characterized by inter- rather than intra-industry specialization, and so was 
complementary rather than competitive.  Hungary was a relatively intra-industrially 
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specialized exception, and this stands for a major difference between Hungary and the 
rest of the bloc, one which can be explained in terms of the different structures of the 
Hungarian political economy and the conflicts of interest that arose within it.  Explaining 
this specific feature of Hungarian development would have been problematic if the ideal-
type had specified how development in the periphery was likely to proceed; instead the 
open-ended approach suggested by the ideal-type can be used to explain this particular 
and unexpected outcome. 
 
5.4 Debt and Technological Backwardness 
 
 Following the argument that the system of subsidised trade within CMEA led to 
a particular type of development for the economies of the Eastern bloc, this section further 
develops the theme of how the changing relation of Hungary to the world economy 
exposed contradictions in the dependent development internal to the bloc.  By the 1980s, 
the inability of the mechanisms of intra-socialist economic relations to keep pace with 
both DMEs and the NICs was evident.  The two most significant features of the dependent 
development of Hungary which need to be set in the context of uneven global capitalist 
development are the debt crisis of the 1980s and the lack of technological innovation that 
characterised the Hungarian large enterprises.  The origin of both these issues in terms of 
the socially-contested reform process and the conflicts of interest between different 
sections of the nomenklatura have already been discussed–here they are set in the broader 
international context which reveals their full implications as signifiers of the limits to 
dependent development. 
 It has already been demonstrated how CMEA processes of trade and integration 
tended to discourage technological dynamism in favour of the maintenance of existing 
structures of production.  Gács (1989) has shown that there was a wide divergence 
between rates of structural change (which would suggest technological innovation was 
taking place) in industries producing rouble exports versus non-rouble exports, with 
rouble exporting industries having significant slower rates of change.  I agree with his 
verdict that the ‘slowness of transformation is assumed to be only partly rooted in the 
tardy and lagging assertion of price changes in this given relation and to a greater extent 
in the institutional system of CMEA trade that makes trade structure highly rigid’ (p.83).  
The increased exposure to world market trade from détente onwards thus served to reveal 
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the fundamental inadequacy of the Hungarian large enterprises when exporting outside 
the CMEA area. 
Simultaneously, these export difficulties were exacerbated by the fact that 
decentralisation and access to Western credit allowed for imports to rise faster than 
exports, and this left the country with a serious hard currency debt problem.  Part of the 
global context to this was the fact that recession in the West brought on by the oil price 
rises meant Western nations were cutting back imports in general at this time, and so were 
purchasing less from the Eastern bloc than they had done previously.  This imbalance 
developed through the 1970s, and became extremely acute in the early 1980s.  From this 
time onwards, the necessity to stabile the external account often came at the expense of 
pushing through reforms, and the avoidance of debt rescheduling, and thus the 
maintenance of international credit-worthiness, became central to Hungarian economic 
policy in the 1980s (Young, 1989).  Again, as was argued to have been the case with 
Poland, this requirement was at least as important to the health of the Hungarian economy 
by now as CMEA was.  The fact that the East European economy most in debt, Poland, 
had to reschedule and accept the consequent economic turbulence was part of the 
motivation for this prioritisation of managing the external debt.  Interestingly, it was 
membership of the IMF and the World Bank gained in 1982–i.e. re-entry into the 
international financial institutions which the socialist states had long been separate from–
that vitally assisted Hungary in avoiding debt rescheduling. 
However, Köves and Oblath (1991) have commented on how the consensus that 
Hungary must service the external debt still left considerable room for divergence of 
opinion between different sections of the party, state, and industrial managers on how this 
should be done, and thus for further conflicts between these agents alongside those 
already covered.  Specifically, the emphasis placed upon stabilising the external account 
was a policy success for the technocrats who saw that the future development of Hungary 
had to be increasingly linked to world markets, but paradoxically this situation also 
strengthened the hand of sections of the nomenklatura who were in favour of maintaining 
and expanding links to CMEA, who could argue this was the only stable and secure 
strategy available.  In this way, the large debt burden came to be seen as both an obstacle 
to reform and a signifier of its necessity.  Once again, the fact that different social groups 
saw the same phenomenon in diametrically opposed ways has to be seen as key to 
exposing the contradictions entailed by Hungary’s development process. 
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 Following some success in dealing with the debt crisis of the early 1980s with 
support from the IMF, a second wave of severe debt financing payment hit the economy 
in the late 1980s.  As Lavigne (1991) points out, the initial Hungarian borrowing to 
finance the import of capital goods necessitated further borrowing to allow the import of 
the wide range of intermediate goods required to ensure the proper functioning of the 
technologies received.  The key issue was that the imports financed by this borrowing 
were often not used efficiently by the large enterprises, who faced little competitive 
pressures either domestically or in CMEA, and the export capacity of Hungarian industry 
ultimately did not increase enough to cover these costs (Medgyessy, 1984).  By 1990 the 
net debt in convertible currencies was equivalent to about half of gross domestic product 
(Hare, 1991). 
Ironically, it was the relative credit worthiness of Hungary in comparison to the 
numerous Latin American countries then getting into serious liquidity problems that made 
Western banks continue to lend to Hungary.  In 1982 the Reagan administration actually 
attempted, and partly succeeded, in persuading European banks not to lend to the East for 
political reasons.  The fact that this measure was only partly successful, and the Eastern 
debt continued to rise, was symptomatic of the decline of US power relative to the rest of 
the capitalist world since the 1970s.  In this way, the existence of the Eastern bloc’s debt 
problem was in itself emblematic of shifts in the structure of the international context 
outside CMEA.  Moreover, as Saull (2007, p.172) has pointed out, this altered East-West 
economic relation actually impacted on the potential for purely political competition 
between the blocs and political unity within the East, since the exposure of Eastern bloc 
countries to Western debt meant they actually had an increasing stake in the political and 
economic stability and success of the West, as this made both manageable rates of interest 
payment more likely and kept the possibility of more credit open.  In this way, the 
growing dependence on Western credit particularly visible in Hungary and Poland dealt 
a crucial blow to the economic priority of the relation to the USSR via CMEA for the 
European socialist states. 
These two limitations of Hungarian dependent development (debt and 
technological backwardness) were thus linked, since it was principally the relative 
technological backwardness of Hungarian industry that lead to poor export performance, 
and this poor export performance in turn exacerbated the debt problem since exports could 
seldom raise enough free exchange to cover imports.  These issues highlight the fact that 
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by the 1980s, the dependent development process was reaching its limits as the structural 
characteristics it generated made it increasingly difficult for the economies involved to 
diversify their international economic relations, whilst there was a growing consensus 
that this was a necessary component of maintaining growth. 
 
5.5 The Ikarus Bus Production Company 
 
A case-study of a company is included to provide a specific illustration of several 
propositions about the generation of surplus by Hungarian market socialism within 
CMEA which have emerged from the application of DT.  I claim that the reformulation 
of DT involving concepts like complementary/competitive development and inter-/intra- 
industry trade allows industrial ‘successes’ like Ikarus to be theorized in the context of 
CMEA and their development related to broader patterns.  Importantly, Ikarus can be 
shown to have been a success within CMEA and a failure outside, thus highlighting the 
contradictory nature of Hungary’s development. 
Located in Budapest, Ikarus was an important employer in socialist Hungary and 
something of a national icon.  The foundations of the company were laid in 1949 when 
the license for the production of Steyr-Daimler-Puch trucks was purchased, and from here 
the plant grew quickly and secured a share of the CMEA market for buses.  The sheer 
scale of production needs to be emphasized with annual production peaking in 1979 at 
14,230 busses.  Importantly, Ikarus was a high-profile beneficiary of the complementary 
development pursued within CMEA; in 1973 similar production was actually stopped in 
the GDR as Hungary was selected to specialize uniquely in this field.  In an example of 
intra-industry trade encouraged by CMEA, firms in the GDR which had previously been 
producing finished buses were relegated to the production of chassis which were then 
delivered to Hungary (Sobell, 1984).  
This result of CMEA cooperation can be seen to have reinforced the trend already 
underway in Hungary for the formation of oligopolistic producers enjoying considerable 
ability to determine their situation against a weakened centre.  Ikarus can be seen as an 
example of this phenomenon specific to Hungarian market socialism in which the interests 
of the large enterprises diverged from those of the party and the autonomy granted by the 
reforms gave them the power to articulate this.  Swain (1992) has observed that,  
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Even if an enterprise, the bus manufacturer Ikarus for example, were run wholly 
democratically, it would be as much in the workers’ short- to medium-term interest 
as it was in the mangers’ to produce huge runs of identical buses for the Soviet 
market rather than meet the changing and more demanding requirements of the 
West (p.227).  
  
The potential schism between workers and managers interests within a given enterprise 
got significantly wider over the final decade.  The second round of decentralising reforms 
in the 1980s fundamentally strengthened the hand of managers in relation to workers.  By 
1988, the Hungarian nomenklatura was overwhelmingly male, middle-aged, well-
educated, and a member of the Party.  Whilst this trend can also be observed elsewhere 
in the bloc, the Hungarian nomenklatura had unique rights to economic power. 
As such, industrial managers in Hungary gained from the decentralising reforms, 
and workers’ power within the work-place declined, but the availability of strategies of 
individual response to economic hardship by engaging with the expanded opportunities 
of the private sector meant the collective strategies that emerged in Poland did not happen 
in Hungary.  Hungarian workers had no independent trade union representation, unlike in 
Poland where Solidarity was then becoming so active.  In 1981, laws were further relaxed 
allowing Hungarians to participate in the private sector, and this meant dissatisfaction 
with communist rule did not lead to wide-spread political dissent at it did in Poland.  Some 
estimates put 36% of the Hungarian work-force engaging in some sort of legal private 
activity (Hanley, 1999, p.151).  This gave conflicts between workers and managers in 
Hungary a less confrontational style, and thus companies like Ikarus achieved a high level 
of stability, partly due to the soft nature of CMEA contracts, and partly due to the 
specificities of Hungarian social relations after the reforms. 
Ikarus stands as an excellent illustration of the contradictory developmental 
tendencies encouraged by CMEA in that Ikarus grew and production rapidly expanded, 
but this development was of type entirely conditional on the price and commodity 
structure of Eastern bloc trade.  This is confirmed by the fact that Ikarus was hit so hard 
by the collapse of CMEA trade (Blahó and Halpern, 1995), so much so that the company 
was declared bankrupt in 1993, although it was subsequently maintained on state 
subsidies at much reduced size.  This was part of a general trend in which Ikarus’ fate 
mirrored that of the economy as a whole.  In 1990-91, Hungarian exports to CMEA fell 
by an astonishing 66% (Sadler and Swain, 1994, p.391).  This was equivalent to 0.5 
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million jobs in a country with a population of only around 10.5 million in 1989.  Although 
Hungary led the other transition economies in the 1990s in terms of attracting foreign 
direct investment, and much of this went into either the automotive or pharmaceutical 
sectors, none-the-less many firms experienced difficulties in maintaining export 
performance and underwent extensive restructuring in order to meet the needs of new 
markets outside the old CMEA area. 
In addition to Ikarus being a bellwether of how the country was faring in 
international trade, an extensive domestic supply network had existed which was also 
badly hit.  These included large companies such as Raba, which produced axles and 
engines for Ikarus, and Csepel which made gearboxes and steering mechanisms also for 
Ikarus.  In total the auto industry employed over 100,000 in 1980s.  More than 90% of 
output went to Soviet Union leaving little doubt as to the significance of these long-term 
contracts for Hungarian economic wellbeing.  In fact, Rodrik (1992) has concluded that 
the decline in real GDP experienced by the Hungarian economy since 1990 can be entirely 
accounted for by the demise of CMEA and the changed trade relation with the 
USSR/Russia that replaced it.  In official figures this decline amounted to 11%. 
   
6. Conclusion  
  
Referring back to the three main theses advanced in the introduction the following 
can be said:  
  
1) Given the organisation of production in Hungary where a series of almost 
monopolistic companies were created before the reforms, the failure of NEM to 
transform the economy can in part be ascribed to the ability of this group to thwart 
moves by the party and state bureaucracy which would have limited their 
autonomy or threatened their privileged position and access to economic surplus.  
This meant that the large enterprises were insulated from competition and this key 
element of the reforms never got off the ground with serious consequences for 
Hungarian industry.  
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2) A case can be made that CMEA membership also played a big role in preventing 
the reforms succeeding.  In particular the period after the oil shock was crucial, 
when the benefits of trade within the bloc became even more substantial.  
  
3) Without claiming Hungarian development was entirely determined by external 
relations, it seems to be possible to recognise the significance of international 
influences which acted upon the party, bureaucracy, and large enterprises and to 
consider this as an instance of dependent development as defined previously.  
  
The theoretical significance of this chapter is that it has shown how an analytical narrative 
of national development can be constructed which takes account of international, most 
significantly but not exclusively regional, dynamics without resorting to the kind of 
structural determinism which would have squeezed agency out of the picture.  By 
discussing the conflicts of interest between elements of the party, bureaucracy and large 
enterprises in terms of the interrelation between them and national and international 
structures, both can be integrated into accounts without over-privileging either.  
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Yugoslavia: Market Socialism outside CMEA  
  
1. Introduction  
  
This chapter provides an account of Yugoslavian market socialism which can be 
compared with the Hungarian historical experience, with the theoretically significant 
difference that Yugoslavia’s foreign economic relations and geopolitical situation differed 
fundamentally from that of Hungary in that Yugoslavia was a European socialist country 
outside the system described in chapter 4.  This will allow comparisons between the 
development problems faced by the two and highlights the effects of the centre/periphery 
system within CMEA on the production and use of economic surplus in Hungary and 
Yugoslavia.  As a non-aligned country with only observer status in CMEA, Yugoslavia 
related to both the Eastern bloc and DMEs in a way that was impossible for Hungary.  The 
core argument of this chapter is that this provided the Yugoslavian leadership with a 
different set of international possibilities and constraints which can in part be seen to have 
circumscribed the course of Yugoslavian development and helps to explain some key 
divergences between the two.  In this way the importance of CMEA for the development 
of the six is underlined.  The most important differences in international context will be 
introduced here.  
  
1. Access to Western credit from the 1950s onwards allowed for the import of 
advanced capital and technology goods and set Yugoslav industry on a 
relatively better footing than elsewhere in Eastern Europe.  
  
2. This benefit was counterbalanced, however, by the foreign debt burden which 
resulted from the failure to export sufficient quantities back to the West.  This 
left the Yugoslav federal government fiscally fragile as a large part of the 
economic surplus had to be used to finance this debt.  Although this problem 
also emerged in Hungary and Poland in the 1980s, it affected Yugoslav 
development earlier and in a different manner due to Yugoslavia’s position 
outside CMEA. 
  
3. By trading with the CMEA countries in convertible currencies, and often to 
obtain essential raw material and energy inputs, less favourable terms of trade 
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were achieved than those common in the bilateral barter arrangements 
prevalent within the bloc.  This meant that Yugoslavia did not benefit from 
the transfers of surplus taking place within CMEA.  
  
The argument is not that these international factors determined the course of 
Yugoslav development, but that they are essential to explaining differences between 
Hungarian and Yugoslav reformed socialism and thus serve to further develop the 
analytical narrative of development within the Eastern bloc by providing a case against 
which individualising comparisons can be made.  Thus the theoretical significance of this 
chapter is that it demonstrates how the reformulation of DT makes comparisons possible 
between economies characterised by some notable similarities (market socialism, East 
European, small, decentralising reforms, similar levels of development), but distinguished 
by being inside or outside CMEA. 
   
2. Comparison with the Hungarian Reforms  
  
In pointing out similarities between Yugoslav and Hungarian development it 
should be possible to isolate in what ways the different international contexts faced by the 
two countries influenced their attempts to reform the Soviet model of socialist economy.  
The aim of the following sections is to highlight how separation from the centre/periphery 
system described in chapter 4 in terms of the idealisation of dependent development given 
in chapter 3 put Yugoslavia in a different position to Hungary.  This is useful to emphasise 
why, in spite of the similarities detailed here, the two market socialist reform processes 
diverged considerably.  
First it is necessary to consider just how distinct Yugoslavia was in relation to the 
rest of the region.  There is a surprising range of opinions on this matter; Bennett (1998) 
even goes as far as to argue that, ‘despite the rhetoric, Yugoslavia’s economic system 
differed little from that of the rest of the Eastern bloc’ (p.68); but in general there was a 
consensus that Yugoslavia’s political economy differed substantially from the traditional 
model, with debate focusing more on the question of how other reform projects could be 
compared.  Bleaney (1988) has claimed Yugoslavia as the only European country to 
significantly deviate from Soviet model, but in the light of the description of the 
Hungarian reforms given in the previous chapter this statement should be questioned.  
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Instead Batt’s (1988) suggestion that the Hungarian uprising and the Yugoslav reforms 
be seen as twin developments signifying both the possibility of and enthusiasm for an 
alternative to the traditional model seems more apt.  It seems logical to make this 
connection given the explicit role the theme of decentralisation played in the Hungarian 
NEM, and therefore it seems permissible to consider the two market socialisms as reform 
processes tending in the same general direct but moving at different paces and in 
fundamentally different international contexts.  
The three most developed areas, Croatia, Slovenia, and Vojvodina, had all been 
part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and shared the pre-war experience of involvement 
in the central European economy that Hungarians also remembered.  This led to a sense 
of resentment on the part of some sections of Hungarian society towards the perceived 
‘backwardness’ of the Soviet bloc into which their country was forceful integrated after 
the war.  As such, the fact that Yugoslavia avoided integration into the twin structures of 
CMEA and the WTO may well have been heralded as a success by economic actors in the 
more developed north.  The awareness that another development path had until recently 
been open may also have played a part in giving the leadership the confidence to break 
with Moscow.  Likewise, both countries exhibited an open and early acceptance of 
weaknesses of planning which took longer to emerge elsewhere, and this may be down in 
part to the shared pre-war history of relative openness and affluence.  
  Reform processes in the two countries both ultimately held true to certain 
conceptualisations appropriate to the traditional model of planning.  It can be revealing to 
view large-scale reform processes both from the perspective of what they alter, as well as 
from the perspective of what they leave unchanged.  This second approach helps to 
identify the unofficial parameters in which agents operated, and from here it can be seen 
that both reforms left notable aspects of the pre-dominant understanding of production 
and economic growth inherited from the Stalinist period of command planning untouched.  
For instance Kabala (1988) has stressed how economic growth based on increased usage 
of fuels and other productive resources remained the goal of Yugoslav planners.  This 
continuity also characterised the Hungarian reforms, which refrained from questioning 
the utility of continuously expanding industrial production without technological 
innovation and did not fully consider other potential uses of economic surplus.  
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  The successful integration of elements of market competition can be seen to have 
played a part in shaping the unusual pattern of industrial successes in both economies.  
Hungary and Yugoslavia both had successful firms in areas non-typical for socialist 
economies–primarily but not exclusively food production and pharmaceuticals in 
Hungary and electronics in Yugoslavia.  Similarly, both faced a common external 
constraint to export expansion in the form of the EEC’s Common Agricultural Policy, 
which stood as a perennial obstacle to the development of potentially profitable beef and 
vegetable exports.  By using ideal-typical methodology, the reformulated version of DT 
is compatible with the idea of plan and market as combinable and directs attention towards 
the specific way the two were blended together in Yugoslavia and Hungary and how these 
processes related to involvement in CMEA or world markets.  
Given the emphasis placed on the bus manufacturer Ikarus in the previous chapter 
and the evidence presented that Hungary engaged in its highest proportion of intra-
industry trade in SITC category 7, the automobile sector might be expected to be on this 
list of industrial successes.  However, I argue that the success of Ikarus can be exclusively 
attributed to the nature of CMEA trade and integration and so should not be considered 
‘non-typical’ as it was dependent on Soviet largesse.  These other successes link to the 
decentralising nature of the reforms, since these firms were more able to respond to 
consumer demand in large part because their supply networks differed to those in the rest 
of the socialist world in that more autonomy was allowed for low-level units which were 
not so inflexibly integrated into large hierarchies characterised by top-down command 
structures. 
Despite these similarities, the specificity of Yugoslav development needs to be 
emphasised when compared to the other European socialist economies.  For this reason a 
reasonably detailed account of Yugoslav development is needed in order that the 
reformulated DT not lapse back into ahistorical generalisations about economies with 
some similarities.  The rest of this chapter highlights the significance of Yugoslavia 
exclusion from CMEA as a key factor in explaining these differences.  This initial 
separation was the product of the politics of subordination under Stalin, and the fact that 
Yugoslavia never gained full membership of CMEA can be seen as evidence of the fact 
that political concerns as they related to socialist trade changed after Stalin but did not 
disappear. 
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3. Yugoslav Economy and Society, 1945-50  
  
Characterisation of the Yugoslav political economy was problematic owing to its 
unique combination of plan and market, where the production and allocation of surplus 
was regulated not by a competitive price mechanism or a central bureaucracy but by 
processes of consultation and negotiation between autonomous units coordinating within 
a multi-layered institutional structure.  Yugoslavia was also a contrast of rich, industrial 
north (Croatia and Slovenia) and poor south, as well as of a social sector and small-hold 
private agriculture and craft-industries.  Table 17 describes the scale of regional 
differences in 1986.  This made Yugoslavia similar to the USSR, in that federal 
administration co-existed and interacted with lower levels of administration based around 
the six constituent republics (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, 
Serbia, and Slovenia), the two autonomous provinces (Vojvodina and Kosovo, both 
within Serbia), and finally the communes. 
In 1945 the Balkans were overwhelmingly rural even in comparison with rest of  
Eastern Europe, meaning there was little pre-existing industrial capacity to be relied upon. 
In addition to the initial shortage of capital and the low productivity of existing capital 
stock, Yugoslavia like the rest of Eastern Europe did not possess the energy resources for 
self-contained development and so would always have to rely on international trade for 
certain key resources.  Uniquely for territories liberated from Nazi control, Yugoslavia 
had a large, well organised and ultimately successful resistance movement, and this 
placed post-war Yugoslavian leaders in a fundamentally different position visa vie 
Moscow than their counterparts elsewhere in that the domestic support-base of the party 
gave it more autonomy and therefore more options.  However, until the relationship began 
to sour in 1948, Tito and the party leadership were not prone to questioning either the 
dominant position of the USSR or the need to work closely together to achieve security 
and development.  
  It was in this context that the new constitution of 1946 was passed which 
nationalised all industry and gave the state a monopoly on foreign trade in the Soviet-
approved style.  Whilst the first half of the first 5-year plan was a notable success, the 
split with Moscow in 1949, finalised by the second Cominform resolution of November, 
29th, which expelled the Yugoslavian party from the assembly, had major consequences 
as the Soviet’s launched an economic blockade at the time when strategic imports of 
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capital goods and fuels were so crucial.  Whilst the rest of Eastern Europe was receiving 
the goods they needed from the USSR at unilaterally imposed and unfavourable prices 
under Stalin, Yugoslavia received nothing at all from the USSR and this exclusion was 
much more economically injurious.  DT can be sensitive to instances like this where 
development is negatively impacted by an international relation, but such instances fall 
outside the ideal-type used here which is concerned with trade within recognisable 
centre/periphery systems.  The effects of this were compounded by droughts in 1950 and 
1952 which pushed down agricultural yields, and meanwhile the perceived need to divert 
funds towards military expansion hindered capital formation in other sectors. 
  However, even before the blockade and the unfavourable weather conditions, the 
ending of UN aid in 1947, which had until then maintained the liquidity of the federal 
government and allowed for essential imports from the West, meant that for the next two 
years the pressure of producing for export and restricting domestic consumption 
prevented the leadership from affecting the balance in the economy between industry and 
agriculture.  The availability of Western credit arrangements thus stood for a key 
structural limit to how quickly the Yugoslav economy could expand, and this early 
awareness that development for a small, agricultural economy would inevitably be 
dependent on the international context was firmly imprinted on the collective memory of 
the party at this time.  Estrin (1991, p.191) argues that Yugoslav growth was dependent 
on borrowing to the point that it effectively ended after it became harder to borrow in 
1979, and this implies that the Yugoslav economy’s ability to generate the surplus outside 
CMEA needed for development was heavily dependent on international finance long 
before this became true for the other European socialist states within CMEA. 
Given these structural constraints and the uniquely independent basis of the 
Yugoslavia communist party, it is understandable that Yugoslavia decided to take a 
different path, one which involved realigning both her international relations and 
transforming domestic social relations.  Although many of these same economic 
constraints also affected other East European socialist countries at this time, the 
dominance of Stalinist elements within their parties and membership of CMEA and WTO 
gave them a discretely different agency to Tito’s party.  Accordingly the reform tendency 
did not appear elsewhere until later, and in generally less radical forms, and this seems to 
support the previous argument that CMEA membership tended to act as a check on how 
far reformers could go whilst remaining within CMEA. 
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The change of direction was described by Yugoslav theorists in terms of a 
distinction between direct and indirect socialism, with direct standing for enterprise self-
management and democratic decision-making rather than the Soviet administrative 
conception where a mass-membership party and state bureaucracy govern on behalf of 
and (supposedly) in the interests of the working class (Singleton and Carter, 1982, p.120).  
As was discussed in the context of the aftermath of the Hungarian uprising, it was the 
party’s indirect form of socialism that won-out and guided the subsequent Hungarian 
reform process.  As such, the central role of self-management in the Yugoslav reforms 
fundamentally separates them from those in Hungary and elsewhere.  Linking with the 
previous analysis of how CMEA related to the Hungarian reforms, I would argue that self-
management would have been incompatible with processes of production and exchange 
encouraged within CMEA which needed the stability best provided by traditional 
planning and thus imposed limits on how far decentralisation could go. 
The significance of Western aid from this time onwards is apparent from a DT 
perspective which has already argued the development of the other European socialist 
economies was dependent on the massive transfers of surplus within CMEA.  This 
Western support manifested itself in the 1950s in aid which effectively financed the trade 
deficits of the period as Yugoslavia returned to the policy of the first years of planning 
whereby imports were prioritised and a substantial current account deficit was deemed an 
acceptable price to pay for the productivity gains capital imports could generate 
(Weisskopf, 1976, p.38).  The fluctuating but generally favourable access to Western 
markets from the 1950s onwards facilitated by Yugoslavia’s geopolitical independence 
from Moscow stands for a major structural difference between the international context 
of Yugoslavian development in relation to the other socialist economies.  In this way, 
Yugoslavia’s development has to be situated in the context of Cold War East-West 
antagonism, just as Hungary’s was, for it was the split with Moscow that paved the way 
for the development of a dependent relation with Western finance for Yugoslavia 
significantly earlier than was the case for CMEA members. 
 
4. Market Socialism outside CMEA  
  
By 1950 Yugoslavia stood-out from the rest of Eastern Europe as a country facing 
significantly different development possibilities and constraints as a result of the split with 
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Moscow and the lack of involvement in the CMEA centre/periphery system.  The next 
sections trace how development proceeded from here and shows how the problems that 
developed can be related back to the structures and agents relevant to Yugoslavia’s 
political economy, and how the difference between these and those in Hungary need to 
be related to international context.  Having taken the first steps towards a new system of 
socialist economy, I suggest that until the mid-1980s a form of development similar to 
that which took place in Hungary occurred, with the difference that Yugoslavia stood in 
fundamentally different relations to the world market and CMEA.  Chossudovsky (1996) 
and Estrin (1991) have both drawn attention to the success of the Yugoslav economy, with 
growth averaging 6% up to the late 1970s. 
  
4.1 Development until 1985  
  
First, it is necessary to set-out the institutional structure that began to emerge in 
the 1950s and set the control mechanisms of the Yugoslavia apart from other socialist 
economies.  Two key legislative acts, both passed in 1950, were the Act on Planned 
Management of the National Economy, which replaced command with indicative 
planning, and the Basic Law on the Management of State Economic Enterprises, which 
made self-management the guiding principle of the economy.  These changes were 
followed in 1953 by a new constitution and the creation of the League of Communists, a 
new entity with only regulatory influence over economic affairs.  Investment decisions 
were still controlled centrally until the 1965 reforms which strengthened the principle of 
competition between firms and limited federal intervention.  Bleaney (1988) sees 1965 as 
the year after which the decentralising process ended as firms acquired significant power 
over the use of economic surplus.  Although the mid-1960s were a period of reform in the 
Soviet bloc as well, on the decentralisation of investment the Yugoslavs went 
considerably further.  This was accompanied by the decentralisation of administration as 
self-management empowered the communes over the republics in many policy areas.  
Elected workers councils became the highest authority within each firm and were charged 
with the appointment of directors from a short-list chosen by a selection committee, one 
third of which had been nominated previously by the workers council, with the League 
also having a substantial say in the matter.  
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  These structural changes meant that Yugoslav agents faced discretely different 
possibilities to those in Hungary.  Although federal plans were still formulated, the 
autonomy of the self-managed firms meant that these macro-plans were purely indicative; 
although they signalled the broad outline of how the state wanted development to 
progress, communes and enterprises were free to decide how much they would commit 
to the realisation of these plans.  In Hungary, a fairly clear distinction between the interests 
of the large enterprises and the interests of the party leadership was identified; in 
Yugoslavia the more thorough decentralising process meant numerous economic 
interests, large and small, could articulate themselves against the centre.  
 Like in Hungary where close links between the large enterprises and CMEA 
markets were identified and related to the reform process, economic agents in Yugoslavia 
can also be seen to have been interrelated to the reforms and the international context.  In 
terms of variable responses to the reforms from the north and south, it is notable that 
richer regions consistently wanted more liberalisation and firm autonomy, not only 
because most of the firms who could succeed in a competitive environment were located 
in the north, but also as this meant less federally-enforced wealth redistribution.  This 
structure of regionally uneven development came to be represented within the structure 
of the party; Woodward (1986, p.514) comments that organisationally conservative 
politicians tended to come from southern, poorer regions which relied on protectionist 
measures, while economic liberals were usually based in outward-oriented, northern 
cities.   
In terms of aspirations for engaging in trade, there was a significant difference 
between firms located in the northern republics, which showed considerably more 
enthusiasm for international trade with the West rather than internal exchange with the 
‘backwards’ southern republics, who in turn wanted closer links with the East.  While 
Serbia was keen to export to the USSR and expand links with the CMEA area, Slovenia 
and Croatia wanted to produce at a higher quality and export to West.  These two 
orientations were also influenced by the nature of particular firms; Yugoslav importers 
preferred to import from the West due to considerations of quality, while many exporters 
wanted to export to the East where prices were higher and markets less demanding (Prout, 
1985).  Thus the pre-existing uneven development characteristic of Yugoslavia was 
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reinforced by the dual nature of Yugoslavia international orientation towards both East 
and West, the requirements of success in each context being contradictory to one another.  
The decentralisation of investment decisions after 1965 was a turning point in the 
regional distribution of surplus since after this investment tended to be concentrated in 
the north where its marginal productivity was highest, and Flaherty (1988) has presented 
evidence that regional differences actually widened in Yugoslavia.  As such the 
investment reforms exposed a contradiction between the socialist goal of equalising levels 
of development and the economic imperative that resources be used efficiently.  Although 
this contradiction affected all socialist countries, it was especially significant for market 
socialist systems in which decentralisation had handed some decision-making power over 
to economic agents with substantial autonomy to maximise their own welfare instead of 
following the plan.  
The 1960s saw the emergence of a series of problems specific to Yugoslavia which 
need to be related to Yugoslavia’s position outside the centre/periphery relation discussed 
earlier.  Foremost of these problems was that growth slowed noticeably in the early 1960s 
after the trade deficit expanded in 1959.  This exposure to world trade was in contrast to 
the high growth and stability enjoyed at the time by Hungary within CMEA.  This 
culminated in a minor crisis as the value of exports as a percentage of imports continued 
to decline.  Simultaneously, another persistent problem was emerging which set 
Yugoslavia apart, inflation.  This hit a devastating peak in 1989 when the consumer price 
index increased by a staggering 2,700%.  Whilst inflationary pressures were hidden 
elsewhere in Eastern Europe by price controls, meaning inflation was expressed instead 
as shortages, Yugoslavia’s different control mechanisms contributed to inflation 
becoming unmanageable.  Significantly, the dinar was allowed to float within parameters 
set by the central bank, and this allowed some linkage between price changes on world 
markets and domestic prices (Tyson and Neuberger, 1980, p.215).  Compared to other 
NICs, and certainly to the rest of Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia was highly open to the 
transmission of wmp changes to the domestic economy meaning economic agents were 
not sheltered from the pressure to produce competitively as much as they were in 
Hungary.  
In the 1960s unemployment also appeared as a large-scale phenomenon.  The early 
1950s had seen the official recognition of the party that unemployment could exist under 
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socialism.  From this time onwards the number of people seeking unemployment benefits 
in Yugoslavia made it stand out from the rest of the socialist world where full employment 
(albeit with a large proportion of people being underemployed) was the norm.  This 
ailment was also affected by structural dichotomies peculiar to Yugoslavia: social/private, 
north/south.  The contradiction arose from the fact that those outside the social sector 
usually had less job security, and since the social sector in the south was less developed 
than in the north this too came to be seen as an example of uneven development in that 
the use of the surplus to alleviate this social problem was generally supported in the south 
and opposed in the north.  
Finally, several problems can be attributed explicitly to the weakness of central 
institutions which could not provide for sufficient policy coordination between the 
republics.  This weakness of the federal state in relation to lower-levels of administration 
was a key difference between Yugoslavia and Hungary.  For example, the growth of 
power generating facilities did not keep pace with industrial requirements and was 
inappropriately distributed between the republics.  Serbia had surplus power-generating 
capacity but could not transfer electricity to other republics due to insufficient inter-
republic grid infrastructure.  This meant that high energy consuming republics like 
Slovenia and Croatia had to import energy from Italy and Austria at peak times.  Partly 
because of this, the Krško Nuclear Power Plant in Slovenia was constructed to provide 
power where it was needed.  The plant went into commercial operation in 1983 after the 
American company, Westinghouse, had been brought in to oversee its construction.  This 
nuclear collaboration with a US company would have been unthinkable had Yugoslavia 
not been non-aligned.  
  
4.2 Foreign Debt  
  
In addition to the issues above, foreign debt needs to be given special significance 
because it originated explicitly from the altered set of international relations Yugoslavia 
created after the split outside the structures of CMEA.  Whilst in the 1950s and 1960s this 
was generally positive enabling imports of Western capital goods, after the oil shocks and 
the Western recession, repayment schemes became stricter and the debt burden grew 
dramatically.  According to Brown (1993), debt to foreign lenders was around $20 billion 
in the 1980s; ‘in most of that decade this was the equivalent of over a quarter of the 
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national income, and debt servicing took up some 20% of all Yugoslavia’s annual exports 
of goods and services’ (p.148).  This amounted to a major drain on economic surplus 
faced by Yugoslavia.  Table 18 describes the commodity composition of Yugoslavia’s 
foreign trade, averaged from 1980-84 values, from which the high proportion of raw 
materials and petroleum in Yugoslav imports can be seen.  Together petroleum and raw 
materials accounted for almost 40% of imports, and accordingly it is easy to see why 
Yugoslavia’s foreign debt grew very quickly in the 1970s.  Tyson and Neuberger (1980, 
p.213) calculate that wmp changes in the 1970s meant a net deterioration of 10.5% in 
Yugoslavia’s terms of trade.  Had Yugoslavia been a full member of CMEA, the price 
formulas described in previous chapters would have acted to cushion the impact of these 
rises, although as has been pointed out, other East European socialist economies also got 
into serious debt problems due to their import of Western capital goods and use of credit 
to finance the maintenance or rise of living-standards. 
Accordingly the policy choices open to Yugoslavia varied from those open to 
Hungary.  Several policy responses practiced by Hungary as well as other net oil importers 
were not open to Yugoslavia as a result of the reforms.  For instance, Hungary responded 
to the price rises by instituting central controls over foreign resources and moving to limit 
the power of the large enterprises, while the Yugoslav government was too weak to 
impose centrally-directed use of foreign resources.  Initially the commodity price rises 
were dealt with by allowing the current account to go into deficit; in the 1980s a more 
active approach was taken and Yugoslavia tried to change its trade structure by reducing 
non-essential imports and boosting exports.  Just as this generated pressure for the six to 
remain close to the USSR and so reinforced the centre/periphery relation, even as the 
limits to the dependent development it signified were so apparent, there was an attempt 
to raise the proportion of Yugoslav exports going to CMEA in order to procure more oil 
at slightly below wmps from the Soviet Union in return (Tyson, 1980, p.91). 
If the process of dependent development within CMEA reached its limit in the 
1980s, for Yugoslavia foreign debt was arguably the core economic problem which the 
federal government failed to solve, and this undermined the successful development 
processes of the previous decades.  Failure to deal with the debt sapped the authority of 
the federal government and simultaneously limited the range of policies that could be 
pursued (Woodward, 1995, p.238).  It became a federal article of faith that foreign loans 
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could not be defaulted on as development for a non-aligned socialist economy depended 
on maintaining international credit worthiness.  In previous chapters it has been 
commented on that in the absence of popular elections, the communist parties of Eastern 
Europe came to see development, broadly construed, as one of the key legitimating 
discourses of their power.  As such, this inability of the federal institutions to legitimise 
themselves by adjusting to the changed international conditions–and thus allowing the 
development process to stall–irreparably damaged their standing domestically in relation 
to lower levels of administration.  
  
4.3 Self-management in Theory and Practice  
  
As the central principle of the Yugoslav reforms, and the key motif which 
distinguishes them from those in Hungary, it is necessary to discuss self-management in 
theory and practice.  In the development of self-management, a pragmatic and 
evolutionary approach characterised the process of change, and to justify the new policy 
the Yugoslavs developed a theory which questioned assumptions about the transition to 
socialism and took a critical stance towards Soviet Marxism.  The original theoretical 
literature on Yugoslav market socialism is well summarised by Milenkovitch (1971).  
Central was an implicit acceptance of plan and market as ideal-types, so questions of 
various combinations and transitory stages were considered.  
However, the Yugoslav theory did not adequately take account of conflicts of 
interest that arose from this process.  As Lydall (1989) has pointed out, ‘What is missing 
from this utopian view is a recognition not only of conflicts of interest between the 
workers in an enterprise and ‘society’, but also of conflicts of interest between different 
groups of workers within an enterprise’ (p.104).  An example of this in the case of a 
prominent Yugoslav firm will be discussed later, and to the list of conflicts of interests 
arising from the mix of plan and market in Yugoslavia can be added that between party 
leadership and local administrators.  Doder (1979) offers an example of this:  
  
The self-managers of Titograd’s customs office voted to give their deputy chief an 
$18,000 loan at 2 percent annually [a highly favourable rate].  Three years later, 
in 1975, when the party reasserted its controls, criminal charges were brought 
against the men involved in the [case]… six employees of the Titograd customs 
who had voted the loan to their deputy chief were given prison terms from six to 
twelve months (p.103).  
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This illustrates the conflict of interests between top federal and party officials concerned 
with the technocratic administration of the economy, and other workers or groups of 
workers who saw in the decentralisation of economic rights chances for increased access 
to economic surplus. 
  In this way the practical realities of self-management can be seen to have 
generated a series of conflicts of interest between different groups within the Yugoslav 
political economy different from the conflicts of interest discussed in the previous chapter.  
The different forms of agency in the two market socialist economies need to be located in 
terms of the different structures (both national and international) which defined the 
parameters within which agents operated.  From a DT perspective, the most significant 
structural difference was that one was within CMEA and the other outside.  
  
4.4 Tito, Yugoslavia, and the Non-aligned Movement  
  
The non-aligned movement is significant in this regard as an emblem of the unique 
geopolitical position of Yugoslavia.  Yugoslavia played a leading role in the movement 
from its inauguration in 1961 as a loose collection of developing nations who wanted to 
avoid the security consequences of association with either of the Cold War superpowers.  
As a founder and key spokes-person, Tito’s personal involvement cannot be separated out 
from Yugoslav involvement in the movement.  Participation in the non-aligned movement 
was perhaps the most symbolic way Yugoslavia distinguished itself from the rest of 
socialist Europe to the international community.  This significance has not always been 
appreciated.  For instance, Lendvai and Parcell (1991) ask, ‘who could have predicted 
that Yugoslavia would undergo the worst crisis of its post-war history just at the point 
[early 1990s] when the East-West divide was being overcome and against the background 
of the almost total disappearance of an external threat to its existence?’ (p.251).  This can 
be answered by pointing-out that Yugoslav development benefited considerably from this 
divide and in some sense cannot be explained independently from the fractured global 
context of the Cold War period. 
Non-alignment allowed partial access to Western markets on account of 
Yugoslavia’s separation from the Eastern bloc centre/periphery system, as well as the 
existence of some valuable trade and cooperation agreements within the non-aligned bloc 
which might otherwise not have existed.  There was a viable joint economic venture 
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between Iskra (to be discussed later) and the Asian Electronics Company of Bombay, 
although as Wilson (1980, p.183n) has emphasised there were relatively few 
economically beneficial arrangements of this type.  This became a sort of comparative 
advantage internationally and boosted Yugoslavia’s diplomatic profile–a fact Tito himself 
understood and pursued consistently.  Yugoslavia was hit by end of Cold War as this 
exogenous development terminated her special status and the non-aligned movement lost 
much of its significance after this point.  Accordingly I suggest that Yugoslavia’s non-
aligned status possessed symbolic significance as an expression of independence from 
Moscow, and this guaranteed a freer hand in international markets than any other 
European socialist country could achieve from within CMEA.  
  
4.5 Yugoslavia, USSR and CMEA  
  
Throughout the account given above, little reference has been made to the Soviet 
Union or CMEA; this raises the question as to how significant the Eastern bloc was for 
the development of Yugoslavia?  Chapter 4 argued that CMEA constituted a system of 
regional trade and development within the world economy, and since Yugoslavia was 
outside this arrangement but shared some notable similarities with the rest of Eastern 
Europe, it is useful to consider relations to the Eastern bloc to draw more focus onto the 
comparison with Hungary.  Linking with the periodisation of CMEA trade given in 
chapter 4, it is significant that it was Khrushchev who sought to mend relations by visiting 
Belgrade in 1955 in the face of bitter opposition from Molotov.  In fact, during the process 
of destalinization begun by Khrushchev, only two parts of Stalin’s foreign policy were 
criticized: military unpreparedness on the eve of WWII, and the unduly harsh and 
counterproductive treatment of Yugoslavia (and by extension the rest of Eastern Europe) 
(Gati, 1980).  The re-opening of diplomatic relations and the gradual increase in economic 
relations can be interpreted as one more plank of Khrushchev’s strategic choice of scaling-
down military posturing and returning to normalized international relations, although this 
did not involve granting the same economic concessions which CMEA members received, 
which was effectively forbidden by Yugoslavia’s commitment to non-aligned status. 
The relative significance of East and West to Yugoslavia can be gauged from table 
19.  While the importance of the two blocs as locations for Yugoslav exports fluctuated, 
imports from the West consistently outstripped those from the East as a percentage of the 
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total.  This confirms that Yugoslav development cannot be considered to have been 
dependent in the sense that it was for the six.  Although Yugoslavia was granted the 
special status of associate member of CMEA in 1964, it is notable that Yugoslavia tended 
to trade with CMEA countries in convertible currencies and at wmps and as such did not 
receive the transfers of surplus the rest of the region did.  The commodity composition of 
this trade should also be taken into account.  The Soviet share of Yugoslavian imports by 
SITC categories can be seen in table 20.  Bearing in mind that SITC 2 and 3, which form 
such a large share of Soviet goods imported by Yugoslavia, are energy and raw material 
categories, the fact that Yugoslavia paid higher prices for these goods than could have 
been achieved within CMEA is important.  Given the descriptions of the systematic 
deviations observed from wmps in Soviet trade with the rest of Eastern Europe, this is a 
major difference in terms of the external conditions faced by Yugoslavia and Hungary, 
one which can be seen as a consequences of Tito’s assertion of Yugoslavia’s geopolitical 
independence.  
  
4.6 Iskra, Electronics Manufacturer  
  
As in the previous chapter, a case-study of a company is included to illustrate some 
of the themes raised above.  The market socialist dream of an industrially-advanced 
economy with small enterprises owned and operated by their employees existing in a 
macroeconomic climate characterised by low unemployment, efficient administration, 
and successful international trade links, was realised to some degree in the northern 
republics, and especially in Slovenia.  Based in Slovenia, Iskra is an example of the 
relatively successful northern economy which managed to produce high-quality, mass-
market electronic goods, some of which were competitive on Western markets (Vukic, 
2010).  Several interesting things about Yugoslavia’s political economy can be highlight 
by looking at Iskra. 
  The self-management motif to the Yugoslav reforms distinguished them from 
those in Hungary, and arguably this conception was unlikely to have been put into practice 
within CMEA due to the volume of trade within the bloc and its tendency to reinforce 
traditional planning methods.  The reality of conflicts of interest under self-management 
and the actual limitations to worker control can be seen from the following incident.  In 
1967-8 Iskra was manufacturing automatic telephone exchanges for the German 
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company, Siemans. The Novo Mesto branch supplied resistors to the parent company in 
Kranj, but at some point realised it was more profitable to sell directly to the Germans 
and so tried to secede in 1967.  The decision went through all necessary resolutions of 
workers councils and to a general vote of the whole workforce before the director stepped 
in and suspended the workers council in Novo Mesto and instituted direct management 
for one year, after which the secessionists lost the crucial vote (Singleton and Carter, 
1982).  So when self-management would have meant the dismembering of a nationally-
significant firm, central management ultimately proved capable of over-ruling worker 
councils in the interests of preserving the company as a single entity.  
Doder (1979) has reported a manager at an unnamed electronics firm (which may 
or may not have been Iskra but can be assumed to have been a similar company if not) as 
saying, ‘Self-management… is helpful for smoothing industrial relations.  But what is 
really important is that his firm was making solid profits and that the workers were making 
good wages’ (p.102).  This provides a good example of how when these two imperatives 
came into conflict, more often than not the profits of the entire combined enterprise were 
prioritised over the profits of the constituent production units like the plant at Novo Mesto.  
Arguably this is because the secession of a small branch enjoying a relatively high profit 
rate could have opened the door to the possibility of workers more easily raising wages 
than they could have within a large enterprise where various institutional bodies would 
have had to be involved in any such decision.  
Looking at how the two case-study companies fared after the end of socialism is 
also revealing.  To give a quick reminder, Ikarus struggled after the collapse of CMEA 
trade, but was eventually preserved after state intervention and a series of painful mergers 
and restructurings. In contrast, Iskra quickly split into a number of smaller companies 
concentrating on areas the previous combine had had genuine comparative advantages in.  
These daughter companies succeeded in foreign markets after the Cold War as suppliers 
of components to final manufacturers (Dyker et al, 2003).  This implies that Ikarus could 
only survive within CMEA, while Iskra was more efficient in the first place and so parts 
of it survived.  I argue that this was partly due to the fact that Yugoslavia had been outside 
CMEA, and so had not experienced a development process–unlike Hungary and the rest 
of the six–that tended to generate structures of production which could only export within 
CMEA and faced extreme difficult in other markets. 
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5. Conclusion  
  
Despite the substantial similarities to be found between Hungary and Yugoslavia, 
market socialism outside the structural context provided by CMEA trade and integration 
patterns and the transfers of surplus they entailed must be considered as fundamentally 
different from market socialism within CMEA.  That the root cause of Yugoslavia’s 
absence from CMEA was Tito’s decision to assert Yugoslav independence from Moscow 
further reinforces the general argument that the Soviet geopolitical project of maintaining 
communist power in Eastern Europe under Soviet leadership is essential to understanding 
CMEA trade.  Thus the problems that came with the development process in Yugoslavia 
(unemployment, inflation, foreign debt, etc.) were specific to the political economy of 
Yugoslavia as it developed since the 1949 split with Stalin and the USSR, and this cannot 
be understood in isolation from the international context that set Yugoslavia apart from 
the other socialist countries of Europe.  This supports the contention that dependent 
development provides a useful frame for the analysis of trade and development in the 
Eastern bloc by showing how a country outside this system experienced a significantly 
different development process in spite of numerous similarities.  As will be returned to in 
the concluding chapter, the fact that this account drew on ideas from the reformulation of 
DT to show the interrelation between international and domestic factors in the case of a 
country outside the centre/periphery system earlier focused on, this perhaps points the 
way to one approach to the question of the transferability of the ideal-type which will be 
discussed further later–namely, the potential separation of the theoretical concept of 
dependent development from the centre/periphery paradigm. 
  
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
202  
  
Conclusion: What Did Dependency Theory Add?  What Has Been Added to 
Dependency Theory?  
  
Two questions will be focused on in summarising this study: What does this tell 
us about DT?  And what has DT told us about Eastern bloc trade?    
  
1. Research Questions  
  
This thesis has attempted to answer certain questions about the nature of 
international economic relations within the Eastern bloc and their implications for 
development, and in so doing to demonstrate the continued relevance of a form of 
dependency analysis.  Considering the two primary questions, the following can be said.  
  
1. What were the intentions and effects of Soviet trade policy with Eastern Europe 
between 1945-89?  
  
By arguing that the USSR aimed to secure Eastern Europe within the Soviet bloc 
partly through a policy of trade and integration which effectively subsidised the East 
European economies at Soviet expense, a coherent account of the reform of CMEA ftps 
in the 1950s can be generated.  The high value attached to this geopolitical objective can 
be inferred from the continuance of the system of subsidised trade right until the end of 
the Cold War.  However, from the 1960s onwards, the USSR was increasingly aware of 
the relatively poor quality of the goods Eastern Europe exported back in return, and 
repeatedly attempted to get a better deal, especially after 1973.  From this time, two 
conflicting intentions were at work, one technocratic, one geopolitical.  Gorbachev was 
the first Soviet leader to take the technocratic position as seriously as the geopolitical one, 
although by this time the geopolitical dynamics of trade within CMEA were extremely 
well established.  The fact that powerful interests in Eastern Europe wanted subsidised 
trade to continue (large enterprises who liked the soft contracts, as well as party leaders 
who saw their countries as net beneficiaries), reinforced this tendency and made 
substantive change to CMEA practices highly improbable before the ending of East-West 
antagonism. 
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The effects were that economic development in Eastern Europe became dependent 
on trade with the USSR at skewed prices through which they obtained essential energy 
and raw material inputs.  The only way to procure these goods was to engage in barter 
trade with the USSR via CMEA, since the structural intertwining of East European 
industry with Soviet supply networks and final markets made these industrial economies 
ill-adapted to export elsewhere.  Therefore production could expand only so long as this 
trade system was maintained and the quantity of goods moving within it increased.  For 
the USSR, the results were the maintenance of the bloc until 1989, and the exacerbation 
of tendencies already at work in the Soviet economy relating to the 
consumption/investment debate, the allocation of investment resources (especially 
towards energy and defence production), and the predisposition of industrial managers to 
scale over quality.  The fundamental difference between this account and others reviewed 
in chapter 2 is that it places the idea of dependent development at the centre of the 
narrative, in contradistinction to the general usage of similar terms without giving clear 
definitions.  This account distinguishes itself from prior DT work on CMEA by its explicit 
reformulation of DT in a new direction, rather than by simply applying the models 
developed by Frank, Cardoso, and others.  By using the concept of dependent 
development as defined in chapter 3, the motivation behind the Soviet decision to 
subsidise Eastern Europe can be understood, as can the effects the subsidies had on the 
smaller socialist economies and on the USSR itself.  
  
2. Can DT be developed through a consideration of this historical case?  
  
This thesis argued throughout that DT can be revised and developed in a 
significant manner through its deployment in relation to the specific case study of CMEA.  
This will be covered in more detail below, but the most essential point to be made is that 
the historical account given in this thesis is only possible once a concept of dependent 
development is used, but that this concept had to be (re)developed in relation to 
considering this historical material since classical DT makes claims which 
straightforwardly contradict the evidence available about Eastern bloc trade and 
development.  
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Referring back to the three secondary research questions presented in the 
introduction, the following answers may be given.  
 
1. Taking into account the high volume of trade within the bloc, what were the 
dynamics of economic interaction between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe? 
  
Whilst under Stalin, the USSR acted much as many theories of imperialism would 
predict by extracting surplus from the subordinate countries and unilaterally dictating 
terms of trade, such a description is inaccurate from 1956 onwards.  After this point, a 
historically-unique system of trade set the region on a path of development which cannot 
be comprehended within the confines of classical DT but which can usefully be 
characterised as dependent none-the-less.  
  
2. How did the structure of trade in terms of prices, quantities, and commodity 
composition relate to development? 
  
Once Khrushchev had replaced Stalin, a new dynamic can be observed in which 
the dominant USSR willingly subordinated its own economic interests to those of the 
smaller socialist states by instigating a system of subsidised trade with Eastern Europe.  
The expansion of production in Eastern Europe was rendered dependent on the 
continuance of the import/export relation to the USSR through CMEA whereby 
undervalued Soviet resources were exchanged against overvalued East European 
manufactures.  I argue the USSR did this to make Eastern Europe dependent on the Soviet 
economy and in so doing to ensure the geopolitical goal of maintaining communist power 
in the region under Soviet leadership.  DT is especially well-placed to discuss this in 
comparison to the other frames discussed in the literature review, all of which lacked a 
specific concept of dependence whilst tending to acknowledge its significance.  
  
3. What were the implications of this system of international economic relations for 
structures of production in Hungary, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union itself 
during this period?  
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This system of exchange had a profound effect on structures of production across 
the bloc and must be integrated into any account seeking to explain the economic 
development of the region over the Cold War period.  For the Soviet ‘centre’, this took 
the form of an increased demand for investment in fuel and materials extraction, 
processing and transportation facilities, the products of which were exported at a loss 
against East European industrial goods which could not be sold on the world market due 
to their low quality and high production cost.  The version of DT used in this thesis helped 
to account for this by giving clearly defined structural concepts (for example, relative 
levels of intra-industry trade) which provided the context within which discussions of 
agency could be situated.  Similarly, the version of DT developed here allowed for the 
analysis of nationally-specific development trajectories within this regional system by 
conceptualising development as a contested international process which needs to be 
related to factors both inside and outside of the bloc. 
 
4.  How did this regional system of trade and development relate to the wider context 
of the Cold War? 
 
I argue that trade and development within the Eastern bloc cannot be fully 
comprehended without relating them to the dynamics of East-West antagonism and 
competition.  Most centrally, the geopolitical antagonism of the Cold War is essential to 
understanding the extra-economic significance attached to intra-bloc trade by post-Stalin 
Soviet leaderships.  The post-Stalin crisis of Soviet authority, both in the region and as 
the unquestioned vanguard of the international communist movement, as epitomised by 
the wide-spread social unrest in Eastern Europe after 1953, is the necessary background 
to understand why the introduction of vast economic incentives in the form of subsidised 
trade were introduced at this time.  This system secured for the Soviet Union geopolitical 
status and security; the fact that armed intervention, most significantly in Czechoslovakia 
in 1968, was still needed shows the instability of this strategy in that ultimately military 
power was still the final enforcer of Soviet authority in the bloc.  This and other 
contradictions in this Soviet strategy emerge most clearly once the bloc is set in the 
context of global political and economic development. 
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This primacy of geopolitics in international economic relations was argued to 
originate partly in the international context and manner in which industrialisation was 
carried out in the USSR under Stalin, and that one of the most significance legacies of 
this period was the prioritisation of heavy industry, and of defence production within this 
category.  This gave the Soviet economy a particular character which influenced the 
foundation and evolution of CMEA in that it was symbolic of the tendency to prioritise 
geopolitical and security objectives over purely economic considerations.  Related to this, 
the structural impact of uneven capitalist development outside of the bloc also has to be 
mentioned at this was argued to be vital for comparatively assessing the development 
pattern internal to CMEA.  This was especially true from the 1970s onwards when 
developments external to the bloc (chiefly, the oil shocks; the increased East-West trade 
due to détente; the exposure of the Eastern bloc to Western debt; and the technology lag 
in relation to DMEs and some NICs) became of great significance in terms of highlighting 
the contradictory nature of development within the bloc. 
The oil price rises of the 1970s were important for underlining both the growing 
severity of the costs the system of subsidised trade imposed on the USSR, and for the 
inefficient and anachronistic mode of industrial development this facilitated in Eastern 
Europe.  The increase in East-West trade from détente onwards, and the fact that the 
Eastern bloc economies stood in relations of noticeable and growing technological 
inferiority to the West, further highlighted the contradictory nature of dependent 
development in the bloc.  The emergence of a series of serious debt crises, notably in 
Poland and Hungary, in the 1980s emphasised this unhealthy asymmetrical relation, in 
which the East exported raw materials, semi-manufacturers and foodstuffs to the West in 
return for finished products and capital goods; ironically this resembled the classical 
description of external dependency. 
In this way, the 1980s have to be conceptualised as the period in which the 
contradictions in the process of dependent development within the bloc became too acute, 
and fundamental change became a question of ‘when’ rather than ‘if’.  This was in 
contradistinction to earlier periods when the ideological proposition that state planning 
was a superior form of economic organisation and would eventually out-compete 
capitalism seemed plausible, and this was earlier argued to partly account for the failure 
to develop a genuinely socialist theory and practice of trade 
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2. Rethinking Dependency Theory  
  
Turning to what has been learnt about DT, a core claim of this thesis is that the 
dependency perspective can still be a useful frame of analysis for asymmetrical 
international economic relations.  However, changes need to be made from the classics of 
the dependency tradition.  Accordingly, chapter 3 began by engaging with methodological 
issues which need to be considered if any reformulation is to go beyond the confines of 
classical DT.  In terms of structure/agency, I followed Cardoso’s approach in that the two 
elements of any explanation, agents and structures, could be conceived of in an either/or 
type sense where one is placed at the centre of analysis and the other to varying degrees 
excluded, or they could more usefully be thought of as fundamentally interrelated.  This 
approach was put forward because a long-standing complaint with Frank’s DT was that 
structural determinism pushed agency almost totally out of the picture.  Thus the 
significance of this for the reformulation and subsequent application of DT was that this 
understanding fundamentally ran against the general emphasis on global structures 
considered to be stable over long time-periods and largely determining agency which is 
implicit in much of DT and WST. 
Secondly, the ideal-typical method was argued to be a feasible way of forming 
coherent explanations by specifying what should be understood as generally valid and 
what as conditional on particular identifiable factors.  In a methodological sense, the 
explicit use of an ideal-type is a break with the DT tradition, and the conception of 
dependent development developed here differs from Cardoso’s.  In terms of specific 
political-economic concepts, the DT used here returned to a more classical Marxian 
political economy than the neo-Marxism characteristic of Frank and Wallerstein.  The key 
moderations will be recapped again:  
  
1. It was proposed that the reconstruction of dependent development as an ideal-type 
was a way to get past the reification of centre/periphery.  Rather than aiming to 
identify static and immutable structures, dependency analysis should focus on 
changing relations between centres and peripheries over time; the idealisation was 
offered to serve as the basic description of dependent development and to provide 
a general starting-point from which inquiry into centre/periphery systems can 
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proceed without presuming any particular dynamic of interaction.  In this way the 
idealisation is not supposed to be an exhaustive definition but can serve as a 
starting-point for constructing specific historical narratives.  I suggest that this is 
a methodologically secure way of avoiding the reification of centre/periphery into 
a static structure with an assumed dynamic of interaction expressed as positive 
statements.  This meant that instead of the empirically problematic claim that 
interaction between centres and peripheries is a zero-sum game, open-ended 
questions of reciprocal influence can be addressed.  In this way, the use of 
idealisation suggested itself as a methodological remedy appropriate for DT.  
 
2. Whilst Cardoso’s amendments to the dominant Frankian scheme were important, 
he did not move far enough away from Frank and did not offer enough in terms of 
specific theoretical constructs.  However, I have largely followed Cardoso’s 
outline of an approach which undogmatically looks to the interaction and mutual 
co-constitution of internal and external factors on the premise that this fits well 
with ideal-typical methodology.  By recognizing that some structures are national 
(e.g. planning), some international (e.g. CMEA pricing), and agency is also 
understood to be relevant in both a national and transnational sense, the historical 
analysis tried to chart a middle course in this sense between the two extremes of 
internalism or globalism.  
  
3. To make improvements to the sometimes vague use of concepts, economic 
surplus, and specific ideas derived from it (like competitive and complementary 
development, and intra- and inter- industry trade), were used.  These appeared in 
the historical chapters in order to provide answers to the research questions. Once 
dependent development was defined in the abstract, economic surplus was used 
as a conceptual object towards which to orient empirical study. Remembering the 
significance of the methodological issues raised in chapter 3, structural notions of 
economic surplus were used in the sense of providing entry-points for the 
discussion of agency in relation to them, rather than being invoked as casual 
factors in their own right.  
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3. Dependent Development in the Eastern bloc  
  
Chapter 4 described the relationship between the USSR and the six in terms of the 
changing pattern of international economic relations and how these related to the 
development of the bloc.  It was argued that a coherent narrative of economic development 
can be arrived at via the application of the previously developed theory.  The most 
important result of this was the identification that Soviet-subsidised trade created a 
historically-unique pattern of dependent development for the bloc, and it was suggested 
this was an intended effect of the CMEA price reforms of the 1950s.  A novel 
periodization of the economic history of the region was proposed; specifically, the 
periodization of international economic relations within the bloc and how they related to 
development differs substantively from those positions critiqued in the literature review, 
all of which minimised the significance of the transition of the mid-1950s and the long-
term development pattern this brought forth.  It was shown how several significant 
structural features of the centrally planned economies (e.g. economic inefficiency, lack of 
technological dynamism, varying commitments to reform) interrelated to CMEA and the 
contradictions of Soviet strategy in this regard.  Area studies scholars would most 
probably not disagree with this characterisation, although their own analysis is sometimes 
not based upon clearly stated theoretical ideas, and various other theoretical perspectives 
would disagree with the premises used here.  
This macro-narrative of Eastern bloc development, although researched from 
secondary sources, can be argued to provide a distinct take on the economic history of the 
period.  By centring the account round a theoretically-secured concept of dependent 
development it was possible to go beyond the confines of debating whether subsidisation 
or exploitation was the key dynamic; both were relevant in particular periods, and insights 
from both perspectives can be combined within a dependency-centred account.  The role 
of CMEA trade as a link between the Soviet model of industrial development and energy 
inefficiency is an example where the attention directed to a crucial international 
dimension by DT leads to the reinterpretation of empirical information.  Similarly, the 
international nature of the material basis and influences acting upon agents in the Eastern 
bloc is another angle highlighted by the theoretical frame.  The uneven struggle within 
the Soviet party-state apparatus between technocrats who wanted to raise efficiency, and 
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the leadership who had to consider geopolitics, or the Hungarian large enterprises who 
wanted to monopolise soft CMEA contracts in opposition to the party who pushed for 
modernisation and trade with the West are examples of this.  
The main claim to historical originality comes from the three case-studies, where 
the method and theory were applied to generate specific accounts of how the Soviet 
Union, Hungary and Yugoslavia developed in interaction with their particular 
international contexts.  These showed how a coherent account of how trade related to 
development within the bloc can be achieved once the theoretical framework is applied 
consistently and challenged the suboptimal division of academic labour whereby 
economists attempted to quantify but not interpret the subsidies, while historically-
minded social scientists focused mainly on description.  Having claimed that the tendency 
to overemphasise external conditions as the most significant determinant of an economy’s 
ability to develop is problematic in classical DT, these chapters attempted to show how 
internal and external factors can be seen to interacted and co-determine each other under 
the frame offered by the revised DT framework.  
 
4. Paths for further research  
 
4.1 Empirical 
  
I believe the thesis points to several areas for future research.  Firstly, the theory 
of dependent development used to explain Soviet trade with Eastern Europe could 
potentially be applied to other asymmetric international systems.  There is significant 
scope to study regional development dynamics from this angle, particularly in reference 
to rising powers such as the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China).  These economies are 
increasingly important parts of the world economy, but are no-longer subordinate to the 
US or EU, with whom they stand instead in relations of complex interdependence.  
However, all these states stand in notably asymmetrical relations to their ‘near abroad’, 
and are often more influential pulls on regional development than the West.  Whilst the 
use of an ideal-type was proposed to avoid the problematic claims which classical DT 
made, this emptying out of specific historical content from the theoretical starting-point 
could make the ideal-type general enough to provide a base for analysis of other cases.  
In the case of Russia, such issues are highly topical given the current trade disputes with 
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the EU and their debated impact and significance.  This is not to claim that DT is the only 
theory capable of looking into these phenomena, but it could be used to good effect 
alongside other theoretical frames. 
In general it would be interesting to extend the study to the post-Cold War period 
and look simultaneously at economic relations within the Former Soviet Union, and 
relations among the former members of CMEA.  The legacies of socialism are still 
relevant today for all the transition economies, and the recent massive energy cooperation 
deal between Russia and China leaves little doubt as to the continuing importance of 
energy resources for the Russian economy and Russia’s international policy.  The re-
integration of Eastern Europe and the Baltic republics into the world economy via the EU 
means an alternative development path which was negated during the Cold War is now 
taking place, and meaningful comparisons of the economic performance of the region 
before and after 1989 could potentially be made. 
 
4.2 Theoretical 
 
The reformulation offered here was intended to both serve the purposes of 
elucidating the relationship between trade and development in the Eastern bloc, and to 
potentially be applicable elsewhere.  As such, a significant theoretical issue to be 
considered in terms of potential future research is the question of just how transferable 
the theoretical frame constructed in chapter 3 is.  Remembering why the methodological 
form of the ideal-type was selected to form the basis of this reformulation, and that the 
propositions given were suggested to be the most essential features of the phenomena of 
dependent development within a centre/periphery system, it is necessary to consider the 
precise elements that would make the model applicable (or not) elsewhere. 
A good way to open-up the issue of transferability is to focus in on elements that 
were included in the reformulation explicitly in order to make it suited to the Eastern bloc, 
since these elements may reduce the chances of the type being capable of useful 
application elsewhere.  The most central thing that emerges once this line of investigation 
is taken is that the ideal-type here remains committed to some sort of conception of 
development as analysable within a centre/periphery system, although not in the rigid and 
necessarily global sense meant by classical DT.  The centre/periphery analytical device 
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was given a place in the reformulation on the grounds that CMEA was argued to be well-
suited to analysis from this perspective, in that it had a fairly obvious set of asymmetries 
which made considering the USSR as the centre seem appropriate.  The fact that the 
economies of the bloc explicitly conceptualised themselves as distinct and different from 
capitalist socio-economic forms, and that this proposed difference can be backed-up by 
evidence making clear the peculiar nature of the domestic and international structures 
characteristic of the bloc, further encouraged the use of the centre/periphery model within 
the bloc.  I argued that once the positive statements and determinisms which imbued 
Frank’s centre/periphery paradigm were removed, the analytical device of separating a 
group into two parts in order to study their interaction was highly useful in this case, and 
I hope the historical analysis has made a case for this. 
Accordingly, for the model to be applicable elsewhere, two distinctions need to be 
able to be made with relative clarity; both between a group as a whole and the rest of the 
world economy, and within the group between centre and periphery.  However, such 
relatively discrete regional systems with a clear centre and periphery as the Eastern bloc 
can be argued to have constituted during the Cold War may not be easily identifiable 
elsewhere.  Most importantly, rhetoric aside, there is no-longer a socialist group trading 
substantially between themselves and operating with a fundamentally different logic.  On 
the other hand, certain dynamics of the post-Cold War international system could be said 
to actually enhance the applicability of a model which puts regional economic relations 
at the centre of analysis.  In the polycentric world economy of the 21st century, perhaps 
the scope for such studies would be essentially expanded in that they would put regional 
dynamics alongside global factors, perhaps on an equal footing, in forming explanations 
of development. 
However, the transferability of the framework is not dependent on whether or not 
the centre/periphery paradigm can be employed widely.  Since the problematic of 
dependent development, rather than underdevelopment, was chosen for the reformulation, 
and because this was defined not as an exact concept to be understood in an either/or 
sense, but rather as a general pattern which could occur in various ways and affect 
different economies to varying degrees, this effectively means that the issue of 
asymmetrical international economic relations could potentially be theoretically separated 
from the assumption that such relations are best framed within a centre/periphery 
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paradigm.  I suggest that the notion of dependent development, so long as it is understood 
in a non-dogmatic and ideal-typical way, could survive such a switch of emphasis away 
from the centre/periphery device.  The Yugoslavia chapter has in part shown how this 
could be possible, in that Yugoslav development was shown to be fundamentally 
influenced by international conditions (both in relation to the world economy and 
CMEA), although this was not accomplished by characterising Yugoslavia as ‘peripheral’ 
in the sense meant by Frank or Wallerstein which would have excluded the significance 
of Yugoslavia’s unique domestic features. 
The decision to focus on surplus production and use should mean studies of 
dependent development would be possible where the separations necessary for the 
centre/periphery paradigm to apply are harder to identify.  I argue that in abstaining from 
making any determinist or essentialist declarations on how internal or external factors co-
relate, but instead in following Cardoso’s approach of looking always to the articulation 
of how they are interrelated and co-constituted, space is left for the historical study of how 
the propositions of the type are realised in any number of varying ways.  Once again, if 
the propositions of the type cannot be identified in a given situation, this simply means 
that the type is irrelevant to the case, and therefore not a useful point from which to begin 
the investigation. 
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Appendix  
 
Table 1 – Marrese and Vanous (1983) estimates in millions of 1983 dollars of the size 
and distribution of Soviet implicit trade subsidies to CMEA members, 1960-78 (p.43):  
Year  Bulgaria  Czechos-
lovakia  
East  
Germany 
 
Hungary  Poland  Romania  CMEA 
Six  
Total  
1960 
 
-77.5  67.4  178.7  46.5  52.9  -24.7  243.4  
1961 
 
-72.7  48.8  171.5  64.6  16.2  -44.2  184.1  
1962 
  
-60.5  60.9  212.0  48.0  33.2  -58.5  235.2  
1963 
 
-112.8  37.3  158.1  40.5  28.8  -56.3  95.6  
1964 
  
-101.7  46.0  242.0  35.2  -1.9  -46.5  173.0  
1965 
 
-73.1  92.4  302.9  52.7  13.1  -19.2  368.7  
1966 
 
-96.0  108.9  321.9  56.3  70.5  -27.9  433.7  
1967 
 
-91.2  124.3  260.9  62.3  95.6  -25.4  426.5  
1968 
 
-89.2  162.5  288.1  98.5  110.2  -15.3  554.8  
1969 
 
-54.8  163.3  282.3  93.4  124.1  -23.4  584.9  
1970 
 
6.0  203.1  466.7  158.1  169.5  33.4  1036.7  
1971 
 
-14.7  157.7  426.1  142.1  164.7  36.6  912.5  
1972 
 
-32.6  109.1  329.6  112.6  131.0  11.9  661.7  
1973 
 
159.8  250.3  688.9  226.8  300.4  1.8  1628.2  
1974 
 
1081.3  1174.2  2022.6  876.9  1067.1  42.9  6264.9  
1975 
 
919.3  1096.9  1665.0  597.9  1027.3  19.1  5325.5  
1976 
 
876.8  1195.4  1786.4  671.1  1021.4  45.4  5596.3  
1977 
 
1014.8  1225.5  1896.0  644.6  1106.3  50.4  5937.6  
1978 
 
1087.1  1086.4  1913.9  660.6  897.0  109.1  5754.1  
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Table 2  Soviet fuel structure (Shabad, 1969, p.6):  
  
  1945  1950  1955  1958  1960  1965  
Petroleum  15.0  17.4  21.1  26.3  30.5  35.9  
Natural 
gas  
2.3  2.3  2.4  5.5  7.9  15.6  
Coal  62.2  66.1  64.8  58.8  53.9  42.9  
Peat  4.9  4.8  4.3  3.4  2.9  1.7  
Oil shale  0.2  0.4  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.8  
Firewood  15.4  9.0  6.7  5.3  4.1  3.1  
  
  
  
  
Table 4 – Comparative production efficiency statistics between Eastern and Western 
Europe (Winiecki, 1988, p.7:)  
  
Countries  Energy intensity in 1979 
(in kg of coal equivalent 
consumption per 1000 US 
dollars of GDP)  
Steel intensity in 1980 (in 
kg of steel consumption 
per 1000 US dollars of 
GDP)  
Planned economies      
Bulgaria  1464  87  
Czechoslovakia  1290  132  
Hungary  1058  88  
GDR  1356  88  
Poland USSR  1515  135  
Unweighted average  1362  135  
West  European 
 market economies  
  111  
Austria  603  39  
Belgium  618  36  
Denmark  502  30  
Finland  767  40  
France  502  42  
FRG  565  52  
Italy  655  79  
Norway  1114  38  
Sweden  713  44  
Switzerland  371  26  
UK  820  38  
Unweighted average  660  42  
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Table 7 Soviet intra-industry trade with CMEA and the rest of the world (sourced from 
Drabek and Greenaway, 1984, p.461):  
  
Year   USSR intra-industry trade 
with:  
World  CMEA  
58  41  26  
59  40  24  
60  40  26  
61  37  29  
62  35  26  
63  40  25  
64  39  25  
65  39  24  
66  36  27  
67  33  27  
68  34  26  
69  34  26  
70  37  27  
71  38  30  
72  37  31  
73                34                      29  
  
  
Table 8 – Soviet and US growth statistics (reproduced from Lane, 1985, p.51):  
  
Year  Population  
(millions)  
  
Russia/USSR  
  
  
  
USA  
GMP per  
capita (1975 
dollars)  
Russia/USSR  
  
  
  
USA  
SovietUSA 
ratio  
(per cent)  
1913  157.9  97.2  600  2,500  24  
1928  151.1  120.5  629  2,931  21  
1940  195.1  132.1  904  3,182  28  
1950  180.1  152.3  1,213  4,315  28  
1960  214.3  180.7  1,838  4,993  37  
1965  230.9  194.3  2,182  5,882  37  
1970  242.8  204.9  2,722  6,523  42  
1975  254.5  213.6  3,088  6,972  44  
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Table 9 Soviet freight (sourced from Bater, 1989, p.234):  
  
  1917  1928  1940  1960  1980  1986  
Rail  63.0  93.4  420.7  1,504.3  3,439.9  3,834.5  
Sea  7.7  9.3  24.9  131.5  848.2  969.7  
Canal  15.0  15.9  36.1  99.6  244.9  255.6  
Pipeline– 0.01  
oil  
0.7  3.8  51.2  1,216.0  1,401.3  
Pipeline– -  
gas  
-  -  12.6  596.0  1,240.0  
Road  0.1  0.2  8.9  98.5  432.1  488.5  
Air  -  -  0.02  0.6  3.1  3.4  
Total  85.8  119.5  494.4  1,898.3  6,781.1  8,193.0  
  
 
 
 
 
 Table 12 – Hungarian imports (sourced from Berend and Ránki, 1985, p.278):  
 
  1938  1950  1960  1970  1980  
Fuels and energy  
  
}73.1  }72.7  
  
8.5  7.3  14.8  
Raw materials and 
semi-manufactures  
  
 54.4  50.2  49.2  
Machinery  
  
10.6  22  21.7  21.6  19.3  
Industrial 
consumer goods  
8.8  1.5  5.7  9.8  8.3  
  
Food  7.5  3.8  9.7  11.1  8.4  
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Table 13 – Hungarian exports (sourced from Brened and Ranki, 1985, p.278):  
  
 1938 1950 1960 1970 1980 
Fuels and energy 
 
}23.5 }17.5 1.5 1 4.1 
Raw materials and 
semi-manufactures 
 
24.6 29 31.2 
Machinery 
 
9.3 23 33.6 26 26.2 
Industrial consumer 
goods 
 
10.2 20.3 18.2 21 16.1 
Food 57 39.2 22.1 23 22.4 
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Table 15 – Hungarian and Czechoslovakian intra-industry trade by SITC category 
(sourced from Drabek and Greenway, 1984):  
  
SITC group  Cz. 1964  Cz. 1977  H. 1964  H. 1977  
5  58  52  42  56  
6  51  50  63  66  
7  64  72  73  87  
8  51  61  39  77  
5-8  55  56  51  70  
  
This table describes trade in the following Standard International Trade Classification 
(SITC) commodity types: SITC 5 = chemicals, SITC 6 = manufactured goods, SITC 7 = 
machinery, SITC 8-9 = miscellaneous manufactures.  The Hungarian data is only for 
European CMEA trade, while the Czechoslovakian data also includes non-European 
CMEA trade, although this was fairly insubstantial.  A near 1 score means intra- 
specialization, while a near 0 score means inter- specialization was predominant.  
  
 
 
 
Table 16 – Hungarian SITC 7 category exports to USSR and OECD countries (sourced 
from Richter, 1989, p.41):  
  
Destination  Years   Hungarian  SITC  7  
exports  
USSR  1971-75  40.4  
  1976-80  44.7  
  1981-85  41.6  
  1986  46.0  
OECD  1971-75  7.8  
  1976-80  11.8  
  1981-85  10.8  
                                                1986 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
11.0  
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Table 17 – Productivity and population 
statistics for Yugoslavian Republics (sourced 
from Lydall, 1989, p.188):  
 
Region  Resident 
population 
(000)  
Real social 
product per 
capita  
Output per 
worker in 
the public 
sector  
Net personal income 
per worker in public 
sector:  
Nominal             Real  
Slovenia  1,871  179  145  145  124  
Croatia  4,437  117  106  108  102  
Vojvodina  1,977  133  103  92  101  
Bosnia 
 and 
Herzegovina  
4,155  80  85  87  96  
Serbia  5,574  94  93  93  93  
Montenegro  604  80  90  81  84  
Kosovo  1,760  36  69  73  89  
Macedonia  1,954  75  75  70  80  
Yugoslavia  22,334  100  100  100  100  
 
Table 18 – Yugoslav exports and imports by category (soured from Lydall, 1989, p.178):  
  
  Exports  Imports   
Food, drink and tobacco  10.8  5.2   
Non-petroleum raw materials  5.3  11.7   
Petroleum  2.5  26.5   
Chemicals  10.9  13.0   
Semi-proceeded products  22.4  15.4   
Machinery  and  transport  
equipment  
30.1  25.4   
Other finished goods  17.6  2.7   
Unclassified  0.4  0.1   
  
Total  100  100  
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Table 19 – Yugoslavian exports and imports by region (sourced from Lydall, 1989, p.177):  
  
  Exports 
1979  
  
1984  
  
1987  
Imports 
1979  
  
1984  
  
1987  
Developed 
market 
economies  
46.0  36.5  50.1  66.3  47.5  57.4  
  
Socialist  
economies  
  
…of which 
USSR  
42.3  
  
  
21.6  
47.0  
  
  
27.3  
35.4  
  
  
19.4  
27.7  
  
  
13.9  
34.7  
  
  
17.4  
30.2  
  
  
15.3  
  
Developing 
countries  
16.3  16.4  14.5  15.0  24.0  12.4  
  
  
Table 20 – Yugoslavian exports by SITC category (sourced from Richter, 1989, p.29):  
  
  SITC 0,1,4  SITC 2  SITC 3  SITC 5,6,7,8  
1971-75  2.6  18.2  33.4  5.6  
1976-80  1.4  24.7  44.8  6.6  
1981-85  2.8  25.3  40.3  8.4  
1986  1.1  28.1  34.4  8.5  
 
